Tag: GHANA

 

WILL PREAIDENT MAHAMA’S 24H+ ECONOMY SUCCEED?

SECOND ARTICLE

CONTEXT AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

BY

HANS PETER RECKLING

(RECKLING ENTERPRISE GHANA RESEARCH)

WEBSITE: https://recklingenterprise.com

 

THE CONTEXT CHAPTER STARTS – AS IT ALREADY DID IN THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – WITH AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (COLONIALISM) AND THE ECONOMICAL CHALLENGES GHANA IS FACING.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMICAL CHALLENGES – EXPORTS OF MAINLY RAW PRODUCTS AND IMPORT OF PROCESSED GOODS – IS CORRECT, AS WELL AS THE ASSUMPTION THAT THIS IS MAINLY A CONTINUATION OF COLONIAL HABITS IN A NEW DRESS.

THE PROGRAMME IDENTIFIES THREE MAIN CAUSES FOR THE PROBLEMS GHANA’S ECONOMY IS FACING:

— THE LACK OF A SOUND AND INTEGRATED PRODUCTION STRUCTURE;

— DIFFICULT ACCESSIBILITY OF AFFORDABLR FINANCE; AND

— WORKFORCE SKILLS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES NOT COORDINATED WITH THE NEEDS OF A MODERN, DEVELOPED ECONOMY.

THE IDENTIFICATION OF THESE PROBLEMS MIGHT BE CORRECT, AND WE WILL SEE IN SUBSEQUENT ARTICLES WHETHER THE PROGRAMME OFFERS ANY FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS.

FIRST OF ALL, THE RE-STRUCTURING OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY – AS IMPORTANT AS IT MAY BE – IS USELESS WITHOUT THE INTEGRATION INTO AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFRICAN ECONOMY AS A WHOLE. THE”AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA (AfCFTA) OFFERS AN EXCELLENT BASE FOE THE ECONOMICAL INTEGRATION OF THE WHOLE OF AFRICA. THEREFORE, WE MUST SEE ANY RE-STRUCTURING OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY IN THE CONTEXT OF PAN-AFRICANISM AND WE CAN SAY IN A DEPARTURE OF A FAMOUS DR. KWAME NKRUMAH CITATION: THE RE-STRUCTURING OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY IS MEANINGLESS WITHOUT RE-STRUCTURING THE AFRICAN ECONOMY. FURTHERMORE, WE MUST ADD THAT THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY IN PARTICULAR AS WELL AS THE AFRICAN ECONOMIES AS A WHOLE DON’T ONLY NEED RE-STRUCTURING, BUT ALSO RE-ORIENTATION, AWAY FROM THEIR FORMER COLONIAL MASTERS AND THEIR ALLIES, AND APPROACHING NEW TRADING AND DEVELOPMENT GROUNDS. THIS SHOULD NOT HAPPEN THROUGH MILITARY COUPS, BUT AS DECISIONS OF ENLIGHTENED CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS.

APART FROM THE LACK OF REALISATION THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY MUST BE CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH THE INTEGRATION INTO THE AFRICAN SCONOMICAL DEVELOPMENT, AND MUST BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT WITH THAT, THERE IS NOT MUCH WRONG WITH THE ANALYSIS. WE WILL SEE IN LATER ARTICLES WHETHER THE PROGRAMME CAN SOLVE THE DEFINED PROBLEMS EFFECTIVELY.

NOW WE GET TO THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH ARE SUPPOSED TO BE THE BACKBONE OF THE WHOLE PROGRAMME.

UNFORTUNATELY, IT SEEMS THAT LARGE PARTS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED, OR EVEN STARTED TO BE INITIATED. THAT ACCOUNTS ESPECIALLY FOR WHAT IS CALLED “AUTHORITY” IN THE PROGRAMME, AND FOR THE PROPOSED STRATEGIC VALUE CHAIN DEVELOPMENT FUND.

THE “AUTHORITY” IS SUPPOSED TO DIRECT AND COORDINATE THE INITIATIVES SUGGESTED BY THE PROGRAMME.

HERE, A PROBLEM OCCURS AGAIN WHICH I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED IN MY FIRST ARTICLE: THE METROPOLITAN, MUNICIPAL, AND DISTRICT CHIEF EXECUTIVES  (MMDCES) ARE SUPPOSED TO TRANSLATE THE PROGRAMME ON THE LOCAL LEVEL. HERE, THE DANGER ARISES THAT THE MMDCES HURRY TO GRANT PERMITS FOR BUSINESSES THAT WANT TO WORK 24 HOURS SHIFTS WHICH DISTURB THE NEIGHBOURHOODS (BEER BARS, RESTAURANTS, ETC.). HERE, SOLUTIONS SHOULD BE FOUND WHICH PREVENT THESE INCIDENTS FROM HAPPENING.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE STRATEGIC VALUE CHAIN DEVELOPMENT FUND IS MEANT TO SUPPORT THE VALUE CHAIN FINANCING FACILITY AND AN EXPORT BONUS FOR EXPORTERS OF GHANA-MADE PRODUCTS. A 2.5% IMPORT LEVY WHICH SHOULD FINANCE THE TWO FACILITIES IS -ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION – ALSO NOT YET IMPOSED. INSTEAD OF THIS, THERE ARE ALREADY SEVERAL LEVIES ON IMPORTED GOODS IN EFFECT, AND THE QUESTION ARISES WHY NOT PART OF THESE LEVIES IS USED FOR THE INTENDED FACILITIES.

MOST OF THE OTHER INCENTIVES MENTIONED IN THIS CHAPTER OF THE PROGRAMME DEAL WITH TAX INCENTIVES FOR THOSE BUSINESSES WHICH JOIN THE 24H+ PROGRAMME IN PRODUCING GOODS FOR LOCAL USE AND EXPORT. AGAIN, WE MUST ASK HOW THE TAX CANCELLATIONS FOR THE INCENTIVES WILL BE COMPENSATED, AS THEY ARE IN FACT FIRST OF ALL A LOSS IN REVENUE, BEFORE IT CAN BE CLEAR WHETHER THE ECONOMY BENEFITS FROM THE LOCAL AND EXPORT PRODUCTION. FURTHERMORE, HAVE THE BUSINESSES THE CAPACITY TO PERFORM THE PRODUCTION. THE CHANGE FROM A ONE-SHIFT PRODUCTION TO A TWO- OR EVEN THREE-SHIFT PRODUCTION ALONE DOES NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM. AN INCREASE IN PRODUCTION NEEDS A LOT OF FRESH INVESTMENT WHICH CANNOT BE DONE BY AN EASIER FINANCING ALONE. INCREASED SHIFTS ALSO NEED AN INCREASE IN STAFF – WHAT THE GOVERNMENT RIGHTFUL WANTS – WHO WANT TO BE PAID. IN THE U.S.A. THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE SAME KIND OF PROBLEM WITH ITS ATTEMPT TO BRING MSNUFACTURING BACK INTO THE COUNTRY.

THE PROGRAMME SUGGESTS A CHANGE IN POLI CY TO INCENTIFY NATIONAL VALUE CREATION. THESE ARE NICE WORDS, BUT WILL THIS CHANGE BRING AN EQUAL CHANGE IN THE MINDS OF THE BUSINESS OWNERS AND WORKERS WHO WANT TO HAVE FAST RESULTS FOR THE BUSINESSES?

LOOKING AT THE WHOLE “CONTEXT AND INSTTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS” CHAPTER WE CAN SAY THAT THE PROGRAMME ITSELF SEEMS TO HAVE CORRECT AND GOODAPPROACHES, BUT FACES ENORMOUS CHALLENGES CAUSED MAINLY BY FINANCING ISSUES. WE WILL SEE IN THE NEXT ARTICLES – ESPECIALLY THE ONE CONCERNING THE FINANCING SUB-PROGRAMME – WHETHER THIS ASSUMPTION IS CORRCT,OR WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT FINDS FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS TO FACE THESE CHALLENGES.

THE NEXT ARTICLE WILL EXAMINE THE STRATEGY OUTLINED IN THE PROGRAMME, BEFORE WE GET TO THE VARIOUS SUB-PROGRAMMES IN FURTHER ARTICLES.

 

WILL PRESIDENT MAHAMA’S 24H+ ECONOMY SUCCEED?

ARTICLE 3

STRATEGY

BY

HANS PETER RECKLING

WEBSITE: https://recklingenterprise.com

 

BEFORE WE START DISCUSSING THE STRATEGY OF THE 23H+ PROGRAMME, WE WILL HAVE A LOOK AT THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGY.

STRATEGY IS

“a plan of action designed to achieve a long-term or overall aim”: (DEFINITION TAKEN FROM BING SEARCH ENGINE “STRATEGY”)

THIS DEFINITION USUALLY APPLIES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SO WE CAN USE IT FOR OUR DISCUSSION HERE.

THE CHAPTER ON THE STRATEGY OF THE 24H+ PROGRAMME OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA STARTS WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAMME

THESE OBJECTIVES ALREADY APPEAR BRIEFLY IN THE PROGRAMME UP TO HERE, BUT WE WILL SUMMARISE THEM NOW:

• BOOSTING LOCAL PRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL AND OTHER GOODS TO REDUCE DEPENDENY ON IMPORTS.
• IN CONNECTION WITH THAT, FACILITATE THE INTEGRATION OF VALUE CHAINS.
• GET THE OPTIMUM OUT OF UTILISING PRODUCTION RESOURCES.
• ACHIEVING STABLE PRODUCTION SURPLUSES.
• DEVELOPING A NATIONAL WORK ETHIC OF “EXCELLENCE, RESPONSIBILITY, DIGNITY, AND COOPERATION.

FORTUNATELY ENOUGH, THE PROGRAMME ALREADY TELLS US THAT IT IS NOT A SHORT-TERM INITIATIVE. UNFORTUNATELY, IT DOES NOT TELL US THE TIME FRAME IN WHICH AT  LEAST THE BASICS OF THE PROGRAMME SHOULD BE ACHHIEVED. IN THE PROGRAMME ITSELF THE AUTHORS RECOGNISE THAT IT IS NOT A SHORT-TIME EVENT, BUT A MEDIUM-TO-LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT. FACT IS THAT ANY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS NOTHING THAT HAS AN END , BUT GOES ON “TILL ETERNITY”. THEREFORE, AS ITS BEST RESULT, THE PROGRAMME COULD ONLY BE THE BASE FOR ANY FUTURE DEVELOPMENT.

MOST OF THE KEY POINTS WERE GENERALLY ALREADY MENTIONED BEFORE, NAMELY THE HOLISTIC APPROACH TO GHANA’S ECONOMIC CHALLENGES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECONOMY TO BE SELF-RELIANT. HERE THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THE EXPRESSION “SELF-RELIANT” IS NOT TOO HIGHLY STRAINED. NO COUNTRY CAN BE SELF-RELIANT, NOT EVEN THE MOST ECONOMICALLY DEVELOPED ONES. AT LEAST THE EXPLANATION LATER SPEAKS OF REDUCING DEPENDENCIES, WHICH DESCRIBES THE TARGETED RESULT BETTER. THIS KEY DIMENSION MUST ALSO BE SEEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE HOLISTIC APPROACH MENTIONED BEFORE.

THE NEXT KEY DIMENSION IS CALLED “STRATEGIC VALUE CHAIN PRIORISATION”, WHICH MEANS THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT AND EASIEST TO  ACCOMPLISH VALUE CHAINS SHALL BE DEALT WITH FIRST. HERE, THE FOCUS IS AGAIN LAID ON AGRICULTURE AAND MANUFACTURING WHICH – ACCORDING TO THE PROGRAMME – ARE MORE OR LESS SEEN AS ONE ENTITY.

THE NEXT DIMENSIONS ARE JOB CREATION AND INCREASING PRODUCTIVITY, PRIVATE SECTOE FOCUSED TRANSFORMATION, SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS SOLUTION, AND BUILDING HUMAN CAPACITY AND CULTUAL RENEWAL. WE WILL SEE ALL THE KEY DIMENSIONS AGAIN WHEN WE EXAMINE THE SUB-PROGRAMMES.

WHEN WE LOOK AT ALL THESE KEY DIMESIONS, WE MUST ASK OURSELVES WHETHER THE GHANAIAN GOVERNMNT,HAS NOT OVERESTIMATED ITS POSSIBILITIES WITH THE PROGRAMME. IT IS CLEAR THAT AN ECONOMY CAN BE TRANSFORMED HOLISTICALLY, BUT THE PROCESS TO ACHIEVE THIS TRANSFORMATION IS COMPLEX, LONG-TERM, AND CONTEXT DEPENDENT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS GENERALLY ALREADY REALISED THAT, BUT THE FACT IS THAT THE FOUNDATIONS EVEN FOR SECTIONAL IMPROVEMENT ARE NOT LAID. THE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IS NOT CONSTANT – THERE IS STILL A LOT OF LIGHT OFF IN THE COUNTRY. THE INTERNET CONNECTIVITY LEAVES MUCH TO BE DESIRED. AS LONG AS AT LEAST THESE SHORTCOMINGS ARE NOT RECTIFIED, AN ECONOMY CANNOT BE TRANSFORMED, IN WHATEVER WAY.

ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNMENT, THE 24H+ PROGRAMME IS BASED ON THREE PILLARS:

— PRODUCTION TRANSFORMATION,

— SUPPLY CHAIN AND MARKET SYSTEM EFFICIENCY, AND

— HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT. (HUMAN CAPITAL IS A TERRIBLE EXPRESSION!)

THESE THREE PILLARS GENERALLY REPRESENT THE EIGHT DIMENSIONS MENTIONED BEFORE. WE WILL GET BACK TO THEM WHEN WE DISCUSS THE VARIOUS SUB-PROGRAMMES; THEY ARE BUILDING THE WHOLE 24H+ PROGRAMME.

THE ONLY PILLAR THAT BRINGS SOMETHING NEW TO THE TABLE IS THE ONE THAT DESCRIBES THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, AS IT MENTIONS BRIEFLY THE ACTIVITIES TO SUPPORT THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT. IN THIS CONNECTIONS, WE MUST ALSO RECOGNISE THAT THIS IS THE PILLAR WHICH IS THE MOST DIFFICULT TO COMPLETE. EVEN IF ALL THE TECHNICAL CONDITIONS ARE FULFILLLED, IT WILL PROBABLY TAKE THE WHOLE TERM OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE THE ATTITUDES OF A LARGE PART OF THE POPULATION. BEHAVIOURS WHICH ARE IMPLEMENTED IN A  HUMAN BEING OVER SEVERAL YEARS CANNOT BE CHANGED IN A MOMENT, EVEN IF THE TECHMICAL FOUNDATIONS TO CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDES WOULD BE THE BEST IN THE WORLD. WE WILL GET BACK TO THIS PROBLEM WHEN WE DISCUSS THE SUB-PROGRAMME THAT DEALS WITH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT.

