WILL PRESIDENT MAHAMA’S 24H+ PROGRAMME SUCCEED?
ARTICLE 4
AGRI-BUSINESS AND MANUFACTURING
BY
HANS PETER RECKLING
WEBSITE: https://recklingenterprise.com
ALTHOUGH ALL SUB-PROGRAMMES TOGETHER FORM THE 24H+ PROGRAMME OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA, THE AGRI-BUSINESS SUB-PROGRAMME (GROW24) AND THE MANUFACTURING SUB-PROGRAMME (MAKE24) HAVE SOME SPECIAL LINKS. ONE OF THEM IS THE VOLTA BASIN AREA WHICH – UNDER THE GROW24 SUB-PROGRAMME – IS TO BECOME THE AGRICULTURAL CENTER OF GHANA (AGBLEDUWO) AND – WITH MAKE24 IN THE CENTER OF THE PLANS – THE VOLTA ECONOMIC CORRIDOR.
ACCORDING TO THE PROGRAMME, THE VOLTA BASIN AREA IS SUPPOSED TO BECOME THE “BREAD BASKET OF WEST AFRICA” UNTIL 2029, AND THE VOLTA ECONOMIC CORRIDOR WILL BE THE BACKBONE OF THE WHOLE PROGRAMME.
HERE IS WHERE THE PROBLEMS ALREADY START:
— TO ESTABLISH THE VOLTA BASIN AREA AS A BREAD BASKET OF WEST AFRICA UNTIL 2029 IS RATHER TOO AMBITIOUSLY MEASURED. ALREADY THE GENERAL COMPLETION FACES MANY CHALLENGES. WHILE THERE ARE MAINLY FIVE REASON WHY THE OUTCOME IS FEASIBLY POSSIBLE – ABUNDANT LAND AND WATER RESOURCES, EXISTING IRRIGATION/DAMS AND INFRASTRUCTURE POTENTIAL, STRONG POLITICAL WILL (AT LEAST AT THE MOMENT) AND FRAMEWORK, POTENTIAL REGIONAL DEMAND, AND POSSIBLE PRODUCTIVITY GAINS – THERE ARE ALSO A NUMBER OF OBSTACLES. THESE ARE FINANCING AND INVESTMENT SCALE, LAND TENURE, LAND USE AND RIGHTS, WATER AVAILABILITY AND CLIMATE RISK, SOIL QUALITY AND ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS, CAPACITY AND SKILLS, INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOGISTICS ECONOMICS OF SCALE VS, SMALLHOLDER INCLUSION, POLICY COHERENCE, GOVERNANCE, CORRUTION, IMPLEMENTATION RISK, AND REGIONAL COMPETITION.
IT IS TRUE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN ITS PROGRAMME OFFERS SOLUTIONS TO SOME OF THESE OBSTACLES. IT PROPOSES ESTABLISHING COOPERATIVES TO INTEGRATE SMALLHOLDER FARMERS, EXPANDING THE IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND WATER STORAGE, TRAINING OF FARMERS, ETC. THESE ARE GOOD SUGGESTIONS AND INTENTIONS, BUT THE REALISATION MIGHT BE A BIGGER PROBLEM. THIS IS ESPECIALLY THE CASE WHEN WE LOOK AT THE POLITICAL WILL, FINANCING, AND LOCAL COOPERATION . THE POLITICAL WILL MIGHT FADE, THE LONGER THE REALISATION OF GROW24 AND THE WHOLE 24H+ PROGRAMME WILL TAKE. NOT EXACTLY AT THE TOP OF GOVERNMENT AND PARTY, BUT AT THE GRASSROOTS AND THE MID-LEVEL MANAGEMENT. FINANCING IS THE NEXT OBSTACLE; WE WILL SEE WHEN WE GET TO THE CONCERNED SUB-PROGRAMME WHETHER THE SUGGESTIONS PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT WORK, AND IF YES, UNDER WHICH CIRCUMSTANCES.
