Tag: 24H+ ECONOMY PROGRAMME

 

WILL PRESIDENT MAHAMA’S 24H+ PROGRAMME SUCCEED?

ARTICLE 5 – CONSTRUCTION

BUILD24 SUB-PROGRAMME

BY

HANS PETER RECKLING

WEBSITE: https://recklingenterprise.com

 

BEFORE WE GET TO THE ANALYSIS, HERE IS A SHORT SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER CONCERNING THE BUILD24 SUB-PROGRAMME

BUILD24 – Infrastructure Backbone of the 24H+ Programme

BUILD24 is the infrastructure-focused sub-programme within Ghana’s 24H+ framework. Its goal is to provide the physical foundation needed to unlock productivity and attract investment. The emphasis is on transport, energy, water, digital connectivity, and social infrastructure       that enable the other pillars of the programme (like GROW24 and MAKE24) to function.

Main Components:

• Transport & Logistics: Roads, bridges, rail links, and modernised ports to reduce costs and connect industrial and agricultural zones.
• Energy: Expanding and stabilising the power grid, with renewable inputs to support industrial parks and manufacturing hubs.
• Water & Irrigation: Dams, boreholes, and irrigation systems to support agriculture and resilience against climate stress.
• Digital Infrastructure: Broadband expansion, fibre-optic corridors, and data centres to support innovation and service delivery.

Social Facilities: Affordable housing, schools, and health centres around new growth hubs to anchor communities.

Challenges:
Land acquisition, high financing costs, weak maintenance culture, coordination gaps across ministries, and the risk of over-concentration of projects in certain regions.

Potential Impact:
If implemented as planned, BUILD24 could reduce structural bottlenecks, make Ghana more competitive for investment, and enable long-term industrialisation. But success depends on sustainable financing, transparency, and balanced regional rollout.

Overlap Across Sub-Programmes

1. Shared Challenges

• Land acquisition & tenure issues → Affects farms (GROW24), factories (MAKE24), and infrastructure sites (BUILD24).
• Financing gaps → All three rely on large, long-term investment with high upfront costs.
• Capacity & skills shortages → Farmers need training (GROW24), workers need technical skills (MAKE24), and engineers/contractors are scarce (BUILD24).
• Regional imbalance → Tendency to cluster projects around Volta/Lake Volta corridor, leaving other regions under-served.

1. Shared Solutions

• Public–private partnerships (PPPs) to spread costs.
• Land reforms to secure access for agriculture, industry, and infrastructure.
• Capacity building & training through technical institutes and community programmes.
• Integrated planning (corridors, clusters, hubs) instead of scattered projects.

1. How They Depend on Each Other

• GROW24 (Agriculture): Needs irrigation, storage facilities, and rural roads — provided by BUILD24.
• MAKE24 (Industry): Needs stable power, industrial parks, and transport corridors — all under BUILD24.
• BUILD24 (Infrastructure): Only makes sense if farms (GROW24) and factories (MAKE24) are ready to use the infrastructure.

SUMMARY PRODUCED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI).

WE SEE IN THE SUMMARY THAT IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED, BUILD24 COULD SOLVE A LOT OF PROBLEMS GHANA HAD IN THE PAST AND STILL HAS RIGHT NOW. THE QUESTION ARISING IS WHETHER IT CAN REALISTICALLY BE IMPLEMENTED COMPLETELY, CONSIDERING THE CHALLENGES BUILD24 AND THE OTHER SUB-PROGRAMMES ARE FACING. ALL THREE, GROW24, MAKE24, AND BUILD24, – AND AS WE WILL LATER SEE, NEARLY ALL THE OTHER SUB-PROGRAMMES – ARE AFFECTED BY LAND ISSUES, FINANCING DIFFICULTIES, AND CAPACITY AND SKILLS SHORTAGES. AND THE SOLUTIONS THE GOVERNMENT OFFERS MAY SOUND NICE IN THEORY, BUT THE REALITY IS MUCH MORE COMPLICATED. APART FROM THE FINANCING ISSUE, AT WHICH WE LOOK LATER WHEN WE EXAMINE THE FUND24 SUB-PROGRAMME, THE SUB-PROGRAMME ARE SO CLOSELY LINKED THAT PROBLEMS IN ONE SUB-PROGRAMME CAN EASILY AFFECT ONE OR MORE OF THE OTHERS.

WE SEE IT IN THE CASE OF BUILD24 THAT IT ONLY MAKE SENSE IF THE FARMS AND FACTORIES ARE READY TO USE IT. THE QUESTION IS – WILL WE ESTABLISH THE FARMS AND FACTORIES FIRST AND THEN BUILD THE INFRASTRUCTURE AROUND IT? THAT WOULD MEAN THAT FARMS AND FACTORIES CAN ONLY PRODUCE EFFECTIVELY WHEN THE INFRASTRUCTURE IS READY; THEY MUST WAIT FOR IT. OR WE START BUILDING ALL THE THREE AT THE SAME TIME. THAT SHOWS THAT IF ANY PROJECT OF GROW24 OR MAKE24 IS FASTER THAN THE PROJECT OF BUILD24, IT MUST WAIT FOR THE BUILD24 PROJECT TO BE COMPLETED. THAT WOULD PRODUCE IN ANY WAY A LOSS OF TIME FOR GROW24 OR MAKE24. IT SEEMS THAT THERE IS NO PLAN TO COORDINATE THE VARIOUS PROJECTS AND SUB-PROGRAMMES.