GOING ON, THE PROGRAMME DESCRIBES THE VALUE CHAIN STRATEGIES IT IS USING, NAMELY THE STRATEGIC VALUE CHAIN APPROACH AND THE INTEGRATED VALUE CHAIN APPROACH. WHILE THE STRATEGIC VALUE CHAIN APPROACH EMPHASISES – CORRECTLY – THAT AN ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION MUST BEGIN WITH THE SECTORS THAT OFFER THE HIGHEST POTENTIAL, THE INTEGRATED VALUR CHAIN APPROACH FOCUSSES ON THE EIGHT SUB-PROGRAMMES AND THEIR INTER-CONNECTIVITY. WE WILL DEAL WITH THAT WHEN EXAMINING THE SUB-PROGRAMMES.

THE VALUE CHAIN APPROACHES LEAD THE PROGRAMME TO THE DUAL FOCUS STRATEGY, WHICH EFFECTIVELY COMBINES THE TWO AFOREMENTIONED STRATEGIES.

THE NEXT POINT IS CONCERNING THE ROLE SECURITY HAS TO PLAY WITH THE PLANNED ECONOMY TRANSFORMATION. IT IS CLEAR THAT EVERY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT NEEDS A FUNCTIONING SECURITY SYSTEM. IT IS ONLY INTERESTING THAT THE PROGRAMME FOCUSSES SO MUCH ON THIS POINT, AS IF THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT BELIEVE IN THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE CURRENT SECURITY SYSTEM. MAYBE THAT THE GOVERNMENT THINKS THAT SECURITY IS CURRENTLY UNDER-EQUIPPED. IN THIS CASE, WE ARE BACK TO THE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCING, WHICH WILL BE DEALT WITH WHEN DISCUSSING THE SPECIFIC SUB-PROGRAMME.

THE VOLTA RIVER BASIN AND THE ADJACENT AREAS ARE IN THE CENTER OF THE PROGRAMME, WHICH IS VERY WELL SHOWN IN CALLING IT THE “VOLTA ECONOMIC CORRIDOR”. LAKE VOLTA AND ITS TRIBUTARIES SHALL SERVE AS MEANS FOR TRANSPORTATION, IRRIGATION, TOURIST ATTRACTION, AMONG OTHERS. IT COULD GENERALLY BE A GOOD IDEA, IF IT WOULD NOT GIVE US THE FEELING THAT THE LAKE VOLTA AREA AND THE NORTHERN REGIONS WILL BENEFIT FROM THE PROGRAMME WHILE OTHER REGIONS WILL BE NEGLECTED. THIS ASSUMPTION IS ALSO SUPPORTED BY THE INTENTION OF THE PROGRAMME TO MAKE THE TAMALE AIRPORT A CARGO HUB, AND TO DEVELOP ONLY COMMUNITIES ALONG THE LAKE VOLTA (BUIPE AND OTHERS). IN THE STRATEGY CHAPTER, THERE IS NOTHING SAID ABOUT DEVELOPING COMMUNITIES IN OTHER REGIONS. WE WILL GET BACK TO THE DETAILS OF THE “VOLTA ECONOMIC CORRIDOR” IN THE COMBINED SUB-PROGRAMMES OF AGRICULTURE AND MANUFACTURING.

BOTH AGROECOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL PARKS NEED LAND FOR DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE PROGRAMME WANTS TO IMPLEMENT A PARTICIPATORY LAND ACCESS MODEL. THIS MODEL INCLUDES A COMMUNITY LAND TRUST AS NATIONAL SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE (SPV), WHERE PEOPLE WITH LAND CAN ASSIGN TO THE NATIONAL SPV; THE LAND WILL THEN BE DISTRIBUTED THROUGH THE TRUSTS. THE MODEL IS INTERESTING AND AS A BASIC IDEA CAPABLE TO BE DEVELOPED, BUT FOR THE MOMENT, IT APPEARS TO BE COMPLICATED, AND IT WILL NEED SOME EFFORTS TO EXPLAIN THE MODEL BETTER THAN THE PROGRAMME DOES UP TO HERE.

SO FAR ABOUT THE STRATEGIES USED IN THE PROGRAMME; IN THE NEXT ARTICLES, WE WILL GET TO THE CORE OF THE PROGRAMME, THE EIGHT SUB-PROGRAMMES. WE WILL START WITH THE EXAMINATION OF THE COMBINED AGRICULTUAL AND MANUFACTURING SUB-PROGRAMMES, AS THEY ARE ALREADY SEEN MORE OR LESS AS A UNITY.

 

WILL PRESIDENT MAHAMA’S 24H+ PROGRAMME SUCCEED?

ARTICLE 4

AGRI-BUSINESS AND MANUFACTURING

BY

HANS PETER RECKLING

WEBSITE: https://recklingenterprise.com

 

ALTHOUGH ALL SUB-PROGRAMMES TOGETHER FORM THE 24H+ PROGRAMME OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA, THE AGRI-BUSINESS SUB-PROGRAMME (GROW24) AND THE MANUFACTURING SUB-PROGRAMME (MAKE24) HAVE SOME SPECIAL LINKS. ONE OF THEM IS THE VOLTA BASIN AREA WHICH – UNDER THE GROW24 SUB-PROGRAMME – IS TO BECOME THE AGRICULTURAL CENTER OF GHANA (AGBLEDUWO) AND – WITH MAKE24 IN THE CENTER OF THE PLANS – THE VOLTA ECONOMIC CORRIDOR.

ACCORDING TO THE PROGRAMME, THE VOLTA BASIN AREA IS SUPPOSED TO BECOME THE “BREAD BASKET OF WEST AFRICA” UNTIL 2029, AND THE VOLTA ECONOMIC CORRIDOR WILL BE THE BACKBONE OF THE WHOLE PROGRAMME.

HERE IS WHERE THE PROBLEMS ALREADY START:

— TO ESTABLISH THE VOLTA BASIN AREA AS A BREAD BASKET OF WEST AFRICA UNTIL 2029 IS RATHER TOO AMBITIOUSLY MEASURED. ALREADY THE GENERAL COMPLETION FACES MANY CHALLENGES. WHILE THERE ARE MAINLY FIVE REASON WHY THE OUTCOME IS FEASIBLY POSSIBLE – ABUNDANT LAND AND WATER RESOURCES, EXISTING IRRIGATION/DAMS AND INFRASTRUCTURE POTENTIAL, STRONG POLITICAL WILL (AT LEAST AT THE MOMENT) AND FRAMEWORK, POTENTIAL REGIONAL DEMAND, AND POSSIBLE PRODUCTIVITY GAINS – THERE ARE ALSO A NUMBER OF OBSTACLES. THESE ARE FINANCING AND INVESTMENT SCALE, LAND TENURE, LAND USE AND RIGHTS, WATER AVAILABILITY AND CLIMATE RISK, SOIL QUALITY AND ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS, CAPACITY AND SKILLS, INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOGISTICS ECONOMICS OF SCALE VS, SMALLHOLDER INCLUSION, POLICY COHERENCE, GOVERNANCE, CORRUTION, IMPLEMENTATION RISK,  AND REGIONAL COMPETITION.

IT IS TRUE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN ITS PROGRAMME OFFERS SOLUTIONS TO SOME OF THESE OBSTACLES. IT PROPOSES ESTABLISHING COOPERATIVES TO INTEGRATE SMALLHOLDER FARMERS, EXPANDING THE IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND WATER STORAGE, TRAINING OF FARMERS, ETC. THESE ARE GOOD SUGGESTIONS AND INTENTIONS,  BUT THE REALISATION MIGHT BE A BIGGER PROBLEM. THIS IS ESPECIALLY THE CASE WHEN WE LOOK AT THE POLITICAL WILL, FINANCING, AND LOCAL COOPERATION . THE POLITICAL WILL MIGHT FADE, THE LONGER THE REALISATION OF GROW24 AND THE WHOLE 24H+ PROGRAMME WILL TAKE. NOT EXACTLY AT THE TOP OF GOVERNMENT AND PARTY, BUT AT THE GRASSROOTS AND THE MID-LEVEL MANAGEMENT. FINANCING IS THE NEXT OBSTACLE; WE WILL SEE WHEN WE GET TO THE CONCERNED SUB-PROGRAMME WHETHER THE SUGGESTIONS PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT WORK, AND IF YES, UNDER WHICH CIRCUMSTANCES.

THE NEXT PROBLEM TO INVESTIGATE IS THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, WITH THE FOCUS ON LAND ACQUISITION FOR THE PROGRAMME. HERE, THE GOVERNMENT ALSO SUGGESTS SOME SOLUTIONS,  WHICH ARE CENTERED AROUND A TRUST. BUT THE PROBLEM HERE IS DEEPER: LAND IS FRAGMENTED AND IS CONTROLLED BY TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES. EVEN WHEN THERE ARE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTT AND THE COMMUNITIES, CHIEFS MIGHT INTERVENE, AND THE CONSEQUENCE WILL BE LAND DISPUTES. GROW24 WILL THEN FACE HUGE OBSTACLES.

GENERALLY, WE CAN SAY THAT WHEREVER THE GOVERNMENT IS IN FULL CONTROL, THE PROBLEMS WILL BE LESS. WHEREVER THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT IN FULL CONTROL (LARGE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, LAND ISSUES), THERE WILL BE MORE OBSTACLES.

BUT WE ALSO RECOGNISE, THAT PRINCIPIALLY, GROW24 CAN LEAD TO THE VOLTA BASIN BEING THE BREAD BASKET OF WEST AFRICA, ALTHOUGH THE NEIGHBOURNG COUNTRIES WON’T BE SITTING THERE DOING NOTHING. HOWEVER, THE NEXT QUESTION IS WHETHER THAT CAN BE ACHIEVED UNTIL 2029.

THIS WILL BE VERY UNLIKELY. THE SCALE OF THE IS LARGE. TO IRRIGATE 2 MILLION HECTARES OF LAND PLUS BUILDING AGRO-PARKS, AND SO ON IS AN UPHILL TASK. EVEN AFRICAN COUNTRIES WITH A MORE DEVELOPED AGRICULTURAL INFRASTRUCTURE LIKE EGYPT OR ERHIOPIA NEED 10-15 YEARS FOR SUCH PROJECTS. FURTHERMORE, TO ESTABLISH AN IRRIGATION INFRASTRUCTURE OF THIS SCALE WILL TAKE AT LEAST 5-7 YEARS. ANOTHER ISSUE WILL BE – AS THROUGH THE WHOLE PROGRAMME – THE FINANCING. IT WILL NEED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO FINANCE GROW24 ALONE. AND AS MENTIONED BEFORE, LAND ISSUES AND WATER MANAGEMENT WILL CAUSE PROBLEMS WHICH – IF AT ALL – TAKE A LONGER TIME TO BE SOLVED.

WE NOW GET TO THE MAKE24 SUB-PROGRAMME. THERE ARE MANY OVERLAPPINGS WITH THE GROW24 SUB-PROGRAMME, WHICH COMES TO NO SURPRISE, AS BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES FALL UNDER THE SAME NATIONAL STRATEGY AND ARE CENTERED AROUND THE SAME GEOGRAPHICAL AREA, THE VOLTA BASIN.

SHARED FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS ARE POLITICAL ALIGNMENT AND COMMITMENT (IF THE COMMITMENT LASTS) AND EXISTING GAPS AND NEEDS (WHICH MEANS THAT THERE ARE SO MANY DEFICIENCIES IN THE SYSTEM THAT BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES CAN ONLY GAIN FROM ANY ADVANCEMENTS). FURTHER COMMON FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS ARE DEMOGRAPHICS AND LABOUR FORCE POTENTIALS (THERE ARE ENOUGH PEOPLE WITH THE NEED FOR A JOB; WHETHER THEY TAKE THE JOBS ON OFFER IS ANOTHER QUESTION), EXPORT POTENTIALS AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTIONS (BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES BENEFIT FROM AN INCREASE IN LOCAL PRODUCTIONS), AND IMPROVE IN INFRASTRUCTURE (CHALLENGES WITH LARGE INFRASTRUCTURAL PROJECTS WERE ALREADY MENTIONED BEFORE).

SHARED CHALLENGES ARE

— FINANCING CONDITIONS AND COST OF CAPITAL (WE WILL GET TO THAT WHEN WE DISCUSS THE FUND24 SUBPROGRAMME IN A FURTHER ARTICLE),

— INSECURE LAND TENURE AND LAND ACQUISITION ISSUES, AS MENTIONED UNDER THE GROW24 SUB-PROGRAMME;

— WEAK VALUE CHAIN INTEGRATION AND MARKET CONNECTIVITY (WHICH CAN ONLY IMPROVE IF THE GOVERNMENT’S AMBITIOUS PLANS ARE SUCCESSFUL);

— INFRASTRUCTURE DEFICITS (THE SOLVING OF THOSE ALSO DEPEND ON THE SUCCESS IN IMPROVING ESPECIALLY LARGE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS);

— HUMAN CAPITAL AND SKILLS MISMATCH (THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC TRANSMISSION DEMANDS DIFFERENT SKILLS FOR MODERNISATION, WHICH MIGHT NOT BE AVAILABLE IN TIME AND NUMBERS THE SUB-PROGRAMMES DEMAND; WE WILL GET TO THAT IN DETAIL ALSO IN A FURTHER ARTICLE);

— RISK OF IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES (INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY, COORDINATION AMONG MINISTRIES, POSSIBLE CORRUPTION, ETC.).

REALISTIC OUTCOMES FOR BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES ARE (ASSUMING BOTH FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS AND CHALLENGES ARE ADDRESSED REASONABLY WELL):

— INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY AND DOMESTIC VALUE ADDITION;

— JOB CREATION ESPECIALLY FOR THE YOUTH (IF THE GOVERNMENT CAN MAKE THEM INTERESTED IN AGRICULTURE;

— EXPORT GROWTH;

— IMPROVED FOOD SECURITY AND PRICE STABILITY;

— STRONGER INDUSTRIAL ECOSYSTEM AND INFRASTRUCTURE.