THE NEXT PROBLEM TO INVESTIGATE IS THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, WITH THE FOCUS ON LAND ACQUISITION FOR THE PROGRAMME. HERE, THE GOVERNMENT ALSO SUGGESTS SOME SOLUTIONS, WHICH ARE CENTERED AROUND A TRUST. BUT THE PROBLEM HERE IS DEEPER: LAND IS FRAGMENTED AND IS CONTROLLED BY TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES. EVEN WHEN THERE ARE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTT AND THE COMMUNITIES, CHIEFS MIGHT INTERVENE, AND THE CONSEQUENCE WILL BE LAND DISPUTES. GROW24 WILL THEN FACE HUGE OBSTACLES.
GENERALLY, WE CAN SAY THAT WHEREVER THE GOVERNMENT IS IN FULL CONTROL, THE PROBLEMS WILL BE LESS. WHEREVER THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT IN FULL CONTROL (LARGE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, LAND ISSUES), THERE WILL BE MORE OBSTACLES.
BUT WE ALSO RECOGNISE, THAT PRINCIPIALLY, GROW24 CAN LEAD TO THE VOLTA BASIN BEING THE BREAD BASKET OF WEST AFRICA, ALTHOUGH THE NEIGHBOURNG COUNTRIES WON’T BE SITTING THERE DOING NOTHING. HOWEVER, THE NEXT QUESTION IS WHETHER THAT CAN BE ACHIEVED UNTIL 2029.
THIS WILL BE VERY UNLIKELY. THE SCALE OF THE IS LARGE. TO IRRIGATE 2 MILLION HECTARES OF LAND PLUS BUILDING AGRO-PARKS, AND SO ON IS AN UPHILL TASK. EVEN AFRICAN COUNTRIES WITH A MORE DEVELOPED AGRICULTURAL INFRASTRUCTURE LIKE EGYPT OR ERHIOPIA NEED 10-15 YEARS FOR SUCH PROJECTS. FURTHERMORE, TO ESTABLISH AN IRRIGATION INFRASTRUCTURE OF THIS SCALE WILL TAKE AT LEAST 5-7 YEARS. ANOTHER ISSUE WILL BE – AS THROUGH THE WHOLE PROGRAMME – THE FINANCING. IT WILL NEED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO FINANCE GROW24 ALONE. AND AS MENTIONED BEFORE, LAND ISSUES AND WATER MANAGEMENT WILL CAUSE PROBLEMS WHICH – IF AT ALL – TAKE A LONGER TIME TO BE SOLVED.
WE NOW GET TO THE MAKE24 SUB-PROGRAMME. THERE ARE MANY OVERLAPPINGS WITH THE GROW24 SUB-PROGRAMME, WHICH COMES TO NO SURPRISE, AS BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES FALL UNDER THE SAME NATIONAL STRATEGY AND ARE CENTERED AROUND THE SAME GEOGRAPHICAL AREA, THE VOLTA BASIN.
SHARED FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS ARE POLITICAL ALIGNMENT AND COMMITMENT (IF THE COMMITMENT LASTS) AND EXISTING GAPS AND NEEDS (WHICH MEANS THAT THERE ARE SO MANY DEFICIENCIES IN THE SYSTEM THAT BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES CAN ONLY GAIN FROM ANY ADVANCEMENTS). FURTHER COMMON FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS ARE DEMOGRAPHICS AND LABOUR FORCE POTENTIALS (THERE ARE ENOUGH PEOPLE WITH THE NEED FOR A JOB; WHETHER THEY TAKE THE JOBS ON OFFER IS ANOTHER QUESTION), EXPORT POTENTIALS AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTIONS (BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES BENEFIT FROM AN INCREASE IN LOCAL PRODUCTIONS), AND IMPROVE IN INFRASTRUCTURE (CHALLENGES WITH LARGE INFRASTRUCTURAL PROJECTS WERE ALREADY MENTIONED BEFORE).