EVEN THE INTEGRATED PLANNING WHICH IS SUGGESTED IN THE 24H+ PROGRAMME CAN ONLY HELP PARTIALLY. LET’S HAVE A LOOK AT THE DEFINITION OF INTEGRATED PLANNING:

Integrated planning is a cross-functional approach that aligns resources, stakeholders,     and strategic goals to ensure effective decision-making and resource allocation across an organization or   project.

INTEGRATED PLANNING IN THAT SENSE CANNOT SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS IN THE COORDINATION BETWEEN GROW24, MAKE24, AND BUILD24. IT CAN ONLY SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE MANY OF THE KEY DIFFICULTIES IF IMPLEMENTED PROPERLY. IT CAN SOLVE THE FOLLOWING:

— DUPLICATION OF EFFORTS – OVERLAPPING INFRASTRUCTURE OR INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS AT THE SAME TIME;

— RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

— DATA AND MONITORING;

— REGIONAL BALANCE (WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT WANTS TO ACHIEVE THIS IS A DIFFERENT QUESTION. I HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT THE REGIONAL IMBALANCE OF THE 24H+ PROGRAMME).

WHAT INTEGRATED PLANNING CANNOT SOLVE IS THE FOLLOWING: INSTITUTIONAL, POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REALITIES CAN LIMIT PROPER IMPLEMENTATION.

—- INSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTATION;

— FUNDING DISPARITIES;

— HUMAN RESOURCE GAPS;

— POLITICAL AND REGIONAL PRESSUES.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 24H+ ECONOMY SECRETARIAT CAN HELP SOLVING THESE ISSUES, AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS MOVED TO CONVERT IT INTO A STATUTORY AUTHORITY, BUT UNTIL NOW IT HAS ONLY PASSED THE CABINET, AND IS STILL TO BE APPROVED BY PARLIAMENT. IN MY OPINION, THE PROCEDURE LASTS A LITTLE BIT TOO LONG FOR THE AMBITIOUS OVERALL PROJECT THE GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO ESTABLISH WITH THE 24H+ PROGRAMME. AND EVEN IF – WHEN – THE 24H+ ECONOMY SECRETARIAT IS APPROVED BY PARLIAMENT, IT CANNOT SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS WHICH OCCUR WITH THE ATTEMPTED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUB-PROGRAMMES INCLUDED BUILD24. ALL THE SUB-PROGRAMMES – PERHAPS EXCEPT FUND24 – NEED LEADERSHIP CONTINUITY, INSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINE, AND MERIT-BASED MANAGEMENT.

LEADERSHIP CONTINUITY INVOLVES POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY, WHICH GHANA HAS ONLY SHOWN PARTIALLY IN THE PAST. POLITICAL CYCLES – PARTY CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT – HAVE USUALLY INTERRUPTED CONTINUITY, ALTHOUGH IN SOME SECTORS, E.G. EDUCATION AND COCOA – HAVE SHOWN SOME KIND OF INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY.

ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE SOME EXAMPLES OF DISCONTINUITY. THESE ARE

— AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMMES,

— INDUSTRIALISATION INITIATIVES,

— LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND DECENTRALISATION,

— YOUTH EMPLOYMENT AND SKILLS PROGRAMMES.

WE SEE THAT THESE SECTORS WHICH SHOWED DISCONTIMUITY IN THE PAST ARE JUST THE ONES COVERED BY THE 24H+ ECONOMY PROGRAMME. FOR THE PROGRAMME IT MEANS THAT THE PROGRAMME MUST BE INSTITUTIONALISED AS LONG AS PUBLIC INTEREST AND DONOR ATTENTION ARE HIGH. THAT IN TURN MEANS  THAT THE PROGRAMME MUST BE EMBEDDED IN A LAW – PROBABLY THROUGH THELAW – PROBABLY THROUGH THE 24H ECONOMY AUTHORITY ACT -, THAT THERE MUST BE A TECHNOCRATIC MANAGEMENT TEAM WHICH OUTLASTS ELECTIONS. AND THERE MUST BE THE BUILDING OF BROAD BIPARTISAN SUPPORT.

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT COMPONENT TO IMPLEMENT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IS TO ELIMINATE OR AT LEAST MINIMISE CORRUPTION. SOME PEOPLE WILL SAY THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE TECHNOCRATIC MANAGEMENT TEAM. I SEE THE PROBLEM, BUT I ALSO SAY THAT IT IS POSSIBLE  IF TECHNOCRACY IS LEGALLY PROTECTED, DIGITALLY TRANSPARENT, PUBLICLY MONITORED , AND MORALLY REWARDED. CORRUPTION MUST NO LONGER BE PART OF GHANAIAN CULTURE, GHANA MUST COMMIT TO

— GENUINE TECHNOCRATIC MANAGEMENT IN MAJOR PROGRAMMES,

— FULL DIGITALISATION OF STATE FUNCTIONS,

— CONSISTENT SANCTIONS FOR ABUSE.