KEEP IN MIND THAT ALL THESE ACHIEVEMENTS CAN BE REACHED ONLY IF THE FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS AND ESPECIALLY THE CHALLENGES ARE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED.

BUT THERE ARE ALSO DIFFERENCES;

— NATURE OF INPUTS AND RISKS (GROW24 IS MORE EXPOSED TO CHANGES IN NATURAL RISKS, WHILE MAKE24 IS MORE EXPOSED TO TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS, GLOBAL COMPETITION, ETC.;

— TIME HORIZON AND GESTATION PERIODS – AGRICULTURE HAS SHORTER PERIODS TO SHOW ECONOMICAL RESULTS THAN MANUFACTURING;

— CAPITAL INTENSITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT THE SAME – MANUFACTURING REQUIRES MORE COMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURE, WHILE IN AGRICULTURE IT IS OFTEN MORE DISTRIBUTED;

— MARKET EXPOSURE AND COMPETITIVENESS;

— SKILL TYPES AND LABUR DYNAMICS – BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES REQUIRE DIFFERENT KINDS OF SKILLED LABOUR.

TO HAAVE AN OVERVIEW, HERE IS A TABLE THAT COMPARES BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES:

Comparative Table: Grow24 vs Make24

Dimension	Grow24 (Agriculture)	Make24 (Manufacturing/Industry)	Overlap / Notes
Favourable Conditions	• Large arable land base and agro-ecological diversity • High domestic food demand (import substitution opportunity) • Regional trade demand for cereals, vegetables, fruits • Traditional knowledge of farming practices • Young labour force available for agribusiness	• Rising domestic market for consumer goods • Strategic position for AfCFTA exports • Existing industrial enclaves (Tema, Kumasi, Takoradi) • Government drive for industrial parks (Wumbei initiative) • Young labour force available for factory/tech work	Both benefit from demographics, infrastructure upgrades, AfCFTA opportunities, and strong government backing
Challenges	• Land tenure insecurity and fragmented holdings • Climate change, weather variability, pests & diseases • Poor irrigation & post-harvest losses • Low mechanisation and productivity • Limited farmer access to finance and inputs	• High cost of power, unreliable supply • Difficulty acquiring serviced industrial land • Expensive financing for capital-intensive investments • Skills mismatch in industrial engineering/tech fields • Weak integration of SMEs into industrial supply chains	Both face finance constraints, infrastructure deficits, skills gaps, and land access issues, though in different forms
Realistic Outcomes		• Growth of light and medium industry (textiles, packaging, assembly) • Stronger value-addition to local raw materials • Significant job creation in industrial parks • Boost in exports of processed goods • More resilient supply chains and SME linkages	Both aim to reduce import dependence, generate jobs, and grow exports; agriculture adds food security, manufacturing adds higher value addition

BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES HAVE ONE PROBLEM IN COMMON, AND IN PRINCIPLE, THIS PROBLEM APPEARS IN THE WHOLE 24H+ PROGRAMME: SOME REGIONS BENEFIT MORE FROM THE PROGRAMME THAN OTHERS, AND SOME HARDLY BENEFIT AT ALL. THIS CAN LEAD TO COMPLICATIONS BETWEEN THE REGIONS, AND INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATING POLITICAL ISSUES.

THE REGIONS THAT BENEFIT MOST FROM THE PROGRAMME ARE THE VOLTA REGION AND THE GREATER ACCRA REGION, WHILE THE FOLLOWING REGIONS ARE NEGLECTED OR LOW-FOCUSSED: UPPER WES, TUPPER EAST, WESTERN NORTH, BONO, BONO EAST, OTI ENCLAVE, AND AHAFO.

FOLLOWING IS A TABLE THAT SUMMARISES THE MAN INTERVENTION REGION BY REGION AND THE DEGREE OF FOCUS;

24H+ Programme – Regional Focus & Interventions

Focus Level	Regions	Main Interventions
High	Volta, Greater Accra	– Volta Basin: irrigation schemes, mechanisation, staple crop expansion (rice, maize), export-oriented agro-processing. – Accra/Urban hubs: Shikpon Urban/Peri-Urban Vegetable & Fruit Farming Revolution, logistics/market infrastructure, agro-industrial parks.
Moderate	Ashanti, Eastern, Northern, Savannah, Western, Central	– Ashanti & Eastern: cocoa sector support, poultry & livestock, value-chain strengthening. – Northern & Savannah: staple grains (rice, sorghum, maize), irrigation pilots, mechanisation centres. – Western & Central: agro-processing for cassava, palm oil, and fisheries; integration with industrial corridors (Takoradi).
Low	Upper East, Upper West, Bono, Bono East, Ahafo, Western North, Oti	– Upper East & Upper West: small-scale irrigation, climate resilience, food security schemes (but not large commercial hubs). – Bono, Bono East, Ahafo, Western North: cocoa, cashew, and niche crops expansion (mainly as raw material zones). – Oti: some livestock, minor irrigation, otherwise limited direct investment.

 

THAT SHOWS THAT THE PROGRAMME INVESTS HEAVILY IN GROWTH POLES LIKE THE VOLTA REGION AND THE URBAN CENTERS, GIVES MODERATE SUPPORT TO MIDDLE-BELT AND NORTHERN FOOD ZONES, WHILE IT LEAVES BORDER AND NICHE CROP REGIONS RELATIVELY UNDER-DEVELOPED. THE GOVERNMENT MUST BY ALL MEANS DO SOMETHING TO BALANCE THESE DIFFERENCES.

WE WILL NOW GET TO THE LAST OPEN QUESTION OF THIS ARTICLE, AND THIS IS TO WHICH EXTENT THE SUB-PROGRAMME MAKE24 IS REALISTICALLY ACHIEVABLE.

WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE GOVERNMENT ON ALL LEVELS REMAINS COMMITTED AND SOLVES ALL CHALLENGES IN COOPERATION WITH ALL STAKEHOLDERS, THE SUB-PROGRAMME CAN BE SUCCESSFUL. THE QUESTION ONLY ARISES WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN A TIME FRAME, AND IF YES, WHETHER THIS TIME FRAME IS ACHIEVABLE.

THE GOVERNMENT SETS A TARGET OF 10 “WUMBEI” INDUSTRIAL PARKS UNTIL 2028, OUT OF 50 INDUSTRIAL PARKS IT INTENDS TO HAVE FOR THE WHOLE GHANA. IT IS HARD TO SAY WHETHER THE TARGET OF 10 INDUSTRIAL ZONES UNTIL 2028 IS ACHIEVABLE, AS THERE ARE POSITIVE SIGNS AND CHALLENGES. POSITIVE SIGNS ARE THE FOLLOWING:

— POLICY COMMITMENT AND PLANNING – THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY PUBLISHED DETAILED PLANS ON HOW THESE INDUSTRIAL PARKS WILL BE DEVELOPED;

— EXISTING INDUSTRIAL PARKS AND PARTNERDHIPS – THERE ARE ALREADY SOME PARKS WHICH COULD BE INTEGRATED AND UPGRADED;

— IDENTIFICATION OF STRATEGIC LOCATIONS – THE PARKS SHOULD MOSTLY BE LOCATED ALONG THE VOLTA BASIN (!), ALONGSIDE THE AGRICULTURAL PARKS.

RISKS ARE:

— RESOURCE MOBILISATION AND FUNDING (AS USUAL);

— LAND ACQUISITION, UTILITIES (ELECTRICITY!) AND INFRASTRUCTURE BOTTLENECKS (ALSO AS USUAL);

— IMPLEMENTATION CAPACITY AND COORDINATION;

— ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RISKS (CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES, INVESTOR SENSITIVITY TO POLITICAL CHANGES) .

WEIGHING THE POSITIVE AND THE NEGATIVE FACTORS, WE CAN SAY THAT THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THE TARGET OF 10 INDUSTRIAL PARKS UNTIL 2028 CAN BE MET IF THE SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE (SPV) WORKS WELL AND IS ADEQUATELY RESOURCED, FINANCING IS SECURED, LAND AND UTILITY ISSUES IN THE PRIORITY AREAS ARE RESOLVED QUICKLY AND SUSTAINED AND THERE IS SUSTAINED POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. BUT THERE IS ALSO THE CHANCE THAT SOME OF THE 10 ENVISAGED INDUSTRIAL PARKS WILL NOT BE OPERATIONAL BY 2028, ESPECIALLY IN REMOTE AREAS, OR WHERE INFRASTRUCTURE PROBLEMS ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO SOLVE.

 

CONCLUSION OF BOTH GROW24 AND MAKE24:

THE STRATEGIES FOR BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES  ARE WELL THOUGHT THROUGH, BUT STRATEGIES ARE THEORIES WHICH MUST BE PROVEN IN REALITY. AND THERE ARE SEVERAL CHALLENGES ESPECIALLY IN THE GOVERNMENT’S PLANNING UNTIL 2028/2029, WHICH MIGHT BE A LITTLE BIT TOO POSITIVE SEEN FOR POLITICAL REASONS. MOST OF THE SUCCESS OF BOTH SUB-PROGRAMMES HANGS ON THE QUESTION OF FINANCING. AND THE GOVERNMENT MUST DO SOMETHING TO BALANCE THE INEQUALITY BETWEEN THE REGIONS.

 

WILL PRESIDENT MAHAMA’S 24H+ PROGRAMME SUCCEED?

ARTICLE 5 – CONSTRUCTION

BUILD24 SUB-PROGRAMME

BY

HANS PETER RECKLING

WEBSITE: https://recklingenterprise.com

 

BEFORE WE GET TO THE ANALYSIS, HERE IS A SHORT SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER CONCERNING THE BUILD24 SUB-PROGRAMME

BUILD24 – Infrastructure Backbone of the 24H+ Programme

BUILD24 is the infrastructure-focused sub-programme within Ghana’s 24H+ framework. Its goal is to provide the physical foundation needed to unlock productivity and attract investment. The emphasis is on transport, energy, water, digital connectivity, and social infrastructure       that enable the other pillars of the programme (like GROW24 and MAKE24) to function.

Main Components:

• Transport & Logistics: Roads, bridges, rail links, and modernised ports to reduce costs and connect industrial and agricultural zones.
• Energy: Expanding and stabilising the power grid, with renewable inputs to support industrial parks and manufacturing hubs.
• Water & Irrigation: Dams, boreholes, and irrigation systems to support agriculture and resilience against climate stress.
• Digital Infrastructure: Broadband expansion, fibre-optic corridors, and data centres to support innovation and service delivery.

Social Facilities: Affordable housing, schools, and health centres around new growth hubs to anchor communities.

Challenges:
Land acquisition, high financing costs, weak maintenance culture, coordination gaps across ministries, and the risk of over-concentration of projects in certain regions.

Potential Impact:
If implemented as planned, BUILD24 could reduce structural bottlenecks, make Ghana more competitive for investment, and enable long-term industrialisation. But success depends on sustainable financing, transparency, and balanced regional rollout.

Overlap Across Sub-Programmes

1. Shared Challenges

• Land acquisition & tenure issues → Affects farms (GROW24), factories (MAKE24), and infrastructure sites (BUILD24).
• Financing gaps → All three rely on large, long-term investment with high upfront costs.
• Capacity & skills shortages → Farmers need training (GROW24), workers need technical skills (MAKE24), and engineers/contractors are scarce (BUILD24).
• Regional imbalance → Tendency to cluster projects around Volta/Lake Volta corridor, leaving other regions under-served.

1. Shared Solutions

• Public–private partnerships (PPPs) to spread costs.
• Land reforms to secure access for agriculture, industry, and infrastructure.
• Capacity building & training through technical institutes and community programmes.
• Integrated planning (corridors, clusters, hubs) instead of scattered projects.

1. How They Depend on Each Other

• GROW24 (Agriculture): Needs irrigation, storage facilities, and rural roads — provided by BUILD24.
• MAKE24 (Industry): Needs stable power, industrial parks, and transport corridors — all under BUILD24.
• BUILD24 (Infrastructure): Only makes sense if farms (GROW24) and factories (MAKE24) are ready to use the infrastructure.

SUMMARY PRODUCED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI).

WE SEE IN THE SUMMARY THAT IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED, BUILD24 COULD SOLVE A LOT OF PROBLEMS GHANA HAD IN THE PAST AND STILL HAS RIGHT NOW. THE QUESTION ARISING IS WHETHER IT CAN REALISTICALLY BE IMPLEMENTED COMPLETELY, CONSIDERING THE CHALLENGES BUILD24 AND THE OTHER SUB-PROGRAMMES ARE FACING. ALL THREE, GROW24, MAKE24, AND BUILD24, – AND AS WE WILL LATER SEE, NEARLY ALL THE OTHER SUB-PROGRAMMES – ARE AFFECTED BY LAND ISSUES, FINANCING DIFFICULTIES, AND CAPACITY AND SKILLS SHORTAGES. AND THE SOLUTIONS THE GOVERNMENT OFFERS MAY SOUND NICE IN THEORY, BUT THE REALITY IS MUCH MORE COMPLICATED. APART FROM THE FINANCING ISSUE, AT WHICH WE LOOK LATER WHEN WE EXAMINE THE FUND24 SUB-PROGRAMME, THE SUB-PROGRAMME ARE SO CLOSELY LINKED THAT PROBLEMS IN ONE SUB-PROGRAMME CAN EASILY AFFECT ONE OR MORE OF THE OTHERS.

WE SEE IT IN THE CASE OF BUILD24 THAT IT ONLY MAKE SENSE IF THE FARMS AND FACTORIES ARE READY TO USE IT. THE QUESTION IS – WILL WE ESTABLISH THE FARMS AND FACTORIES FIRST AND THEN BUILD THE INFRASTRUCTURE AROUND IT? THAT WOULD MEAN THAT FARMS AND FACTORIES CAN ONLY PRODUCE EFFECTIVELY WHEN THE INFRASTRUCTURE IS READY; THEY MUST WAIT FOR IT. OR WE START BUILDING ALL THE THREE AT THE SAME TIME. THAT SHOWS THAT IF ANY PROJECT OF GROW24 OR MAKE24 IS FASTER THAN THE PROJECT OF BUILD24, IT MUST WAIT FOR THE BUILD24 PROJECT TO BE COMPLETED. THAT WOULD PRODUCE IN ANY WAY A LOSS OF TIME FOR GROW24 OR MAKE24. IT SEEMS THAT THERE IS NO PLAN TO COORDINATE THE VARIOUS PROJECTS AND SUB-PROGRAMMES.