SHARED CHALLENGES ARE
— FINANCING CONDITIONS AND COST OF CAPITAL (WE WILL GET TO THAT WHEN WE DISCUSS THE FUND24 SUBPROGRAMME IN A FURTHER ARTICLE),
— INSECURE LAND TENURE AND LAND ACQUISITION ISSUES, AS MENTIONED UNDER THE GROW24 SUB-PROGRAMME;
— WEAK VALUE CHAIN INTEGRATION AND MARKET CONNECTIVITY (WHICH CAN ONLY IMPROVE IF THE GOVERNMENT’S AMBITIOUS PLANS ARE SUCCESSFUL);
— INFRASTRUCTURE DEFICITS (THE SOLVING OF THOSE ALSO DEPEND ON THE SUCCESS IN IMPROVING ESPECIALLY LARGE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS);
— HUMAN CAPITAL AND SKILLS MISMATCH (THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC TRANSMISSION DEMANDS DIFFERENT SKILLS FOR MODERNISATION, WHICH MIGHT NOT BE AVAILABLE IN TIME AND NUMBERS THE SUB-PROGRAMMES DEMAND; WE WILL GET TO THAT IN DETAIL ALSO IN A FURTHER ARTICLE);
— RISK OF IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES (INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY, COORDINATION AMONG MINISTRIES, POSSIBLE CORRUPTION, ETC.).
REALISTIC OUTCOMES FOR BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES ARE (ASSUMING BOTH FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS AND CHALLENGES ARE ADDRESSED REASONABLY WELL):
— INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY AND DOMESTIC VALUE ADDITION;
— JOB CREATION ESPECIALLY FOR THE YOUTH (IF THE GOVERNMENT CAN MAKE THEM INTERESTED IN AGRICULTURE;
— EXPORT GROWTH;
— IMPROVED FOOD SECURITY AND PRICE STABILITY;
— STRONGER INDUSTRIAL ECOSYSTEM AND INFRASTRUCTURE.
KEEP IN MIND THAT ALL THESE ACHIEVEMENTS CAN BE REACHED ONLY IF THE FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS AND ESPECIALLY THE CHALLENGES ARE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED.
BUT THERE ARE ALSO DIFFERENCES;
— NATURE OF INPUTS AND RISKS (GROW24 IS MORE EXPOSED TO CHANGES IN NATURAL RISKS, WHILE MAKE24 IS MORE EXPOSED TO TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS, GLOBAL COMPETITION, ETC.;
— TIME HORIZON AND GESTATION PERIODS – AGRICULTURE HAS SHORTER PERIODS TO SHOW ECONOMICAL RESULTS THAN MANUFACTURING;
— CAPITAL INTENSITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT THE SAME – MANUFACTURING REQUIRES MORE COMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURE, WHILE IN AGRICULTURE IT IS OFTEN MORE DISTRIBUTED;
— MARKET EXPOSURE AND COMPETITIVENESS;
— SKILL TYPES AND LABUR DYNAMICS – BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES REQUIRE DIFFERENT KINDS OF SKILLED LABOUR.