(DETAILS CAN FOLLOW IN A POSSIBLE DISCUSSION.)

THE LAST QUESTION IN THIS CONTEXT IS WHETHER GHANA IS READY TO MINIMISE CORRUPTION, BECAUSE THAT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WHOLE 24H+ PROGRAMME.

ON PAPER, GHANA IS SURELY READY, BUT IN PRACTICE, THERE IS A LOT TO BE DONE. THE BOTTLENECK IS IN APPLICATION OF THE EXCELLENT THEORIES AND THE CONSISTENCY OF THE R. DETAILS FOR THIS CAN ALSO FOLLOW IN A POSSIBLE DISCUSSION. THEREFORE, THE CONCLUSION IS THAT GHANA’S SYSTEMS ARE READY, THE COUNTRY ITSELF NOT YET.

LET US NOW GO TO INSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINE AND MERIT-BASED MANAGEMENT.

INSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINE MEANS THAT INSTITUTIONS GUIDE           DECISIONS, ENFORCE RULES, AND ENSURES CONSISTENCY. IN BRIEF IT MEANS THAT SYSTEMS WORK ACCORDING TO RULES, NOT PERSONALITIES. HOW FAR THIS IMPLIES FOR THE VARIOUS SUB-PROGRAMMES IS LEFT FOR A POSSIBLE DISCUSSION.

MERIT-BASED MANAGEMENT MEANS THAT APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS, AND LEADERSHIP ROLES ARE GIVEN TO COMPETENT PROFESSIONALS BASED ON SKILLS, QUALIFICATIONS, AND PERFORMANCE, NOT POLITICAL LOYALTY. PEOPLE MANAGE THE PROGRAMME BECAUSE THEY ARE GOOD ON THE JOB, NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE IN THE RIGHT PARTY. (DETAILS AS USUAL) BOTH PRINCIPLES ARE COMPLEMENTARY.

NOW THE QUESTION MUST AUTOMATICALLY COME UP WHETHER GHANA IS READY FOR THESE PRINCIPLES. THE RESULT OF MY RESEARCH IS THAT THE BARRIER IN GHANA IS NOT THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, BUT THE POLITICISATION OF ADMINISTRATION. GHANREQUIRES A SHIFT OF THE POLITICAL MINDSET. THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP MUST VALUE THESE PRINCIPLES THERE MUST ALSO BE A CULTURAL SHIFT AWAY FROM CONNECTIONS OVER COMPETENCE. BUT THERE IS HOPE, AS

— PERFORMANCE METRICS ARE DEBATED ONLINE,

— INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM IS EXPOSING FAVOURITISM,

— CIVIL SERVANTS ARE FORMING PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS.

WE SEE THAT THE OLD CULTURE STILL PERSISTS, BUT THERE IS HOPE FOR A BETTER FUTURE. IF THIS BETTER FUTURE COMES EARLY ENOUGH FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 24H+ ECONOMY PROGRAMME IS LEFT TO BE SEEN.

AS WE HAVE SEEN THAT THE FUNDAMENTALS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS ARE THE SAME FOR ALL SUB-PROGRAMMES EXCEPT FUND24, I WILL COMBINE SHOW24, CONNECT24, ASPIRE24, AND GO24 IN ONE ARTICLE, AND THEN CONCENTRATE ON ANALYSING FUND24 AND THEN A CONCLUDING ARTICLE WHICH CAPTURES THE IF, HOW AND  .WHEN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WHOLE 24H+ ECONOMY PROGRAMME.

 

WILL PRESIDENT MAHAMA’S 24H+ ECONOMY PROGRAMME SUCCEED?

ARTICLE 6

SHOW24, CONNECT24, ASPIRE24, GO24

BY

HANS PETER RECKLING

WEBSITE: https://recklingenterprise.com

 

 

The Social Transformation Wing of the 24H+ Programme: An Integrated Analysis of SHOW24, CONNECT24, ASPIRE24, and GO24

Executive Summary

The social transformation wing of Ghana’s 24H+ Programme — comprising SHOW24, CONNECT24, ASPIRE24, and GO24 — aims to reshape public attitudes, strengthen civic engagement, and promote unity as foundations for sustainable national development. Conceptually, it is one of the most innovative aspects of the 24H+ framework, linking social change to economic transformation.

However, implementation realities expose deep structural and behavioural constraints. Weak inter-ministerial coordination, irregular funding, and limited monitoring systems undermine effectiveness. Public mistrust of government communication further reduces engagement, while politicisation risks turning programmes like SHOW24 and GO24 into partisan instruments. The absence of credible leadership by example also limits the moral authority needed to drive mindset change.

While these initiatives could in theory promote transparency, participation, and social cohesion, in practice they remain vulnerable to institutional inertia and political volatility. Unless Ghana addresses these systemic weaknesses, the social pillar of the 24H+ Programme may remain its weakest link — visionary in design but constrained by a political and societal environment not yet ready for deep behavioural transformation.