EVEN THE INTEGRATED PLANNING WHICH IS SUGGESTED IN THE 24H+ PROGRAMME CAN ONLY HELP PARTIALLY. LET’S HAVE A LOOK AT THE DEFINITION OF INTEGRATED PLANNING:

Integrated planning is a cross-functional approach that aligns resources, stakeholders,     and strategic goals to ensure effective decision-making and resource allocation across an organization or   project.

INTEGRATED PLANNING IN THAT SENSE CANNOT SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS IN THE COORDINATION BETWEEN GROW24, MAKE24, AND BUILD24. IT CAN ONLY SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE MANY OF THE KEY DIFFICULTIES IF IMPLEMENTED PROPERLY. IT CAN SOLVE THE FOLLOWING:

— DUPLICATION OF EFFORTS – OVERLAPPING INFRASTRUCTURE OR INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS AT THE SAME TIME;

— RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

— DATA AND MONITORING;

— REGIONAL BALANCE (WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT WANTS TO ACHIEVE THIS IS A DIFFERENT QUESTION. I HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT THE REGIONAL IMBALANCE OF THE 24H+ PROGRAMME).

WHAT INTEGRATED PLANNING CANNOT SOLVE IS THE FOLLOWING: INSTITUTIONAL, POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REALITIES CAN LIMIT PROPER IMPLEMENTATION.

—- INSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTATION;

— FUNDING DISPARITIES;

— HUMAN RESOURCE GAPS;

— POLITICAL AND REGIONAL PRESSUES.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 24H+ ECONOMY SECRETARIAT CAN HELP SOLVING THESE ISSUES, AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS MOVED TO CONVERT IT INTO A STATUTORY AUTHORITY, BUT UNTIL NOW IT HAS ONLY PASSED THE CABINET, AND IS STILL TO BE APPROVED BY PARLIAMENT. IN MY OPINION, THE PROCEDURE LASTS A LITTLE BIT TOO LONG FOR THE AMBITIOUS OVERALL PROJECT THE GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO ESTABLISH WITH THE 24H+ PROGRAMME. AND EVEN IF – WHEN – THE 24H+ ECONOMY SECRETARIAT IS APPROVED BY PARLIAMENT, IT CANNOT SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS WHICH OCCUR WITH THE ATTEMPTED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUB-PROGRAMMES INCLUDED BUILD24. ALL THE SUB-PROGRAMMES – PERHAPS EXCEPT FUND24 – NEED LEADERSHIP CONTINUITY, INSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINE, AND MERIT-BASED MANAGEMENT.

LEADERSHIP CONTINUITY INVOLVES POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY, WHICH GHANA HAS ONLY SHOWN PARTIALLY IN THE PAST. POLITICAL CYCLES – PARTY CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT – HAVE USUALLY INTERRUPTED CONTINUITY, ALTHOUGH IN SOME SECTORS, E.G. EDUCATION AND COCOA – HAVE SHOWN SOME KIND OF INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY.

ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE SOME EXAMPLES OF DISCONTINUITY. THESE ARE

— AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMMES,

— INDUSTRIALISATION INITIATIVES,

— LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND DECENTRALISATION,

— YOUTH EMPLOYMENT AND SKILLS PROGRAMMES.

WE SEE THAT THESE SECTORS WHICH SHOWED DISCONTIMUITY IN THE PAST ARE JUST THE ONES COVERED BY THE 24H+ ECONOMY PROGRAMME. FOR THE PROGRAMME IT MEANS THAT THE PROGRAMME MUST BE INSTITUTIONALISED AS LONG AS PUBLIC INTEREST AND DONOR ATTENTION ARE HIGH. THAT IN TURN MEANS  THAT THE PROGRAMME MUST BE EMBEDDED IN A LAW – PROBABLY THROUGH THELAW – PROBABLY THROUGH THE 24H ECONOMY AUTHORITY ACT -, THAT THERE MUST BE A TECHNOCRATIC MANAGEMENT TEAM WHICH OUTLASTS ELECTIONS. AND THERE MUST BE THE BUILDING OF BROAD BIPARTISAN SUPPORT.

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT COMPONENT TO IMPLEMENT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IS TO ELIMINATE OR AT LEAST MINIMISE CORRUPTION. SOME PEOPLE WILL SAY THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE TECHNOCRATIC MANAGEMENT TEAM. I SEE THE PROBLEM, BUT I ALSO SAY THAT IT IS POSSIBLE  IF TECHNOCRACY IS LEGALLY PROTECTED, DIGITALLY TRANSPARENT, PUBLICLY MONITORED , AND MORALLY REWARDED. CORRUPTION MUST NO LONGER BE PART OF GHANAIAN CULTURE, GHANA MUST COMMIT TO

— GENUINE TECHNOCRATIC MANAGEMENT IN MAJOR PROGRAMMES,

— FULL DIGITALISATION OF STATE FUNCTIONS,

— CONSISTENT SANCTIONS FOR ABUSE.

(DETAILS CAN FOLLOW IN A POSSIBLE DISCUSSION.)

THE LAST QUESTION IN THIS CONTEXT IS WHETHER GHANA IS READY TO MINIMISE CORRUPTION, BECAUSE THAT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WHOLE 24H+ PROGRAMME.

ON PAPER, GHANA IS SURELY READY, BUT IN PRACTICE, THERE IS A LOT TO BE DONE. THE BOTTLENECK IS IN APPLICATION OF THE EXCELLENT THEORIES AND THE CONSISTENCY OF THE R. DETAILS FOR THIS CAN ALSO FOLLOW IN A POSSIBLE DISCUSSION. THEREFORE, THE CONCLUSION IS THAT GHANA’S SYSTEMS ARE READY, THE COUNTRY ITSELF NOT YET.

LET US NOW GO TO INSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINE AND MERIT-BASED MANAGEMENT.

INSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINE MEANS THAT INSTITUTIONS GUIDE           DECISIONS, ENFORCE RULES, AND ENSURES CONSISTENCY. IN BRIEF IT MEANS THAT SYSTEMS WORK ACCORDING TO RULES, NOT PERSONALITIES. HOW FAR THIS IMPLIES FOR THE VARIOUS SUB-PROGRAMMES IS LEFT FOR A POSSIBLE DISCUSSION.

MERIT-BASED MANAGEMENT MEANS THAT APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS, AND LEADERSHIP ROLES ARE GIVEN TO COMPETENT PROFESSIONALS BASED ON SKILLS, QUALIFICATIONS, AND PERFORMANCE, NOT POLITICAL LOYALTY. PEOPLE MANAGE THE PROGRAMME BECAUSE THEY ARE GOOD ON THE JOB, NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE IN THE RIGHT PARTY. (DETAILS AS USUAL) BOTH PRINCIPLES ARE COMPLEMENTARY.

NOW THE QUESTION MUST AUTOMATICALLY COME UP WHETHER GHANA IS READY FOR THESE PRINCIPLES. THE RESULT OF MY RESEARCH IS THAT THE BARRIER IN GHANA IS NOT THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, BUT THE POLITICISATION OF ADMINISTRATION. GHANREQUIRES A SHIFT OF THE POLITICAL MINDSET. THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP MUST VALUE THESE PRINCIPLES THERE MUST ALSO BE A CULTURAL SHIFT AWAY FROM CONNECTIONS OVER COMPETENCE. BUT THERE IS HOPE, AS

— PERFORMANCE METRICS ARE DEBATED ONLINE,

— INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM IS EXPOSING FAVOURITISM,

— CIVIL SERVANTS ARE FORMING PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS.

WE SEE THAT THE OLD CULTURE STILL PERSISTS, BUT THERE IS HOPE FOR A BETTER FUTURE. IF THIS BETTER FUTURE COMES EARLY ENOUGH FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 24H+ ECONOMY PROGRAMME IS LEFT TO BE SEEN.

AS WE HAVE SEEN THAT THE FUNDAMENTALS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS ARE THE SAME FOR ALL SUB-PROGRAMMES EXCEPT FUND24, I WILL COMBINE SHOW24, CONNECT24, ASPIRE24, AND GO24 IN ONE ARTICLE, AND THEN CONCENTRATE ON ANALYSING FUND24 AND THEN A CONCLUDING ARTICLE WHICH CAPTURES THE IF, HOW AND  .WHEN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WHOLE 24H+ ECONOMY PROGRAMME.

 

WILL PRESIDENT MAHAMA’S 24H+ ECONOMY PROGRAMME SUCCEED?

ARTICLE 6

SHOW24, CONNECT24, ASPIRE24, GO24

BY

HANS PETER RECKLING

WEBSITE: https://recklingenterprise.com

 

 

The Social Transformation Wing of the 24H+ Programme: An Integrated Analysis of SHOW24, CONNECT24, ASPIRE24, and GO24

Executive Summary

The social transformation wing of Ghana’s 24H+ Programme — comprising SHOW24, CONNECT24, ASPIRE24, and GO24 — aims to reshape public attitudes, strengthen civic engagement, and promote unity as foundations for sustainable national development. Conceptually, it is one of the most innovative aspects of the 24H+ framework, linking social change to economic transformation.

However, implementation realities expose deep structural and behavioural constraints. Weak inter-ministerial coordination, irregular funding, and limited monitoring systems undermine effectiveness. Public mistrust of government communication further reduces engagement, while politicisation risks turning programmes like SHOW24 and GO24 into partisan instruments. The absence of credible leadership by example also limits the moral authority needed to drive mindset change.

While these initiatives could in theory promote transparency, participation, and social cohesion, in practice they remain vulnerable to institutional inertia and political volatility. Unless Ghana addresses these systemic weaknesses, the social pillar of the 24H+ Programme may remain its weakest link — visionary in design but constrained by a political and societal environment not yet ready for deep behavioural transformation.

1. Introduction

The Government of Ghana’s 24H+ Programme presents an ambitious vision of an economy and society that function productively around the clock. While its economic and infrastructural components — such as GROW24, BUILD24, and MAKE24 — target production, employment, and investment, a parallel set of initiatives focuses on the social and behavioural transformation required to sustain this vision. These are SHOW24, CONNECT24, ASPIRE24, and GO24 — collectively referred to as the social transformation wing of the 24H+ framework.

Their mission is to change attitudes, promote civic engagement, and build a shared sense of national purpose. However, as this paper argues, these objectives, though laudable, face deep structural, institutional, and socio-political barriers. Without a cultural environment and governance system prepared for such transformation, these sub-programmes risk remaining largely symbolic.

1. Shared Objectives and Core Philosophy

The four social sub-programmes were conceived to work in synergy to influence mindsets and encourage citizen participation in national transformation.

• SHOW24 is intended to publicise progress and achievements under the 24H+ agenda, building transparency and national pride.
• CONNECT24 aims to link citizens, communities, and institutions through digital platforms and participatory networks.
• ASPIRE24 focuses on motivation, work ethics, and leadership development, especially among youth and professionals.
• GO24 uses sports and culture to promote unity, discipline, and social inclusion.

Together, they seek to cultivate a society that is productive, cohesive, and values-driven, supporting the economic pillars of the 24H+ programme.

Yet, this ideal assumes a level of institutional discipline, civic trust, and coordination that Ghana’s public sector and political culture have struggled to achieve. The underlying philosophy of these sub-programmes — that behavioural change can be engineered through top-down government initiatives — remains ambitious but potentially unrealistic within the current social context.

1. Implementation Framework

Implementation of the social transformation wing rests on a mix of communication, digital engagement, education, and community mobilisation. SHOW24 depends heavily on public broadcasting and information campaigns; CONNECT24 on digital platforms and data systems; ASPIRE24 on mentorship, training, and value reorientation; and GO24 on sports and cultural mobilisation.

In theory, these mechanisms are mutually reinforcing. In practice, however, their implementation has been uneven. Institutional fragmentation — with responsibilities scattered across the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the NCCE, and the 24H+ Secretariat — has led to overlaps and slow coordination.

Moreover, these initiatives depend on sustained funding from FUND24, which itself faces delays and political contestation. Most community-level activities have either not started or operate only in pilot forms, undermining visibility and public confidence. The digital tools envisioned under CONNECT24, though innovative on paper, remain largely conceptual due to weak technical infrastructure and inconsistent internet access across regions.

1. Shared Challenges

While all 24H+ sub-programmes face structural bottlenecks, the social transformation pillar is p7articularly vulnerable because it relies on intangible outcomes such as behavioural change and civic participation — areas where Ghana’s governance culture faces persistent challenges.

1. Coordination and Bureaucratic Inefficiency
   The lack of a unified management framework undermines inter-ministerial collaboration. Competition for visibility among ministries has occasionally replaced cooperation, and the absence of clear performance benchmarks makes accountability difficult.
2. Funding Shortfalls and Delays
   FUND24’s budgetary constraints have been widely reported, and the social components are often the first to suffer cuts. Without predictable financing, campaigns and training initiatives stall, leaving communication efforts sporadic and disjointed.
3. Public Skepticism and Behavioural Resistance
   Deep-rooted mistrust of government programmes, shaped by decades of political inconsistency, hampers citizen buy-in. Many Ghanaians view initiatives like SHOW24 or ASPIRE24 as rhetorical exercises rather than genuine empowerment tools. Changing public attitudes requires not only communication but also demonstrable improvements in governance integrity and service delivery.
4. Weak Monitoring and Evaluation Systems
   There are no reliable indicators for measuring “mindset change” or “national pride.” Without baseline data and independent evaluation, it is almost impossible to assess progress. Consequently, feedback loops are weak, and lessons are seldom institutionalised.
5. Politicisation and Media Capture
   The communication-based nature of SHOW24 and GO24 exposes them to political influence. Instead of promoting nonpartisan civic messages, they risk becoming extensions of government propaganda. Such politicisation would erode the credibility of the entire 24H+ framework.
6. Societal Readiness
   Finally, Ghana’s socio-political context — characterised by patronage politics, institutional weakness, and uneven civic discipline — raises doubts about the society’s readiness for the type of behavioural transformation envisioned. Without credible leadership by example, the call for attitudinal change may not resonate.
7. Expected Impacts and Realistic Prospects

If implemented effectively, the four sub-programmes could provide an important social foundation for Ghana’s transformation. SHOW24 could enhance transparency, CONNECT24 could democratise participation, ASPIRE24 could cultivate ambition and professionalism, and GO24 could promote unity through sports and culture.