TO HAAVE AN OVERVIEW, HERE IS A TABLE THAT COMPARES BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES:
Comparative Table: Grow24 vs Make24
| Dimension |
Grow24 (Agriculture) |
Make24 (Manufacturing/Industry) |
Overlap / Notes |
| Favourable Conditions |
• Large arable land base and agro-ecological diversity
• High domestic food demand (import substitution opportunity)
• Regional trade demand for cereals, vegetables, fruits
• Traditional knowledge of farming practices
• Young labour force available for agribusiness |
• Rising domestic market for consumer goods
• Strategic position for AfCFTA exports
• Existing industrial enclaves (Tema, Kumasi, Takoradi)
• Government drive for industrial parks (Wumbei initiative)
• Young labour force available for factory/tech work |
Both benefit from demographics, infrastructure upgrades, AfCFTA opportunities, and strong government backing |
| Challenges |
• Land tenure insecurity and fragmented holdings
• Climate change, weather variability, pests & diseases
• Poor irrigation & post-harvest losses
• Low mechanisation and productivity
• Limited farmer access to finance and inputs |
• High cost of power, unreliable supply
• Difficulty acquiring serviced industrial land
• Expensive financing for capital-intensive investments
• Skills mismatch in industrial engineering/tech fields
• Weak integration of SMEs into industrial supply chains |
Both face finance constraints, infrastructure deficits, skills gaps, and land access issues, though in different forms |
| Realistic Outcomes |
|
• Growth of light and medium industry (textiles, packaging, assembly)
• Stronger value-addition to local raw materials
• Significant job creation in industrial parks
• Boost in exports of processed goods
• More resilient supply chains and SME linkages
|
Both aim to reduce import dependence, generate jobs, and grow exports; agriculture adds food security, manufacturing adds higher value addition |
BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES HAVE ONE PROBLEM IN COMMON, AND IN PRINCIPLE, THIS PROBLEM APPEARS IN THE WHOLE 24H+ PROGRAMME: SOME REGIONS BENEFIT MORE FROM THE PROGRAMME THAN OTHERS, AND SOME HARDLY BENEFIT AT ALL. THIS CAN LEAD TO COMPLICATIONS BETWEEN THE REGIONS, AND INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATING POLITICAL ISSUES.
THE REGIONS THAT BENEFIT MOST FROM THE PROGRAMME ARE THE VOLTA REGION AND THE GREATER ACCRA REGION, WHILE THE FOLLOWING REGIONS ARE NEGLECTED OR LOW-FOCUSSED: UPPER WES, TUPPER EAST, WESTERN NORTH, BONO, BONO EAST, OTI ENCLAVE, AND AHAFO.
FOLLOWING IS A TABLE THAT SUMMARISES THE MAN INTERVENTION REGION BY REGION AND THE DEGREE OF FOCUS;
24H+ Programme – Regional Focus & Interventions
| Focus Level |
Regions |
Main Interventions |
| High |
Volta, Greater Accra |
– Volta Basin: irrigation schemes, mechanisation, staple crop expansion (rice, maize), export-oriented agro-processing.
– Accra/Urban hubs: Shikpon Urban/Peri-Urban Vegetable & Fruit Farming Revolution, logistics/market infrastructure, agro-industrial parks. |
| Moderate |
Ashanti, Eastern, Northern, Savannah, Western, Central |
– Ashanti & Eastern: cocoa sector support, poultry & livestock, value-chain strengthening.
– Northern & Savannah: staple grains (rice, sorghum, maize), irrigation pilots, mechanisation centres.
– Western & Central: agro-processing for cassava, palm oil, and fisheries; integration with industrial corridors (Takoradi). |
| Low |
Upper East, Upper West, Bono, Bono East, Ahafo, Western North, Oti |
– Upper East & Upper West: small-scale irrigation, climate resilience, food security schemes (but not large commercial hubs).
– Bono, Bono East, Ahafo, Western North: cocoa, cashew, and niche crops expansion (mainly as raw material zones).
– Oti: some livestock, minor irrigation, otherwise limited direct investment. |
THAT SHOWS THAT THE PROGRAMME INVESTS HEAVILY IN GROWTH POLES LIKE THE VOLTA REGION AND THE URBAN CENTERS, GIVES MODERATE SUPPORT TO MIDDLE-BELT AND NORTHERN FOOD ZONES, WHILE IT LEAVES BORDER AND NICHE CROP REGIONS RELATIVELY UNDER-DEVELOPED. THE GOVERNMENT MUST BY ALL MEANS DO SOMETHING TO BALANCE THESE DIFFERENCES.