1. Introduction

The Government of Ghana’s 24H+ Programme presents an ambitious vision of an economy and society that function productively around the clock. While its economic and infrastructural components — such as GROW24, BUILD24, and MAKE24 — target production, employment, and investment, a parallel set of initiatives focuses on the social and behavioural transformation required to sustain this vision. These are SHOW24, CONNECT24, ASPIRE24, and GO24 — collectively referred to as the social transformation wing of the 24H+ framework.

Their mission is to change attitudes, promote civic engagement, and build a shared sense of national purpose. However, as this paper argues, these objectives, though laudable, face deep structural, institutional, and socio-political barriers. Without a cultural environment and governance system prepared for such transformation, these sub-programmes risk remaining largely symbolic.

1. Shared Objectives and Core Philosophy

The four social sub-programmes were conceived to work in synergy to influence mindsets and encourage citizen participation in national transformation.

• SHOW24 is intended to publicise progress and achievements under the 24H+ agenda, building transparency and national pride.
• CONNECT24 aims to link citizens, communities, and institutions through digital platforms and participatory networks.
• ASPIRE24 focuses on motivation, work ethics, and leadership development, especially among youth and professionals.
• GO24 uses sports and culture to promote unity, discipline, and social inclusion.

Together, they seek to cultivate a society that is productive, cohesive, and values-driven, supporting the economic pillars of the 24H+ programme.

Yet, this ideal assumes a level of institutional discipline, civic trust, and coordination that Ghana’s public sector and political culture have struggled to achieve. The underlying philosophy of these sub-programmes — that behavioural change can be engineered through top-down government initiatives — remains ambitious but potentially unrealistic within the current social context.

1. Implementation Framework

Implementation of the social transformation wing rests on a mix of communication, digital engagement, education, and community mobilisation. SHOW24 depends heavily on public broadcasting and information campaigns; CONNECT24 on digital platforms and data systems; ASPIRE24 on mentorship, training, and value reorientation; and GO24 on sports and cultural mobilisation.

In theory, these mechanisms are mutually reinforcing. In practice, however, their implementation has been uneven. Institutional fragmentation — with responsibilities scattered across the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the NCCE, and the 24H+ Secretariat — has led to overlaps and slow coordination.

Moreover, these initiatives depend on sustained funding from FUND24, which itself faces delays and political contestation. Most community-level activities have either not started or operate only in pilot forms, undermining visibility and public confidence. The digital tools envisioned under CONNECT24, though innovative on paper, remain largely conceptual due to weak technical infrastructure and inconsistent internet access across regions.

1. Shared Challenges

While all 24H+ sub-programmes face structural bottlenecks, the social transformation pillar is p7articularly vulnerable because it relies on intangible outcomes such as behavioural change and civic participation — areas where Ghana’s governance culture faces persistent challenges.

1. Coordination and Bureaucratic Inefficiency
   The lack of a unified management framework undermines inter-ministerial collaboration. Competition for visibility among ministries has occasionally replaced cooperation, and the absence of clear performance benchmarks makes accountability difficult.
2. Funding Shortfalls and Delays
   FUND24’s budgetary constraints have been widely reported, and the social components are often the first to suffer cuts. Without predictable financing, campaigns and training initiatives stall, leaving communication efforts sporadic and disjointed.
3. Public Skepticism and Behavioural Resistance
   Deep-rooted mistrust of government programmes, shaped by decades of political inconsistency, hampers citizen buy-in. Many Ghanaians view initiatives like SHOW24 or ASPIRE24 as rhetorical exercises rather than genuine empowerment tools. Changing public attitudes requires not only communication but also demonstrable improvements in governance integrity and service delivery.
4. Weak Monitoring and Evaluation Systems
   There are no reliable indicators for measuring “mindset change” or “national pride.” Without baseline data and independent evaluation, it is almost impossible to assess progress. Consequently, feedback loops are weak, and lessons are seldom institutionalised.
5. Politicisation and Media Capture
   The communication-based nature of SHOW24 and GO24 exposes them to political influence. Instead of promoting nonpartisan civic messages, they risk becoming extensions of government propaganda. Such politicisation would erode the credibility of the entire 24H+ framework.
6. Societal Readiness
   Finally, Ghana’s socio-political context — characterised by patronage politics, institutional weakness, and uneven civic discipline — raises doubts about the society’s readiness for the type of behavioural transformation envisioned. Without credible leadership by example, the call for attitudinal change may not resonate.
7. Expected Impacts and Realistic Prospects

If implemented effectively, the four sub-programmes could provide an important social foundation for Ghana’s transformation. SHOW24 could enhance transparency, CONNECT24 could democratise participation, ASPIRE24 could cultivate ambition and professionalism, and GO24 could promote unity through sports and culture.

However, given the systemic weaknesses described above, the likely outcome in the short to medium term is partial or symbolic success. Visibility may improve, some communication channels may be established, and a few youth initiatives may succeed, but deep behavioural transformation will require generational consistency — something Ghana’s changing political landscape rarely provides.

Without institutional insulation from political cycles and clear performance metrics, these sub-programmes risk becoming another set of well-intentioned policies that fade with administrative transitions.