However, given the systemic weaknesses described above, the likely outcome in the short to medium term is partial or symbolic success. Visibility may improve, some communication channels may be established, and a few youth initiatives may succeed, but deep behavioural transformation will require generational consistency — something Ghana’s changing political landscape rarely provides.

Without institutional insulation from political cycles and clear performance metrics, these sub-programmes risk becoming another set of well-intentioned policies that fade with administrative transitions.

1. Policy and Strategic Recommendations

1. Establish a Single Social Transformation Coordination Unit:
   Create a central coordinating mechanism within the 24H+ Secretariat that consolidates all communication, civic, and cultural activities, ensuring accountability and resource efficiency.
2. Secure Dedicated Funding Windows:
   Allocate stable, multi-year funding for mindset and civic education projects, protected from short-term political and fiscal fluctuations.
3. Develop Measurable Social Indicators:
   Introduce quantifiable metrics — such as civic participation indices, volunteerism rates, or digital engagement levels — to track impact.
4. Depoliticise Public Communication:
   Maintain editorial independence for SHOW24 content and require transparent reporting standards to prevent political bias.
5. Strengthen Local Partnerships:
   Engage civil society, private media, schools, and community leaders to deliver programmes. Top-down government campaigns alone cannot reshape values.
6. Leadership by Example:
   Visible ethical conduct by political and institutional leaders is essential. No communication campaign can succeed without credible role models at the top.

1. Conclusion

The social transformation wing of the 24H+ Programme — embodied in SHOW24, CONNECT24, ASPIRE24, and GO24 — represents a crucial yet fragile dimension of Ghana’s national development agenda. Its conceptual foundation is sound: economic progress must rest on civic responsibility, national unity, and ethical conduct. But the gulf between concept and reality remains wide.

Persistent weaknesses in coordination, funding, and political neutrality threaten to render these initiatives symbolic rather than transformative. Ghana’s governance culture still struggles with partisanship, limited institutional discipline, and a public that often doubts the sincerity of official programmes. Under such conditions, the behavioural and mindset change envisioned by the 24H+ designers is unlikely to materialise quickly.

Unless government institutions demonstrate consistency, credibility, and measurable results, the social pillar could become the weakest link in the 24H+ framework — strong in rhetoric, but shallow in implementation. The 24H+ idea remains visionary, but Ghana’s readiness to realise it, particularly on the social front, remains uncertain.

(THIS ARTICLE WAS PRODUCED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE – AI)

 

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FUND24 serves as the financial core of Ghana’s 24H+ Economy Programme, intended to mobilise and coordinate national and external financing for all associated sub-programmes. Its overarching goal is to create a transparent, diversified, and sustainable development-finance system that reduces dependence on short-term borrowing and aligns fiscal resources with long-term national priorities.

At the centre of FUND24 lies the proposed National Development Financing Mechanism (NDFM) — a framework designed to unify institutions such as the Development Bank Ghana (DBG), the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund (GIIF), and the Ghana EXIM Bank under one coordinated financing strategy. Yet, as of late 2025, the NDFM remains largely conceptual: institutional fragmentation, weak fiscal space, and limited regulatory alignment delay its full operationalisation.

The government’s revenue-mobilisation intentions—anchored in the Medium-Term Revenue Strategy (MTRS 2024–2027) and the Sustainable Financing Framework (2021)—focus on five pillars: tax reform and digitalisation, natural-resource revenue stabilisation, public-asset optimisation, green-bond issuance, and diaspora-investment mobilisation. While ambitious, these measures face persistent structural constraints, notably a narrow tax base, enforcement weaknesses, and exposure to commodity-price volatility.

FUND24’s success will depend on the effective integration of existing financial institutions, transparent fund allocation, and consistent political commitment. Current trends suggest that full operational functionality may not be achieved before 2027, meaning the broader 24H+ Programme will remain financially fragmented in the near term. The experience of the Ghana–China Business Summit (June 2025)—where several MoUs are still awaiting implementation—illustrates how long it typically takes for policy agreements to mature into tangible investment.

A robust FUND24 will require a legal and institutional consolidation process, creation of a central development-finance account, and strong digital oversight through real-time monitoring systems. If these reforms are successfully enacted between 2026 and 2028, FUND24 could evolve into Ghana’s first integrated national financing mechanism. If not, the 24H+ Economy risks remaining a conceptual framework without sufficient fiscal traction.

FUND24 — Financing the 24H+ Economy

1. Core Purpose

FUND24 is conceived as the financial pillar of Ghana’s 24H+ Economy Programme — the sub-programme responsible for mobilising, coordinating, and sustaining financial resources across all 24H+ initiatives. It aims to create a stable, transparent, and diversified financial foundation for Ghana’s transition toward a productive, export-driven, and continuously operating economy.

1. Historical and Policy Background

Ghana’s development finance landscape has long been fragmented, marked by dependence on external borrowing, commodity export revenues, and donor inflows.
Institutions such as the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund (GIIF), the Ghana EXIM Bank, and the Development Bank Ghana (DBG) were established to expand access to long-term capital, but have largely operated in isolation, with overlapping mandates and uncoordinated funding pipelines.

FUND24 intends to reverse this pattern by establishing a National Development Financing Mechanism (NDFM) — a unified structure to align financial flows, harmonise institutional mandates, and coordinate both public and private investment in line with the 24H+ strategy.
This effort fits within Ghana’s IMF-supported fiscal reform agenda and the Medium-Term Revenue Strategy (MTRS 2024–2027), both of which emphasise domestic resource mobilisation, fiscal discipline, and sustainable debt management.

1. Strategic Objectives

• Build a diversified, sustainable financing structure combining domestic, concessional, and private capital sources.
• Reduce reliance on short-term borrowing and strengthen access to affordable long-term finance.
• Institutionalise fiscal transparency and accountability through digital monitoring systems.
• Attract private, diaspora, and international investment into infrastructure, industry, and innovation.
• Promote financial inclusion and SME access to credit via risk-sharing and guarantee mechanisms.
• Initial efforts under the IMF programme to improve revenue predictability and transparency.

But in practice, no unified operational allocation system exists yet. Financing decisions remain sectoral and project-based, without central coordination under FUND24.

 

1. The National Development Financing Mechanism (NDFM): Policy vs. Reality

The NDFM is meant to act as the central coordination hub of Ghana’s development finance ecosystem — linking the Ministry of Finance, GIIF, DBG, EXIM Bank, and other agencies.
As of late 2025, however, it remains conceptually defined but not yet institutionally realised.

Key institutional realities:

1. Development Bank Ghana (DBG) – Disbursed over GH₵600 million to SMEs and agriculture in 2024, but governance issues (board dissolution in 2025) disrupted confidence.
2. GIIF – Secured US$75 million from the AfDB to expand infrastructure financing; effective but limited in scale.
3. Integrated National Financing Framework (INFF) – Designed with UNDP to align financing flows with SDGs; analytical in scope, not yet operational.
4. PPP Programme – Estimated US$37 billion infrastructure gap; progress constrained by investor risk perceptions and slow project structuring.

Assessment:
The NDFM exists in partial form through these institutions, but FUND24’s envisioned unified mechanism has yet to emerge. Institutional integration remains the largest single challenge.

1. Fund Mobilisation and Allocation Framework

The Fund Mobilisation and Allocation Framework under FUND24 seeks to consolidate revenues from the national budget, natural resource proceeds, development banks, and private investors into a single structured pool for strategic allocation.

So far, Ghana has established:

• The INFF and MTRS 2024–2027 as conceptual bases.
• The Sustainable Financing Framework (2021) and Green Finance Taxonomy (2024) for ESG and environmental alignment.
• Initial efforts under the IMF programme to improve revenue predictability and transparency.

But in practice, no unified operational allocation system exists yet. Financing decisions remain sectoral and project-based, without central coordination under FUND24.

 

5A. Revenue Mobilisation Intentions and Analysis

The effectiveness of FUND24 depends fundamentally on Ghana’s ability to generate predictable, sustainable, and diversified domestic revenues to feed into its financing mechanisms.
The government’s revenue mobilisation intentions are embedded in the Medium-Term Revenue Strategy (MTRS 2024–2027), the Sustainable Financing Framework (2021), and the emerging Integrated National Financing Framework (INFF).

Key Revenue Mobilisation Pillars

1. Domestic Tax Reforms

• Expansion of the VAT and e-VAT systemto improve compliance and close loopholes.
• Broadening of the tax base by integrating informal sector actors through digital ID and mobile-money records.
• Enhanced analytics within the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) to curb leakages.

1. Natural Resource Revenues and Royalties

• Improved transparency in gold, oil, and lithiumroyalties through digital tracking.
• A proposed stabilisation bufferwithin FUND24 to shield public investments from commodity price shocks.
• Possible earmarking of part of the gold-for-reserves proceedsfor long-term infrastructure funding.

1. Public Asset Optimisation

• Conversion of dormant state assets into revenue streams via public–private leasing and joint ventures.
• Monetisation of government-owned real estate and digital assets under GIIF.

1. Green and Thematic Financing Instruments

• Issuance of Green, Social, and Sustainability Bonds (GSSBs)under the Sustainable Financing Framework.
• Use of climate finance and carbon creditsto support renewable energy and agriculture projects within GROW24 and BUILD24.

1. Diaspora and Domestic Savings Mobilisation

• Launch of Diaspora Bondsto attract long-term investment from Ghanaians abroad.
• Incentivising pension and insurance funds to channel savings into development projects.

Analytical Assessment

Ghana’s revenue mobilisation agenda is ambitious but uneven in implementation potential.
Structural weaknesses — such as a narrow tax base, limited compliance, and fiscal deficits — constrain the achievable pace. Digitalisation could raise non-oil domestic revenues by 2–3% of GDP by 2027 if consistently enforced, yet GRA capacity and legal enforcement remain weak.

Reliance on natural resource proceeds introduces volatility. Without automatic stabilisation rules and disciplined fund management, windfall revenues could again be lost to short-term fiscal consumption.
Hence, success will depend on institutional coordination, transparent rules, and the depoliticisation of revenue flows.
The government’s ability to demonstrate visible returns on new taxes and bonds will be decisive in building public and investor confidence.

6. Implementation Strategy

• Lead institutions: Ministry of Finance, Bank of Ghana, GIIF, DBG, EXIM Bank.
• Oversight: Proposed 24H+ Financial Steering Committee to approve projects and monitor resource flows.
• Phases:

• Phase I (2025–2026):Institutional consolidation, fiscal mapping, donor coordination.
• Phase II (2027–2028):Expansion through PPPs, diaspora bonds, and blended finance.
• Phase III (2029–2030):Full national integration of financing flows under FUND24.

 

7. Expected Outcomes

• Predictable, transparent, and sustainable financing for all 24H+ sub-programmes.
• Enhanced fiscal discipline and public accountability.
• Greater liquidity for productive sectors and infrastructure.
• Improved investor and donor confidence in Ghana’s development finance ecosystem.

8. Persistent Challenges

• Tight fiscal space and debt-service pressures.
• Overlapping mandates among financial institutions.
• Weak digital integration and information-sharing.
• Inconsistent accountability mechanisms.
• Bureaucratic inertia and political transitions affecting continuity.

9. Integration within the 24H+ Framework

FUND24 is the connective tissue of the 24H+ Programme.
Without it, the other sub-programmes — BUILD24, MAKE24, GROW24, CONNECT24, ASPIRE24, and GO24 — remain financially isolated.
A functioning FUND24 is therefore a precondition for an integrated, scalable, and measurable 24H+ Economy.

10. Implementation Outlook (2025–2030)

Given current fiscal and institutional conditions, the operational realisation of FUND24’s core frameworks — the NDFM and the Fund Mobilisation & Allocation Framework — will likely take 1–2 years.

• Institutional coordination among MoF, GIIF, DBG, EXIM Bank, and NDPC will require at least 12–18 months.
• Fiscal constraints under the IMF programme restrict expansion until 2026.
• Legal and digital systems for FUND24 are still being drafted.
• Political transitions could delay further into 2027.

Comparative example – Ghana–China Business Summit (June 2025):
That summit produced multiple MoUs on industrial parks, energy, and agriculture. Yet as of late 2025, no major investment has materialised beyond feasibility studies — showing that in Ghana’s institutional setting, even high-level MoUs often need 18–24 months before they translate into real projects.
FUND24 faces the same structural test: transforming frameworks into operational investments requires time, coherence, and legal authority.

Analytical summary: 

The groundwork for FUN D24 is being laid, but its financial machinery remains under construction. Until FUND24 becomes operati  onal — realistically not before 2027 — the 24H+ Programme will remain fragmented and under-financed. Its success will test Ghana’s capacity to turn fiscal ambition into institutional delivery.

11. Reform and Poli cy Recommendations (2026–2028)

To convert FUND24 from a  policy design into a functioning national financing mechanism, Ghana must implement targeted reforms across six key areas:

1. Legal and Institutiona l Consolidation

1. Enact a FUND24 Act or Executive Instrument to coordinate all development-finance entities.
2. Clarify roles within the   NDFM to avoid duplication.
3. Empower the NDPC to  enforce financial alignment with national priorities.

1. Fiscal and Financial Int egration

1. Create a Consolidated  Development Finance Account (CDFA) in the Ministry of Finance.
2. Link FUND24 to the MTRS for stable inflows.
3. Introduce a unified financial-tracking system for transparency.

1. Domestic Resource Mobilisation and Private Capital Attraction

1. Operationalise blended-finance instruments such as PPP co-financing and credit guarantees.
2. Issue Diaspora and Green Bonds tied to sustainability frameworks.
3. Engage pension and insurance funds to unlock long-term domestic capital.

1. Digital Oversight and Transparency

1. Build a FUND24 Digital Monitoring Dashboard integrated with GIFMIS.
2. Enable real-time disbursement and performance tracking.
3. Publish annual FUND24 reports to ensure accountability.

1. Capacity Building and Institutional Discipline

1. Apply performance-based budgeting to all 24H+ projects.
2. Strengthen analytical and risk-management capacity in financial agencies.
3. Enforce merit-based leadership across institutions.