WE WILL NOW GET TO THE LAST OPEN QUESTION OF THIS ARTICLE, AND THIS IS TO WHICH EXTENT THE SUB-PROGRAMME MAKE24 IS REALISTICALLY ACHIEVABLE.
WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE GOVERNMENT ON ALL LEVELS REMAINS COMMITTED AND SOLVES ALL CHALLENGES IN COOPERATION WITH ALL STAKEHOLDERS, THE SUB-PROGRAMME CAN BE SUCCESSFUL. THE QUESTION ONLY ARISES WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN A TIME FRAME, AND IF YES, WHETHER THIS TIME FRAME IS ACHIEVABLE.
THE GOVERNMENT SETS A TARGET OF 10 “WUMBEI” INDUSTRIAL PARKS UNTIL 2028, OUT OF 50 INDUSTRIAL PARKS IT INTENDS TO HAVE FOR THE WHOLE GHANA. IT IS HARD TO SAY WHETHER THE TARGET OF 10 INDUSTRIAL ZONES UNTIL 2028 IS ACHIEVABLE, AS THERE ARE POSITIVE SIGNS AND CHALLENGES. POSITIVE SIGNS ARE THE FOLLOWING:
— POLICY COMMITMENT AND PLANNING – THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY PUBLISHED DETAILED PLANS ON HOW THESE INDUSTRIAL PARKS WILL BE DEVELOPED;
— EXISTING INDUSTRIAL PARKS AND PARTNERDHIPS – THERE ARE ALREADY SOME PARKS WHICH COULD BE INTEGRATED AND UPGRADED;
— IDENTIFICATION OF STRATEGIC LOCATIONS – THE PARKS SHOULD MOSTLY BE LOCATED ALONG THE VOLTA BASIN (!), ALONGSIDE THE AGRICULTURAL PARKS.
RISKS ARE:
— RESOURCE MOBILISATION AND FUNDING (AS USUAL);
— LAND ACQUISITION, UTILITIES (ELECTRICITY!) AND INFRASTRUCTURE BOTTLENECKS (ALSO AS USUAL);
— IMPLEMENTATION CAPACITY AND COORDINATION;
— ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RISKS (CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES, INVESTOR SENSITIVITY TO POLITICAL CHANGES) .
WEIGHING THE POSITIVE AND THE NEGATIVE FACTORS, WE CAN SAY THAT THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THE TARGET OF 10 INDUSTRIAL PARKS UNTIL 2028 CAN BE MET IF THE SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE (SPV) WORKS WELL AND IS ADEQUATELY RESOURCED, FINANCING IS SECURED, LAND AND UTILITY ISSUES IN THE PRIORITY AREAS ARE RESOLVED QUICKLY AND SUSTAINED AND THERE IS SUSTAINED POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. BUT THERE IS ALSO THE CHANCE THAT SOME OF THE 10 ENVISAGED INDUSTRIAL PARKS WILL NOT BE OPERATIONAL BY 2028, ESPECIALLY IN REMOTE AREAS, OR WHERE INFRASTRUCTURE PROBLEMS ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO SOLVE.
CONCLUSION OF BOTH GROW24 AND MAKE24:
THE STRATEGIES FOR BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES ARE WELL THOUGHT THROUGH, BUT STRATEGIES ARE THEORIES WHICH MUST BE PROVEN IN REALITY. AND THERE ARE SEVERAL CHALLENGES ESPECIALLY IN THE GOVERNMENT’S PLANNING UNTIL 2028/2029, WHICH MIGHT BE A LITTLE BIT TOO POSITIVE SEEN FOR POLITICAL REASONS. MOST OF THE SUCCESS OF BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES HANGS ON THE QUESTION OF FINANCING. AND THE GOVERNMENT MUST DO SOMETHING TO BALANCE THE INEQUALITY BETWEEN THE REGIONS.