1. Policy and Strategic Recommendations

1. Establish a Single Social Transformation Coordination Unit:
   Create a central coordinating mechanism within the 24H+ Secretariat that consolidates all communication, civic, and cultural activities, ensuring accountability and resource efficiency.
2. Secure Dedicated Funding Windows:
   Allocate stable, multi-year funding for mindset and civic education projects, protected from short-term political and fiscal fluctuations.
3. Develop Measurable Social Indicators:
   Introduce quantifiable metrics — such as civic participation indices, volunteerism rates, or digital engagement levels — to track impact.
4. Depoliticise Public Communication:
   Maintain editorial independence for SHOW24 content and require transparent reporting standards to prevent political bias.
5. Strengthen Local Partnerships:
   Engage civil society, private media, schools, and community leaders to deliver programmes. Top-down government campaigns alone cannot reshape values.
6. Leadership by Example:
   Visible ethical conduct by political and institutional leaders is essential. No communication campaign can succeed without credible role models at the top.

1. Conclusion

The social transformation wing of the 24H+ Programme — embodied in SHOW24, CONNECT24, ASPIRE24, and GO24 — represents a crucial yet fragile dimension of Ghana’s national development agenda. Its conceptual foundation is sound: economic progress must rest on civic responsibility, national unity, and ethical conduct. But the gulf between concept and reality remains wide.

Persistent weaknesses in coordination, funding, and political neutrality threaten to render these initiatives symbolic rather than transformative. Ghana’s governance culture still struggles with partisanship, limited institutional discipline, and a public that often doubts the sincerity of official programmes. Under such conditions, the behavioural and mindset change envisioned by the 24H+ designers is unlikely to materialise quickly.

Unless government institutions demonstrate consistency, credibility, and measurable results, the social pillar could become the weakest link in the 24H+ framework — strong in rhetoric, but shallow in implementation. The 24H+ idea remains visionary, but Ghana’s readiness to realise it, particularly on the social front, remains uncertain.

(THIS ARTICLE WAS PRODUCED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE – AI)

 

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FUND24 serves as the financial core of Ghana’s 24H+ Economy Programme, intended to mobilise and coordinate national and external financing for all associated sub-programmes. Its overarching goal is to create a transparent, diversified, and sustainable development-finance system that reduces dependence on short-term borrowing and aligns fiscal resources with long-term national priorities.

At the centre of FUND24 lies the proposed National Development Financing Mechanism (NDFM) — a framework designed to unify institutions such as the Development Bank Ghana (DBG), the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund (GIIF), and the Ghana EXIM Bank under one coordinated financing strategy. Yet, as of late 2025, the NDFM remains largely conceptual: institutional fragmentation, weak fiscal space, and limited regulatory alignment delay its full operationalisation.

The government’s revenue-mobilisation intentions—anchored in the Medium-Term Revenue Strategy (MTRS 2024–2027) and the Sustainable Financing Framework (2021)—focus on five pillars: tax reform and digitalisation, natural-resource revenue stabilisation, public-asset optimisation, green-bond issuance, and diaspora-investment mobilisation. While ambitious, these measures face persistent structural constraints, notably a narrow tax base, enforcement weaknesses, and exposure to commodity-price volatility.

FUND24’s success will depend on the effective integration of existing financial institutions, transparent fund allocation, and consistent political commitment. Current trends suggest that full operational functionality may not be achieved before 2027, meaning the broader 24H+ Programme will remain financially fragmented in the near term. The experience of the Ghana–China Business Summit (June 2025)—where several MoUs are still awaiting implementation—illustrates how long it typically takes for policy agreements to mature into tangible investment.

A robust FUND24 will require a legal and institutional consolidation process, creation of a central development-finance account, and strong digital oversight through real-time monitoring systems. If these reforms are successfully enacted between 2026 and 2028, FUND24 could evolve into Ghana’s first integrated national financing mechanism. If not, the 24H+ Economy risks remaining a conceptual framework without sufficient fiscal traction.

FUND24 — Financing the 24H+ Economy

1. Core Purpose

FUND24 is conceived as the financial pillar of Ghana’s 24H+ Economy Programme — the sub-programme responsible for mobilising, coordinating, and sustaining financial resources across all 24H+ initiatives. It aims to create a stable, transparent, and diversified financial foundation for Ghana’s transition toward a productive, export-driven, and continuously operating economy.

1. Historical and Policy Background

Ghana’s development finance landscape has long been fragmented, marked by dependence on external borrowing, commodity export revenues, and donor inflows.
Institutions such as the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund (GIIF), the Ghana EXIM Bank, and the Development Bank Ghana (DBG) were established to expand access to long-term capital, but have largely operated in isolation, with overlapping mandates and uncoordinated funding pipelines.

FUND24 intends to reverse this pattern by establishing a National Development Financing Mechanism (NDFM) — a unified structure to align financial flows, harmonise institutional mandates, and coordinate both public and private investment in line with the 24H+ strategy.
This effort fits within Ghana’s IMF-supported fiscal reform agenda and the Medium-Term Revenue Strategy (MTRS 2024–2027), both of which emphasise domestic resource mobilisation, fiscal discipline, and sustainable debt management.