1. Political and Policy Stability

1. Anchor FUND24 as a non-partisan mechanism with cross-party oversight.
2. Ensure continuity across electoral cycles via parliamentary monitoring.
3. Institutionalise public–private dialogue forums for stakeholder stability.

Analytical Conclusion

FUND24’s long-term success will depend not on new institutions but on integrating and disciplining existing ones.
The years 2026–2028 will be decisive. If Ghana achieves legal consolidation, fiscal integration, and transparent oversight, FUND24 can evolve from a conceptual framework into a powerful national financing engine.
If reforms lag — as illustrated by the slow conversion of the Ghana–China MoUs into actual investment — the 24H+ Economy will remain financially fragmented and dependent on short-term improvisation.

(This article was written with the assistance of Artificial Intelligence – AI.)

 

The 24H+ Economy: Ghana’s Vision of Transformation Meets the Fiscal Wall

When the government of Ghana unveiled the 24H+ Economy concept, it was presented as nothing less than a new development paradigm. The idea — that Ghana’s economy should function seamlessly day and night, with productive activities distributed across all regions — sought to reposition the country as a logistics and industrial hub for West Africa.

In principle, the framework is compelling. It aligns agriculture (through GROW24), manufacturing (MAKE24), infrastructure (BUILD24), technology and innovation (ASPIRE24), financing (FUND24), and several sectoral initiatives under one integrated umbrella. It promises jobs, export diversification, and balanced regional growth — a formula any economy would envy.

But good economics does not automatically translate into feasible policy. And as the programme moves from concept to execution, the gap between vision and fiscal reality is becoming increasingly visible.

A grand plan in a constrained economy

The 24H+ Economy arrives at a time when Ghana’s public finances are at their most fragile in decades. Following the 2022–2023 debt crisis and the subsequent IMF Extended Credit Facility, the government remains in a tight fiscal corner. Domestic arrears persist, interest payments absorb over half of total revenue, and capital expenditure is chronically underfunded.

Against this background, the 24H+ initiative faces a simple but uncomfortable question: how can a government already struggling to meet basic obligations finance such an expansive programme?

The answer — for now — lies in FUND24, a proposed financing mechanism meant to blend public, private, and external sources. On paper, FUND24 will pool capital from development partners, the private sector, and sovereign resources, using the state as a coordinator rather than a spender. In practice, however, it remains a shell without proven capacity.

The risk is evident: Ghana could replicate the pattern that led to its debt distress in the first place — borrowing for transformation while neglecting fiscal consolidation. Unless the 24H+ framework includes strict safeguards against new debt accumulation, it may inadvertently deepen the country’s financial vulnerability.

The regional imbalance problem

Equally significant is the issue of regional equity. Although the 24H+ Economy is marketed as a nationwide strategy, early signs point to a spatially uneven rollout. Infrastructure investments, pilot industrial clusters, and logistics corridors have been concentrated around Greater Accra, Ashanti, and Central Regions, while northern and coastal peripheries remain largely at the planning stage.

This is not a new story. For decades, Ghana’s economic geography has revolved around a southern growth corridor — from Tema through Kumasi — with the rest of the country lagging behind. The 24H+ framework risks reinforcing this imbalance if its interventions are not deliberately weighted toward disadvantaged regions.

For example, while the Volta Basin agricultural transformation (a component of GROW24) has strong potential to boost northern productivity, financing delays and limited road connectivity have slowed progress. Meanwhile, urban projects under BUILD24 — such as the 24-hour logistics zones and industrial enclaves — are already advancing where the infrastructure is strongest.

The result could be a two-speed transformation: an accelerated southern economy and a periphery left behind, precisely the opposite of what the policy intends.

Institutional inertia and governance fatigue

Beyond finance and geography lies the deeper structural question of institutional capacity. The 24H+ Economy requires seamless coordination between ministries, metropolitan assemblies, and regional administrations — a level of inter-agency discipline Ghana’s bureaucracy rarely achieves.

Project implementation units are under-resourced, and accountability frameworks are still vague. The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), which should play a central monitoring role, lacks the enforcement authority to ensure compliance across sectors. Meanwhile, overlapping mandates among ministries risk producing bureaucratic turf wars rather than synergy.

Moreover, the politicisation of the initiative has blurred its administrative boundaries. The 24H+ Economy has evolved from a technocratic policy instrument into a political narrative — a flagship slogan meant to symbolise economic renewal. As election cycles draw near, the temptation to treat 24H+ as a campaign identity rather than a national development pact will grow stronger.

To be fair, this is not a problem unique to the current administration. Successive governments, regardless of party, have shown a tendency to overpromise transformation while underestimating the fiscal and institutional discipline required to achieve it. There is, in short, bipartisan continuity in the mistakes.

The financing illusion

Even if FUND24 were fully operational, the deeper question remains: what is the private sector’s appetite for large-scale participation in a programme heavily dependent on state facilitation? Ghana’s private sector is already grappling with high interest rates, limited access to long-term finance, and the aftermath of the domestic debt exchange. Expecting it to anchor a major transformation effort without significant risk mitigation may be unrealistic.

Development partners, too, are cautious. With IMF oversight ongoing, new concessional financing must fit within strict debt-sustainability parameters. That leaves little room for the sort of expansive capital spending the 24H+ vision implies.

Unless the government identifies alternative revenue channels, improves tax efficiency, and enforces expenditure control, the financial backbone of 24H+ will remain aspirational.

Why the idea still matters

Yet, dismissing the 24H+ Economy entirely would be shortsighted. The vision of a round-the-clock economy — one that integrates production, logistics, and digital innovation — is strategically sound. It acknowledges that Ghana’s next growth frontier lies not in more resource extraction but in higher productivity across time, space, and sectors.

If properly implemented, GROW24 could stabilise food security; MAKE24 could rebuild local industry; BUILD24 could modernise infrastructure; and ASPIRE24 could foster a culture of innovation. The ambition is right. The weakness lies in the misalignment between ambition and capacity.

What Ghana needs now is a scaled, fiscally realistic version of the 24H+ Economy — one that prioritises catalytic interventions with measurable impact rather than a grand, all-embracing plan. Transparency, regional targeting, and merit-based implementation must take precedence over symbolism.

A call for pragmatic realism

The 24H+ Economy embodies both the promise and the peril of Ghana’s policymaking tradition: bold ideas constrained by financial and institutional reality. The government deserves credit for thinking beyond electoral cycles, yet it must now prove that such thinking can survive them.

Transforming the vision into reality requires radical fiscal honesty, regional fairness, and institutional discipline — virtues that have too often been sacrificed to political convenience. Without them, the 24H+ Economy risks becoming another impressive policy architecture that the state simply cannot afford to build.

(This article was prepared with the assistance of Artificial Intelligence – AI.)

SINCE YESTERDAY, 7TH OF AUGUST 2025, THE U.S.A. HAVE IMPOSED A 15% TARIFF ON ALL GOODS IMPORTED FROM GHANA. WITH THAQT, GHANA IS PART OF A GROUP OF 15 AFRICAN NATIONS ON WHICH A TARIFF OF 15%z IS IMPLEMENTED,

GHANA HAS A TRADE SURPLUS WITH THE U.S.A., AND THAT MIGHT BE THE REASON WHY THE TARIFF WAS PUT ON GHANA. THE TRADE SURPLUS AMOUNTS TO 19 MILLION US-DOLLARS IN FAVOUR OF GHANA. IN MAY 2025, GHANA EXPORTED GOODS WORTH 108 MILLION US-DOLLARS TO THE U.S.A, WGILE THE COUNTRY IMPORTED GOODS WORTH 88.6 MILLION US-DOLLARS FROM THE U.S.A.

GHANA MAINLY EXPORTS COCOA BEANS, COCOA PASTE AND COCOA POWDER TO THE U.S.A. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE EXPORT OF COCOA BEANS IS 8 TIMES AS HIGH AS THE EXPORT OF COCOA PASTE AND COCOA POWDER TOGETHER, BUT THIS IS THE SUBJEDT FOR A DIFFERENT ARTICLE (MARCH 2025; SOURCE: BING CO-PILOT).

AS THE U.S.A. TARIFFS ON COTE D’IVOIRE – ANOTHER BIG COCOA PRODUCER ARE ALSO 15%, THE TARIFFS WOULDN’T MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE IN THE PRICE FOR COCOA AND COCOA PRODUCTS FROM BOTH COUNTRIES. AND AS THE U.S.A WILL HARDLY BE ABLE TO GROW COCOA IN THEIR COUNTRY, THE OTHER ARGUMENT OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION THAT PRDUCTION OF GOODS SHOULD BE BROUGHT BACK TO THE COUNTRY DOES ALSO NOT APPLY TO COCOA.

THEREFORE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TARIFFS ON COUNTRIES – AND ESPECIALLY AFRICAN COUNTRIES – IS A GENERAL PROBLEM. TRUMP’S ADMINISTRATION TRIES TO “CONQUER” COUNTRIES THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TARIFFS. WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES TRY TO ACHIEVE BY MILI TARY FORCE, TRUMP’S ADMINISTRATION TRIES THE ECONOMY WAY.  GOOD EXAMPLES FOR THAT ARE BRAZIL, WHERE TRUMP TRIES TO PUNISH THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION FOR TAKING THE FORMER PRESIDENT TO COURT, AND INDIA FOR BUYING OIL FROM RUSSIA. FURTHERMORE, BOTH COUNTRIES ARE PUNISHED FOR BEING MEMBERS OF THE BRICS ORGANISATION.

AS TRUMP’S POLICIES ARE UNPREDICTABLE. THE ONLY THING WE CAN SAY IS THAT HE ALWAYS CHANGES HIS POLICIES WHEN HE THINKS THAT IT SERVES HIS OWN INTERESTS BETTER. THEREFORE, THE U.S.A. APPEAR UNRELIABLE AS A TRADING PARTNER, ESPECIALLY FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

ON THE OTHER HAND, CHINA APPEARS TO BE AN ALTERNATIVE AS A TRADING PARTNER. GHANA HAS ALREADY JOINED THE BELT-AND-ROAD INIATIVE IN 2018, AND UNTIL NOW, THE COOPERATION OF GHANA WITH CHINA IS ONLY OF ADVANTAGE FOR GHANATHE COPERATIN WITH CHINA IS FOR OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES. 

ALSO, A MEMBERSHIP OR AT LEAST AN OBSERVER STATUS IN THE BRICS ORGANISATION SHOULD NOT BE LEFT OUT OF SIGHT. THIS ORGANISATION OFFERS FINANCIAL AND TRADE ADVANTAGES WHICH ARE ESPECIALLY NECESSARY FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES. ALREADY SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES LIKE ETHIOPIA HAVE JOINED THE BRICS ORGANISATIN. EVEN THE AFRICA UNION AS AN ORGANISATION SHOULD TAKE A COOPERATION WITH THE BRICS COUNTRIES INTO CONSIDERATION.

LAST BUT NOT LEAST, AFRICA INCLUDED GHANA SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR OWN “INVENTION”, THE AFRICA CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTER-AFRICAN TRAFE WOULD GIVE THE 54 COUNTRIES A GOOD CHANCE TO BECOME AT LEAST MORE INDEPENDENT FROM EXTERNAL UNPREDICTABILITIES WHICH THE U.S.A. HAVE TO OFFER.

BEFORE WE DIG INTO THE MATTER AT HEART, WE MUST KNOW WHAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DIGITISATION AND DIGITALISATION IS:

 

Digitization converts analog info into digital form, while digitalization transforms processes using digital tech. Digitization is about converting information, while digitalization improves processes and creates new opportunities. (COURTESY OF BING)

 

SO, NO MATTER WHAT THE DIFFERENCE IS, BOTH WORDS HAVE TO DO WITH DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY. AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY IS THE ISSUE OF THE DAY. DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY APPEARS EVERYWHERE IN YOUR LIFE NOWADAYS. AND FOR WHATEVER SUBJECT YOU RESEARCH LITERATURE FOR SCHOOL OR WORK, YOU WILL COME ACROSS DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY. BIG COMPANIES, BANKS AND OTHERS, DEMAND KNOWLEDGE OF DIGITAL KNOWLEDGE AS A FOUNDATION FOR JOBS THEY OFFER. A GOOD EXAMPLE FOR THAT IS THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK – THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE BRICS COUNTRIES BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA, CHINA, AND SOUTH AFRICA. IN ITS STRATEGY FOR THE YEARS 2022-2026, THE BANK DEDICATES A WHOLE CHAPTER TO EXPLAIN THE IMPORTANCE OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY FOR THE WORK IN THE BANK.

 

GHANA HAS STARTED TO IMPLEMENT DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY IN THE LIFE OF EVERYONE, AND THERE SHOULD BE NO WAY BACK. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER ENTERPRISES WOULD LOSE TJEIR COMPETITIVENESS WITHOUT TECHNOLOGY, AND THAT WOULD SURELY BE OF DISADVATAGE FOR THEIR BUSINESS.

 

OF COURSE, DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY CAN ONLY BE USED PROFITABLY, IF THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THIS ARE BUILT. THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY MUST IMPROVE, SO THAT THE USE OF THE INTERNET AND OTHER SERVICES ASSOCIATED WITH DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY CAN BE GUARANTEED WITHOUT INTERRUPTION (REMEMBER THAT THE USE OF THE INTERNET IS WIDELY CONSIDERED AS PART OF HUMAN RIGHTS).

 

AND APART FROM THE TECHNICAL FOUNDATION FOR DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY, THERE IS THE NEED OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM TO BE REFORMED IN A WAY THAT DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY BECOMES THE BASE FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN SCHOOL FROM THE PRIMARY LEVEL ON. TEACHERS MUST BE EQUIPPED WITH KNOWLEDGE ABOUT TECHNOLOGY, SO THAT THEY CAN PASS THIS KNOWLEDGE OVER TO THEIR STUDENTS EFFICIENTLY. FURTHERMORE, SCHOOLS MUST BE SUPPLIED WITH MATERIALS AND DEVICES THAT ENABLE STUDENTS TO BECOME ACQUAINTED WITH DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY.

A REPLY –OR BETTER ADDITION TO MS RACHEL GYABAAH’S ARTICLE IN THE BUSINESS&FINANCIAL TIMES DATED NOVEMBER 20,2024 “BRICS: THE NEED FOR AFRICA TO CAREFULLY BALANCE THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE AMID GLOBAL POWER STRUGGLES”

 

AUTHOR: HANS PETER RECKLING

ORGANISATION: GHANA RESEARCH

WEBSITE: https://www.recklingenterprise.com

SUBMITTED: 20/01/25

 

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

BEGINNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF NDB

2^ND NDB STRATEGY 2022-2026

MISSION OF NDB

PROFILE OF NDB

NDB WITHIN THE FINANCJAL SYSTEM – PRESENT AND FUTURE

LINKAGE BETWEEN NDB AND BRICS

CONDITIONS FOR  A MEMBERSHIP OF GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS IN BRICS AND NDB

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS OF AN NDB AND BRICS MEMBERSHIP

CONCLUSION

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

FIRST OF ALL, I WANT TO THANK MS. GYABAAH FOR HER INTERESTING ARTICLE. IF ANYTHING, IT BRINGS TO MIND OF THE GHANAIAN READER THE EXISTENCE OF THE BRICS ORGANISATION AND ITS SUCCESS SINCE ITS INAUGURATION.

HER CONCLUSION, HOWEVER, WAS A LITTLE BIT TOO CAUTIOUS FOR MY TASTE. AFRICA IN GENERAL, AND GHANA IN PARTICULAR, MUST SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY. A MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS – OR FOR THE MEANTIME AT LEAST AN OBSERVER STATUS, AND THEREFORE AN APPROACH TOWARDS THE ORGANISATION – WOULD BRING TO THE COUNTRY AND THE CONTINENT AT LARGE.

AS MS. GYABAAH FOCUSSED MORE ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION A POSSIBLE MEMBERSHIP FOR GHANA WILL BE CONFRONTED WITH – AND UNDERSTANDABLY POINTED OUT THE GEOPOLITICAL RISKS – I WILL STRESS MORE THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMICAL FACTORS, AND LOOK AT THE “NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK” (FOLLOWING CALLED NDB) WHICH WAS FOUNDED BY THE FOUNDING MEMBERS BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA, AND CHINA PLUS THE LATER JOINING SOUTH AFRICA. FIRST OF ALL, I WILL INTRODUCE A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NDB WHICH I TOOK FROM ITS STRATEGY PLAN 2017 TO 2021:

 

BEGINNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NDB

FIRST OF ALL, I WILL INTRODUCE A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NDB WHICH I TOOK FROM ITS STRATEGY PLAN 2017 TO 2021:

Trajectory of NDB’s Creation

NDB was established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in the context of the BRICS mechanism, along with the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement. At the March 2012 New Delhi Summit, the leaders of BRICS countries directed their finance ministers to examine the feasibility and viability of setting up a new development bank that would support economic growth in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries. One year later, in the Durban Summit in March 2013, BRICS leaders announced the start of formal negotiations to establish NDB. The Agreement on the New Development Bank was signed during the BRICS Summit held in Fortaleza on July 15, 2014. Following ratification by all five founding members, the Agreement entered into force on July 3, 2015. The inaugural meeting of the Board of Governors of NDB was held in Moscow on July 7, 2015.

CURRENTLY, THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK (FOLLOWING, I ‘LL USE THE ABBREVIATION “ NDB”) IS IN THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR TERM OF STRATEGY PLANNING.

IN THE AGREEMENT ABOUT THE FOUNDING OF NDB THAT WAS SIGNED BY THE FIVE BRICS MEMBERS, IT IS STATED THAT THE SIGNING MEMBERS ACKNOWLEDGE THE CONSTRAINTS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND EMERGING ECONOMIES FACE IN TODAY’S GLOBAL ECONOMY.THE PURPOSE OF THE BANK SHALL BE TO MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN BRICS COUNTRIES AND OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THE MEMBERSHIP IN NDB IS OPEN TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS BORROWING AND NON-BORROWING MEMBERS. THE NON-BORROWING MEMBERS ARE CLASSIFIED AS DEVELOPED NATIONS, WHOSE MEMBERSHIP IS LIMITED TO 20% OF ALL MEMBERS, TO AVOID A CONTROL OF DEVELOPED NATIONS IN THE BANK. THE BANK WAS THEN LAUNCHED ONE YEAR AFTER THE AGREEMENT IN 2016.

THE FIRST AND FOREMOST INTENTION OF THE NDB – ACCORDING TO THE AGREEMENT – IS TO MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.

THE FIRST STRATEGY PERIOD OF THE BANK DATED FROM 2017 TO 2021. IN THIS PERIOD, THE MISSION AND THE TARGETS WERE MANIFESTED. THESE TARGETS WERE IN PARTICULAR:

— BUILDING NEW RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE MEMBERS OF THE BANK AND EXTERNALLY;

— DEVELOPING NEW PROJECTS AND THE INSTRUMENTS TO FINANCE THEM;

— DEVELOPING NEW APPROACHES FOR FINANCING IN THE EMERGING ECONOMIES.

(NDB’S GENERAL STRATEGY 2017-2021, P.3F.)

BUILDING NEW RELATIONSHIPS MEANS DEVELOPING TRUST BETWEEN THE BANK AND THE MEMBER STATES.

DEVELOPING NEW PROJECTS AND NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS MEANS THE BANK LAYING EMPHASIS ON SUSTAINABLE PROJECTS. FURTHERMORE, BUILDING SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE IS AT THE CORE OF THE BANK, AS MOST OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND EMERGING ECONOMIES LACK MODERN INFRASTRUCTURAL BASICS. REALISING THAT THERE IS A GAP IN THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE, THE BANK IS READY TO FILL IN THIS GAP FOR THE BETTER OF THE EMERGING ECONOMIES.THAT INCLUDES LOW INTEREST RATES AND OFFERING LOANS IN LOCAL CURRENCIES.

ADDITIONALLY, THE BANK ENVISAGED NEW APPROACHES, ESPECIALLY CONCERNING THE HANDLING OF LOAN DISBURSEMENT. THE BANK USES A TWO-WAY APPROACH TO RISK MANAGEMENT: LOW RISK PROJECTS ENJOY A FAST TRACK APPROVAL AND OVERSIGHT, WHILE HIGH RISK PROJECTS ARE PUT UNDER MORE SCRUTINY IN APPROVAL AND OVERSIGHT.

THESE ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT BASICS THE BANK INTENDED TO INTRODUCE IN ITS BUSINESS ACCORDING TO THE GENERAL STRATEGY 2017-2021. NOW WE WILL SEE HOW THE BANK PUTS THESE UNDERLININGS INTO REALITY DURING THE SECOND GENERAL STRATEGY 2022-2026.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2^ND NDB STRATEGY 2022-2026

THE SECOND STRATEGIC PLAN OF THE NDB IS CHARACTERISED BY THREE MAJOR ISSUES: THE MISSION OF NDB, THE PROFILE OF NDB, AND THE POSITION OF NDB WITHIN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM – HOW DOES IT LOOK LIKE NOW, AND WHAT WILL NDB’S POSITION IN THE SYSTEM IN FUTURE.

MISSION OF NDB

THE TITLE OF THIS SECOND STRATEGY PAPER FORMS ALREADY THE BASE FOR THE MISSION OF NDB: “SCALING UP DEVELOPMENT FINANCE FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE”. IT CONTAINS TWO ELEMENTS: DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTURE. THE BANK SETS ITS TARGET TO BECOME A LEADING MEMBER OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM TO SUPPLY EMERGING MARKETS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE PROJECTS. THUS, AFTER IN ITS FEW YEARS OF EXISTENCE, NDB HAS ALREADY FOUND ITS PLACE WITHIN MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS (MDB’S).

THE BANK REALISES THAT THERE IS A GAP BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES, AND THAT THE EXISTING MDBS CANNOT FILL THIS GAP. CONSEQUENTLY, NDB SETS AS ITS MISSION THE SUPPORT OF THESE EMERGING ECONOMIES, IMPROVE THE INFRASTRUCTURE IN ITS MEMBERSHIP COUNTRIES AND SUSTAIN THEIR FINANCIAL STRUCTURE.

PROFILE OF NDB

SINCE ITS START AS AN IDEA IN FORTALEZA, NDB HAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS A MAJOR PLAYER IN SUPPORT OF ITS TARGET GROUP. IT HAS A SOUND  FINANCIAL FOUNDATION WHICH IS RECOGNISED BY MAJOR RATING AGENCIES. FITCH RATES NDB WITH “AA+” = OUTLOOK STABLE – FROM NEGATIVE IN 2023. S&P GLOBAL AFFIRMED ITS RATINGS OF NDB ON 10^TH OF MAY, 2024 AS “AA+/A-+”. UNLIKE SEVERAL WESTERN ECONOMISTS THAT DECLARE NDB “TOO SMALL” TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, THE “INTERNATIONAL BANKER” ACKNOWLEDGES ON ITS WEBSITE https://internationalbanker.com THAT NDB IS A REFLECTION OF DEVELOPING NATIONS BEING UNHAPPY WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM. THIS DESIRE TO HAVE A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION THAT PUTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMERGING MARKETS INTO THE CENTER OF ITS OPERATIONS IS REFLECTED IN THE SERVICES OF NDB AND ITS TARGET MARKET: FINANCING SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE AND OTHER SUSTAINABLE PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

AND JUST LIKE MODERN TECHNOLOGY IS INTEGRATED IN THE DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS OF THE BANK, THIS MODERN TECHNOLOGY ALSO FORMS PART OF THE SERVICES OF THE BANK. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY IS AT THE CORE OF PROJECTS FINANCED BY NDB.

BY THAT, WE GET TO THE POSITION OF NDB IN THE PRESENT AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE. GEOPOLITICALLY, THE WORLD IS MORE AND MORE DIVIDED INTO THE “DEVELOPED” NORTH AND THE “DEVELOPING” SOUTH. THIS POLITICAL DIVIDE IS MIRRORED IN THE ECONOMICAL SITUATION. THIS IS BECAUSE ECONOMY AND POLITICS  HAVE A DIALECTICAL RELATION, WHICH MEANS THAT ECONOMY DEPENDS ON POLITICS, AND VICE VERSA. NDB GETS MORE AND MORE REGOGNITION IN THE FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL WORLD, AS ELABORATED BEFORE IN VIEW OF THE RATING AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM. MEANWHILE, FOUR NEW COUNTRIES HAVE BECOME MEMBERS OF THE NDB IN 2021, NAMELY BANGLA DESH, EGYPT, AND URUGUAY AS BORROWING MEMBERS, AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AS NON-BORROWING MEMBER. THIS SHOWS THE GROWING ATTRACTION NDB AND ITS FINANCIAL STRATEGIES ENJOY IN THE EMERGING MARKETS. THIS GROWING ATTRACTION WILL SURELY LEAD TO A FURTHER EXPANSION, AS IT IS ALREADY INCORPORATED IN THE SECOND STRATEGY OF THE NDB 2022-2026.

OF COURSE, THERE ARE CHALLENGES AND DOUBTS FOR  POTENTIAL FUTURE MEMBERS OF NDB. THESE ARE BASICALLY THE SAME AS THEY ARE CONCERNING THE BRICS ORGANISATION. THE MOST IMPORTANT CONCERNS ARE THE ECONOMICAL AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF CHINA IN THE BANK, AND POSSIBLE INTERNAL CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN NDB MEMBERS, LIKE CHINA AND INDIA. WE WILL LOOK AT THESE CONCERNS IN THE NEXT CHAPTER. APART FROM THAT, THERE ARE MORE TECHNICAL ISSUES WHICH I ADMIT, I CANNOT LOOK AT FURTHER, SIMPLY I LACK THE KNOWLEDGE TO COMMENT ON THOSE. BUT I AM SURE THAT THERE ARE PEOPLE WITHIN BRICS AND THE NDB WHO CAN SOLVE THESE ISSUES AS THEY APPEAR.

LINKAGE BETWEEN NDB AND BRICS

AS WE ALL MEANWHILE KNOW, THE BRIC ORGANISATION WAS FOUNDED BY BRAZIL, RUSSIS, INDIA, AND CHINA,  LATER JOINED BY SOUTH AFRICA TO BECOME BRICS. THE BRICS ORGANISATION THEN LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR NDB IN 2015, WHICH WAS THEN LAUNCHED IN 2016. AS THE FOUNDING MEMBERS OS BRICS AND NDB ARE THE SAME, THERE ARE SURELY LINKAGES BETWEEN BOTH.

BUT OF COURSE, THE LINKAGE BETWEEN BRICS AND NDB IS NOT REDUCED TO WHO FOUNDED WHOM. LINKAGES BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMY ARE RECOGNISED BY MAINSTREAM WESTERN ECONOMISTS (POLITICAL ECONOMY!) AS WELL AS BY MARXIST ECONOMISTS.

POLITICAL ECONOMY IS DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:

 

Political economy is an interdisciplinary branch of the social sciences. It focuses on the interrelationships of individuals, governments, and public policy.

Political economists study how economic theories such as capitalism, socialism, and communism work in the real world. Any economic theory is a means of directing the distribution of a finite amount of resources in a way that benefits the greatest number of individuals.

o Political economy is an interdisciplinary branch of the social sciences. It focuses on the interrelationships of individuals, governments, and public policy.

Political economists study how economic theories such as capitalism, socialism, and communism work in the real world. Any economic theory is a means of directing the distribution of a finite amount of resources in a way that benefits the greatest number of individuals.

(INVESTOPEDIA: WHAT IS POLITICAL ECONOMY?)

HERE WE SEE ALREADY HOW ECONOMY IS RELATED TO POLITICAL SYSTEMS. OF COURSE, THE DEFINITION IS INCORRECT, AS FAR AS CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND COMMUNISM ARE NO THEORIES (PERHAPS COMMUNISM, AS THERE IS NO COMMUNIST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD), BUT CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM ARE POLITICAL SYSTEMS.

PERHAPS THE BEST KNOWN PHRASE CHARACTERISING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN A PRACTICAL WAY IS THE ONE ATTRIBUTED TO JAMES CARVILLE, ADVISOR TO BILL CLINTON IN THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN IN THE U.S.A. IN 1992: “IT’S THE ECONOMY STUPID.” (OFTEN, THIS SENTENCE IS WRITTEN AS “IT’S THE ECONOMY, STUPID.”) IT SHOWS HOW IMPORTANT ECONOMY IS CONSIDERED IN THE POLITICAL LIFE.