1. Strategic Objectives

• Build a diversified, sustainable financing structure combining domestic, concessional, and private capital sources.
• Reduce reliance on short-term borrowing and strengthen access to affordable long-term finance.
• Institutionalise fiscal transparency and accountability through digital monitoring systems.
• Attract private, diaspora, and international investment into infrastructure, industry, and innovation.
• Promote financial inclusion and SME access to credit via risk-sharing and guarantee mechanisms.
• Initial efforts under the IMF programme to improve revenue predictability and transparency.

But in practice, no unified operational allocation system exists yet. Financing decisions remain sectoral and project-based, without central coordination under FUND24.

 

1. The National Development Financing Mechanism (NDFM): Policy vs. Reality

The NDFM is meant to act as the central coordination hub of Ghana’s development finance ecosystem — linking the Ministry of Finance, GIIF, DBG, EXIM Bank, and other agencies.
As of late 2025, however, it remains conceptually defined but not yet institutionally realised.

Key institutional realities:

1. Development Bank Ghana (DBG) – Disbursed over GH₵600 million to SMEs and agriculture in 2024, but governance issues (board dissolution in 2025) disrupted confidence.
2. GIIF – Secured US$75 million from the AfDB to expand infrastructure financing; effective but limited in scale.
3. Integrated National Financing Framework (INFF) – Designed with UNDP to align financing flows with SDGs; analytical in scope, not yet operational.
4. PPP Programme – Estimated US$37 billion infrastructure gap; progress constrained by investor risk perceptions and slow project structuring.

Assessment:
The NDFM exists in partial form through these institutions, but FUND24’s envisioned unified mechanism has yet to emerge. Institutional integration remains the largest single challenge.

1. Fund Mobilisation and Allocation Framework

The Fund Mobilisation and Allocation Framework under FUND24 seeks to consolidate revenues from the national budget, natural resource proceeds, development banks, and private investors into a single structured pool for strategic allocation.

So far, Ghana has established:

• The INFF and MTRS 2024–2027 as conceptual bases.
• The Sustainable Financing Framework (2021) and Green Finance Taxonomy (2024) for ESG and environmental alignment.
• Initial efforts under the IMF programme to improve revenue predictability and transparency.

But in practice, no unified operational allocation system exists yet. Financing decisions remain sectoral and project-based, without central coordination under FUND24.

 

5A. Revenue Mobilisation Intentions and Analysis

The effectiveness of FUND24 depends fundamentally on Ghana’s ability to generate predictable, sustainable, and diversified domestic revenues to feed into its financing mechanisms.
The government’s revenue mobilisation intentions are embedded in the Medium-Term Revenue Strategy (MTRS 2024–2027), the Sustainable Financing Framework (2021), and the emerging Integrated National Financing Framework (INFF).

Key Revenue Mobilisation Pillars

1. Domestic Tax Reforms

• Expansion of the VAT and e-VAT systemto improve compliance and close loopholes.
• Broadening of the tax base by integrating informal sector actors through digital ID and mobile-money records.
• Enhanced analytics within the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) to curb leakages.

1. Natural Resource Revenues and Royalties

• Improved transparency in gold, oil, and lithiumroyalties through digital tracking.
• A proposed stabilisation bufferwithin FUND24 to shield public investments from commodity price shocks.
• Possible earmarking of part of the gold-for-reserves proceedsfor long-term infrastructure funding.

1. Public Asset Optimisation

• Conversion of dormant state assets into revenue streams via public–private leasing and joint ventures.
• Monetisation of government-owned real estate and digital assets under GIIF.

1. Green and Thematic Financing Instruments

• Issuance of Green, Social, and Sustainability Bonds (GSSBs)under the Sustainable Financing Framework.
• Use of climate finance and carbon creditsto support renewable energy and agriculture projects within GROW24 and BUILD24.

1. Diaspora and Domestic Savings Mobilisation

• Launch of Diaspora Bondsto attract long-term investment from Ghanaians abroad.
• Incentivising pension and insurance funds to channel savings into development projects.

Analytical Assessment

Ghana’s revenue mobilisation agenda is ambitious but uneven in implementation potential.
Structural weaknesses — such as a narrow tax base, limited compliance, and fiscal deficits — constrain the achievable pace. Digitalisation could raise non-oil domestic revenues by 2–3% of GDP by 2027 if consistently enforced, yet GRA capacity and legal enforcement remain weak.

Reliance on natural resource proceeds introduces volatility. Without automatic stabilisation rules and disciplined fund management, windfall revenues could again be lost to short-term fiscal consumption.
Hence, success will depend on institutional coordination, transparent rules, and the depoliticisation of revenue flows.
The government’s ability to demonstrate visible returns on new taxes and bonds will be decisive in building public and investor confidence.

6. Implementation Strategy

• Lead institutions: Ministry of Finance, Bank of Ghana, GIIF, DBG, EXIM Bank.
• Oversight: Proposed 24H+ Financial Steering Committee to approve projects and monitor resource flows.
• Phases:

• Phase I (2025–2026):Institutional consolidation, fiscal mapping, donor coordination.
• Phase II (2027–2028):Expansion through PPPs, diaspora bonds, and blended finance.
• Phase III (2029–2030):Full national integration of financing flows under FUND24.

 

7. Expected Outcomes

• Predictable, transparent, and sustainable financing for all 24H+ sub-programmes.
• Enhanced fiscal discipline and public accountability.
• Greater liquidity for productive sectors and infrastructure.
• Improved investor and donor confidence in Ghana’s development finance ecosystem.

8. Persistent Challenges

• Tight fiscal space and debt-service pressures.
• Overlapping mandates among financial institutions.
• Weak digital integration and information-sharing.
• Inconsistent accountability mechanisms.
• Bureaucratic inertia and political transitions affecting continuity.

9. Integration within the 24H+ Framework

FUND24 is the connective tissue of the 24H+ Programme.
Without it, the other sub-programmes — BUILD24, MAKE24, GROW24, CONNECT24, ASPIRE24, and GO24 — remain financially isolated.
A functioning FUND24 is therefore a precondition for an integrated, scalable, and measurable 24H+ Economy.

10. Implementation Outlook (2025–2030)

Given current fiscal and institutional conditions, the operational realisation of FUND24’s core frameworks — the NDFM and the Fund Mobilisation & Allocation Framework — will likely take 1–2 years.

• Institutional coordination among MoF, GIIF, DBG, EXIM Bank, and NDPC will require at least 12–18 months.
• Fiscal constraints under the IMF programme restrict expansion until 2026.
• Legal and digital systems for FUND24 are still being drafted.
• Political transitions could delay further into 2027.

Comparative example – Ghana–China Business Summit (June 2025):
That summit produced multiple MoUs on industrial parks, energy, and agriculture. Yet as of late 2025, no major investment has materialised beyond feasibility studies — showing that in Ghana’s institutional setting, even high-level MoUs often need 18–24 months before they translate into real projects.
FUND24 faces the same structural test: transforming frameworks into operational investments requires time, coherence, and legal authority.

Analytical summary: 

The groundwork for FUN D24 is being laid, but its financial machinery remains under construction. Until FUND24 becomes operati  onal — realistically not before 2027 — the 24H+ Programme will remain fragmented and under-financed. Its success will test Ghana’s capacity to turn fiscal ambition into institutional delivery.

11. Reform and Poli cy Recommendations (2026–2028)

To convert FUND24 from a  policy design into a functioning national financing mechanism, Ghana must implement targeted reforms across six key areas:

1. Legal and Institutiona l Consolidation

1. Enact a FUND24 Act or Executive Instrument to coordinate all development-finance entities.
2. Clarify roles within the   NDFM to avoid duplication.
3. Empower the NDPC to  enforce financial alignment with national priorities.

1. Fiscal and Financial Int egration

1. Create a Consolidated  Development Finance Account (CDFA) in the Ministry of Finance.
2. Link FUND24 to the MTRS for stable inflows.
3. Introduce a unified financial-tracking system for transparency.

1. Domestic Resource Mobilisation and Private Capital Attraction

1. Operationalise blended-finance instruments such as PPP co-financing and credit guarantees.
2. Issue Diaspora and Green Bonds tied to sustainability frameworks.
3. Engage pension and insurance funds to unlock long-term domestic capital.

1. Digital Oversight and Transparency

1. Build a FUND24 Digital Monitoring Dashboard integrated with GIFMIS.
2. Enable real-time disbursement and performance tracking.
3. Publish annual FUND24 reports to ensure accountability.

1. Capacity Building and Institutional Discipline

1. Apply performance-based budgeting to all 24H+ projects.
2. Strengthen analytical and risk-management capacity in financial agencies.
3. Enforce merit-based leadership across institutions.

1. Political and Policy Stability

1. Anchor FUND24 as a non-partisan mechanism with cross-party oversight.
2. Ensure continuity across electoral cycles via parliamentary monitoring.
3. Institutionalise public–private dialogue forums for stakeholder stability.

Analytical Conclusion

FUND24’s long-term success will depend not on new institutions but on integrating and disciplining existing ones.
The years 2026–2028 will be decisive. If Ghana achieves legal consolidation, fiscal integration, and transparent oversight, FUND24 can evolve from a conceptual framework into a powerful national financing engine.
If reforms lag — as illustrated by the slow conversion of the Ghana–China MoUs into actual investment — the 24H+ Economy will remain financially fragmented and dependent on short-term improvisation.

(This article was written with the assistance of Artificial Intelligence – AI.)

 

The 24H+ Economy: Ghana’s Vision of Transformation Meets the Fiscal Wall

When the government of Ghana unveiled the 24H+ Economy concept, it was presented as nothing less than a new development paradigm. The idea — that Ghana’s economy should function seamlessly day and night, with productive activities distributed across all regions — sought to reposition the country as a logistics and industrial hub for West Africa.

In principle, the framework is compelling. It aligns agriculture (through GROW24), manufacturing (MAKE24), infrastructure (BUILD24), technology and innovation (ASPIRE24), financing (FUND24), and several sectoral initiatives under one integrated umbrella. It promises jobs, export diversification, and balanced regional growth — a formula any economy would envy.

But good economics does not automatically translate into feasible policy. And as the programme moves from concept to execution, the gap between vision and fiscal reality is becoming increasingly visible.

A grand plan in a constrained economy

The 24H+ Economy arrives at a time when Ghana’s public finances are at their most fragile in decades. Following the 2022–2023 debt crisis and the subsequent IMF Extended Credit Facility, the government remains in a tight fiscal corner. Domestic arrears persist, interest payments absorb over half of total revenue, and capital expenditure is chronically underfunded.

Against this background, the 24H+ initiative faces a simple but uncomfortable question: how can a government already struggling to meet basic obligations finance such an expansive programme?

The answer — for now — lies in FUND24, a proposed financing mechanism meant to blend public, private, and external sources. On paper, FUND24 will pool capital from development partners, the private sector, and sovereign resources, using the state as a coordinator rather than a spender. In practice, however, it remains a shell without proven capacity.

The risk is evident: Ghana could replicate the pattern that led to its debt distress in the first place — borrowing for transformation while neglecting fiscal consolidation. Unless the 24H+ framework includes strict safeguards against new debt accumulation, it may inadvertently deepen the country’s financial vulnerability.

The regional imbalance problem

Equally significant is the issue of regional equity. Although the 24H+ Economy is marketed as a nationwide strategy, early signs point to a spatially uneven rollout. Infrastructure investments, pilot industrial clusters, and logistics corridors have been concentrated around Greater Accra, Ashanti, and Central Regions, while northern and coastal peripheries remain largely at the planning stage.

This is not a new story. For decades, Ghana’s economic geography has revolved around a southern growth corridor — from Tema through Kumasi — with the rest of the country lagging behind. The 24H+ framework risks reinforcing this imbalance if its interventions are not deliberately weighted toward disadvantaged regions.

For example, while the Volta Basin agricultural transformation (a component of GROW24) has strong potential to boost northern productivity, financing delays and limited road connectivity have slowed progress. Meanwhile, urban projects under BUILD24 — such as the 24-hour logistics zones and industrial enclaves — are already advancing where the infrastructure is strongest.

The result could be a two-speed transformation: an accelerated southern economy and a periphery left behind, precisely the opposite of what the policy intends.

Institutional inertia and governance fatigue

Beyond finance and geography lies the deeper structural question of institutional capacity. The 24H+ Economy requires seamless coordination between ministries, metropolitan assemblies, and regional administrations — a level of inter-agency discipline Ghana’s bureaucracy rarely achieves.

Project implementation units are under-resourced, and accountability frameworks are still vague. The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), which should play a central monitoring role, lacks the enforcement authority to ensure compliance across sectors. Meanwhile, overlapping mandates among ministries risk producing bureaucratic turf wars rather than synergy.

Moreover, the politicisation of the initiative has blurred its administrative boundaries. The 24H+ Economy has evolved from a technocratic policy instrument into a political narrative — a flagship slogan meant to symbolise economic renewal. As election cycles draw near, the temptation to treat 24H+ as a campaign identity rather than a national development pact will grow stronger.

To be fair, this is not a problem unique to the current administration. Successive governments, regardless of party, have shown a tendency to overpromise transformation while underestimating the fiscal and institutional discipline required to achieve it. There is, in short, bipartisan continuity in the mistakes.

The financing illusion

Even if FUND24 were fully operational, the deeper question remains: what is the private sector’s appetite for large-scale participation in a programme heavily dependent on state facilitation? Ghana’s private sector is already grappling with high interest rates, limited access to long-term finance, and the aftermath of the domestic debt exchange. Expecting it to anchor a major transformation effort without significant risk mitigation may be unrealistic.

Development partners, too, are cautious. With IMF oversight ongoing, new concessional financing must fit within strict debt-sustainability parameters. That leaves little room for the sort of expansive capital spending the 24H+ vision implies.

Unless the government identifies alternative revenue channels, improves tax efficiency, and enforces expenditure control, the financial backbone of 24H+ will remain aspirational.

Why the idea still matters

Yet, dismissing the 24H+ Economy entirely would be shortsighted. The vision of a round-the-clock economy — one that integrates production, logistics, and digital innovation — is strategically sound. It acknowledges that Ghana’s next growth frontier lies not in more resource extraction but in higher productivity across time, space, and sectors.

If properly implemented, GROW24 could stabilise food security; MAKE24 could rebuild local industry; BUILD24 could modernise infrastructure; and ASPIRE24 could foster a culture of innovation. The ambition is right. The weakness lies in the misalignment between ambition and capacity.

What Ghana needs now is a scaled, fiscally realistic version of the 24H+ Economy — one that prioritises catalytic interventions with measurable impact rather than a grand, all-embracing plan. Transparency, regional targeting, and merit-based implementation must take precedence over symbolism.

A call for pragmatic realism

The 24H+ Economy embodies both the promise and the peril of Ghana’s policymaking tradition: bold ideas constrained by financial and institutional reality. The government deserves credit for thinking beyond electoral cycles, yet it must now prove that such thinking can survive them.

Transforming the vision into reality requires radical fiscal honesty, regional fairness, and institutional discipline — virtues that have too often been sacrificed to political convenience. Without them, the 24H+ Economy risks becoming another impressive policy architecture that the state simply cannot afford to build.

(This article was prepared with the assistance of Artificial Intelligence – AI.)