MARXISM-LENINISM SEES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMY EVEN CLEARER, ALBEIT PERHAPS MORE DRASTCALLY IN THE DEFINITION OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM:

As a materialist philosophy, Marxist dialectics emphasizes the importance of real-world conditions and the presence of functional contradictions within and among social relations, which derive from, but are not limited to, the contradictions that occur in social class, labour economics, and socioeconomic interactions.^[3] Within Marxism, a contradiction is a relationship in which two forces oppose each other, leading to mutual development.^{[4]:  (WIKIPEDIA;; DIALECTICAL MATERIALIM)}

HERE WE SEE CLEARLY THAT BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMY THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON CONTRADICTIVE FORCES (MARX AND ENGELS MORE OR LESS LIMIT THESE CONTRADICTIVE FORCES TO POLITICAL CLASSES!) WHICH OPPOSE EACH OTHER OVER ECONOMICAL CONDITIONS.

AND EXACTLY THESE CONTRADICTIVE FORCES WE NOW HAVE GLOBALLY, NOT WITHIN ONE COUNTRY. AND THESE CONTRADICTIONS ARE NOT (YET) THOSE OF CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM, BUT THOSE OF THE “DEVELOPED NORTH” AND THOSE OF THE “DEVELOPING SOUTH”.

THE BRICS NATIONS HAVE RECOGNISED THAT WITHOUT A SOUND FINANCIAL FOUNDATION, THE BEST POLITICAL CONCEPTS ARE LEADING TO NOTHING. FOR THE “DEVELOPED WEST”, THE U.S.A. PRACTISES THIS FOR A RATHER LONG TIME, PRACTICALLY SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. ONLY IN THE LAST YEARS, IT IS BECOMING MORE OBVIOUS. IN HIS FIRST TERM, TRUMP HAS INTRODUCED TARIFFS WHICH WERE CONTINUED UNDER THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION. AND FOR HIS SECOND TERM, TRUMP PROMISED MORE AND HIGHER TARIFFS, NOT ONLY ON COUNYTIES WHICH ARE OPPOSED TO U.S.A. POLITICS, BUT ALSO ON ALLIES LIKE CANADA, THE EU AND MEXICO. MARTYNOV HAS REALISED THAT VERY WELL IN HIS ARTICLE “THE BRICS: PARADIGM SHIFT IN DEALING WITH NEW CHALLENGES”. HE POINTS OUT THAT THE AIM OF THE U.S.A. IS TO BE THE “POLICE OF THE WORLD”. HE CITES MOVEMENTS IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ACADEMIC LITERATURE WHICH PROPOSES A “CIVILIZATION OF MODERNITY” WITH SEVERAL NEW CIVILISATIONS WHICH ARE “SUPERVISED” BY ONE WHICH IS MORE EQUAL THAN THE OTHERS – THE ANGLO-AMERICAN. THIS ASIDE: THE UNITED KINGDOM DOES NOT SEEM TO REALISE THAT THE ROLES HAVE BEEN REVERSED. THE  U.S.A. IS NO LONGER A COLONY OF THE UK, BUT IT IS THE OTHER WAY ROUND.

BUT BACK TO BRICS AND THE NDB: UNLIKE DOOMSAYERS HAVE SUGGESTED WHAT WILL HAPPEN AT THE LONG RUN, BOTH ORGANISATIONS HAVE SURVIVED, AND EVEN BECAME STRONGER IN THE LAST YEARS. FOR THE NDB, THIS IS SHOWN – AMONG OTHER SIGNS – BY THE JUDGMENT OF THE RATING AGENCIES, AND FOR BRICS BY THE ATTENTION THE LAST BRICS SUMMIT ENJOYED IN THE WESTERN MEDIA AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES THAT SHOWED INTEREST IN JOINING BRICS. PERHAPS THE MOST VALUABLE RECOGNITION OF BRICS AND THE NDB COMES FROM TRUMP HIMSELF WHO WARNED COUNTRIES THAT EXCHANGE THE DOLLAR WITH A BRICS CURRENCY WITH SERIOUS MEASURES. WELL, A BRICS CURRENCY IS NOT (YET) ON THE AGENDA, BUT WHAY IS ON THE AGENDA IS TRADE AMONG BRICS MEMBERS IN NATIONAL CURRENCIES. WHICH IS IN LINE WITH THE POLICY OF NDB TO INCREASINGLY DISBURSE LOANS IN NATIONAL CURRENCIES,

ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE REACTIONS OF THE WESTERN MEDIA TO IT SHOW THAT DESPITE MANY CHALLENGES (FOR EXAMPLE DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT, MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN FOR EXAMPLE INDIA AND CHINA), BRICS AND THE NDB ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK TO BECOME NAJOR PLAYERS IN THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR. ALWAYS KEEP IN MIND THAT BOTH ORGANISATIONS ARE RELATIVELY YOUNG, AND WHAT THEY HAVE ALREADY ACHIEVED IN THAT SHORT PERIOD OF TIME IS REMARKABLE.

CONDITIONS FOR  A MEMBERSHIP OF GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS IN BRICS AND NDB

AS THERE ARE CONDITIONS FOR ANY OTHER ORGANISATION, THERE ARE ALSO CONDITIONS FOR A MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS. MOST OF THESE CONDITIONS ARE BASED  ON THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF BRICS. TOGETHER THEY ARE CALLED THE “BRICS SPIRIT”, AND THEY ARE IN PARTICULAR:

MUTUAL RESPECT, UNDERSTANDING, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY, SOLIDARITY, DEMOCRACY, OPENNESS, INCLUSIVENESS, COLLABORATION, AND CONSENSUS.

MOST PEOPLE WON’T HAVE PROBLEMS WITH MOST OF THESE GUIDING PRINCIPLES, EXCEPT FOR ONE: THAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRACY. ESPECIALLY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, COUNTRIES LIKE CHINA AND RUSSIA ARE CONSIDERED AN AUTOCRACY.

LET’S HAVE A LOOK AT CHINA FIRST. CHINA IS A SOCIALIST COUNTRY, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MARX AND LENIN. ACCORDING TO THESE PRINCIPLES, DEMOCRACY HAS A DIFFERENT DEFINITION FROM THE WESTERN INTERPRETATION.  REAL DEMOCRACY FOR MARXISM-LENINISM IS THE DEMOCRACY OF THE WORKING CLASS, LED BY THE PARTY OF THE WORKING CLASS, THE COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS KIND OF DEMOCRACY IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM THE DEMOCRACY IN THE WESTERN FORM, WHICH IS A DEMOCRACY OF THE CAPITALIST CLASS. IF WE ACCEPT THIS DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF DEMOCRACY – WHICH IS IN LINE WITH THE OTHER GUIDING PRINCIPLES -, THEN THERE IS REALLY NO PROBLEM WITH CHINA’S DEMOCRACY.

THE SITUATION IS A LITTLE BIT DIFFERENT  WITH RUSSIA, WHICH IS THEORETICALLY A DEMOCRACY IN THE WESTERN SENSE (THE “DUMA” IS THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT WITH VARIOUS PARTIES OCCUPYING SEATS IN IT), BUT FOR WESTERN IDEOLOGISTS IT IS ONLY PUTIN WHO HAS THE COMMAND IN RUSSIA, NOT THE PARLIAMENT AS “REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE”. NEVERTHELESS, AS RUSSIA IS AT LEAST A DEMOCRACY IN THE FORMAL SENSE OF THE WORD, AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, BRICS AND THE NDB DON’T HAVE ANY PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUS OF RUSSIA, WE SHOULD ACCEPT THAT. FURTHERMORE, BOTH ORGANISATIONS ARE OPEN TO ANY KIND OF FORM OF GOVERNANCE; THEREFORE, WE CAN ARGUE THAT THE COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IS MEANT AS DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE ORGANISATION. AND WITH THIS ONE, RUSSIA OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT HAVE ANY PROBLEMS.

THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT CONDITIONS FOR A MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS. OTHERS – WHICH ARE SURELY CONNECTED WITH THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES – ARE AS FOLLOWS:

— COMMITMENT TO STRENGTHENING BRICS,

— BE AN EMERGING OR DEVELOPING COUNTRY WITH REGIONAL INFLUENCE,

— ALIGN WITH FOUNDING VALUES OF BRICS,

— HAVE DIPLOMATIC AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL MEMBERS OF BRICS,

— BEING COMMITTED TO SUPPORT REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURUTY,

— SUPPORTING REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS AN ORGANISATION, AMONG OTHERS.

(FOR A COMPLETE OVERVIEW OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES, THE CONDITIONS FOR EXPANSION, AND THE PROCEDURE OF ACCEPTING NEW MEMBERS, GO TO http://www.brics.utoronto. ca)

GHANA – AS MANY OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS – WOULD SURELY FULFILL THE CONDITIONS FOR A MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS. GHANA IS COMMITTED TO SUPPORT REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, WHICH IS SHOWN BY THE LONG=LASTING CONTRIBUTION OF GHANA TO THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING FORCE. GHANA SUPPORTS – ON ITS OWN AND THROUGH THE AFRICAN UNION – A REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS.AND GHANA IS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY WITH REGIONAL INFLUENCE – AS SHOWN BY RUNNING THE SECRETARIAT OF THE AFRICA CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA. AS GHANA ALSO HAS DIPLOMATIC AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS TO ALL BRICS MEMBERS – OLD AND NEW – THERE SHOULD ALSO NOT FROM THIS SIDE ANY PROBLEMS FOR GHANA BECOMING A MEMBER OF BRICS.

WHAT ARE NOW THE ADVANTAGES AND THE DISADVANTAGES OF GHANA BECOMING A MEMBER OF BRICS AND THE NDB?

 

 

 

 

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS OF AN NDB AND BRICS MEMBERSHIP

THE ADVANTAGES OF GHANA – AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS – IN  THE NDB ARE OBVIOUS. THEY WOULD GET BETTER FINANCING CONDITIONS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND OTHER SUSTAINABLE PROJECTS. AS I ALREADY MENTIONED, THERE WOULD EVEN BE THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING LOANS IN THE LOCAL CURRENCY, WHICH WOULD MAKE THE COUNTRY LESS DEPENDENT ON DOLLAR-DENOMINATED FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS. ONE DISADVANTAGE WOULD BE THAT GHANA HAS TO CONTRIBUTE TO FINANCING NDB, BUT THAT IS PROBABLY A PROBLEM THAT CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

THE MAJOR PROBLEM FOR MOST PEOPLE – AS MS  GYABAAH MENTIONED IN HER ARTICLE – IS WHETHER A MEMBERSHIP IN NDB AND BRICS WOULDN’T MAKE THE COUNTRY MORE DEPENDENT ON CHINA, AND THAT WOULD ONLY EXCHANGE THE DEPENDENCY ON ONE COUNTRY – THE U.S.A. – WITH THE DEPENDENCY ON ANOTHER – CHINA.

IN MY OPINION, THIS ARGUMENTATION MISSES THE REALITY ON THE GROUND. THERE ARE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES. AS ONE CONTRIBUTOR FROM A DEVELOPING COUNTRY – NOT CHINA! – PUT IT:  THE U.S.A IS WORRIED ABOUT ENEMIES, CHINA IS WORRIED ABOUT FRIENDS. WHEREVER THE U.S.A. GOES, TGERE IS DESTRUCTION. LIBYA, SYRIA, AND AFGHANISTAN ARE THE BEST EXAMPLES FOR THAT. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE IS IN THE FOREMOST INTEREST OF THE U.S.A., BECAUSE THE MILITARY INDUSTRY GAINS A LOT OF PROFIT FROM IT. THIS HAS BEEN THE CASE UNDER THE FIRST TRUMP ADMINISTRATION, WAS CONTINUED UNDER THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION – PERHAPS WITH OTHER WORDS, BUT IN REALITY THE SAME OUTCOME – AND WILL CONTINUE EVEN STRONGER UNDER THE SECOND TRUMP ADMINISTRATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, CHINA IS MORE INTERESTED IN COOPERATION BETWEEN COUNTRIES. CHINA IS NOT INTERESTED IN MILITARY CONFLICTS, AND ONLY TRIES TO DEFEND THE ONE-CHINA POLICY, WHICH IS HISTORICALLY BASED, AGAINST THE U.S.A. AND SOME OF THEIR ALLIES IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA. AND EVEN IF CHINA WOULD USE ITS ECONOMIC STRENGTH FOR ITS OWN INTERESTS: AS LONG AS IT ALSO BENEFITS OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND EMERGING MARKETS, I DON’T SEE ANYTHING WRONG WITH THAT.

OTHER CHALLENGES FOR BRICS, WHICH COULD CAUSE DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS, IS THE ARGUMENTATION THAT BRICS IS STILL STRUCTURALLY WEAK, AND WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SURVIVE AT THE LONG RUN. THIS ARGUMENTATION WAS FROM THE BEGINNING ON THE SAME FOR THE NDB.

I BELIEVE THAT REALITY HAS OUTPACED THIS ARGUMENTATION.THIS IS ESPECIALLY OBVIOUS FOR THE NDB WHICH HAS BECOME FINANCIALLY MUCH STRONGER FROM THE 1^ST STRATEGY DOCUMENT 2017-2021 TO THE SECOND 2022-2026. THIS IS – AS I ALREADY MENTIONED – IN THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN THE RATINGS BY FITCH AND S&P GLOBAL. AND THIS ACCOUNTS ALSO FOR THE WHOLE BRICS ORGAINSATION. AS A YOUNG INSTITUTION WITH A LOT OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES WITHIN THE ORGANISATION, BRICS HAS ACHIEVED A LOT UNTIL TODAY. MANY COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY JOINED BRICS AND THE NDB, OR SHOWN INTEREST IN  A MEMBERSHIP. INTERESTINLY ENOUGH, AMONG THOSE SHOWING INTEREST IS NIGERIA, A MEMBER OF THE MINT COUNTRIES, WHICH MS GYABAAH SHORTLY CONSIDERED AS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO BRICS, BUT ALSO DISMISSED IT BECAUSE OF WEAK ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE.

AS WE NOW FOUND OUT THAT THERE ARE MORE ADVANTAGES THAN DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA IN JOINING BRICS, SHOULD GHANA COMPLETE THE STEP AND BECOME A MEMBER? LET’S FIND OUT IN THE CONCLUSION.

 

CONCLUSION

NOW THAT WE HAVE SEEN THE MAIN ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS TO JOIN BRICS AND NDB (I INTENTIONALLY LEFT ANY TECHNICAL CHALLENGES FOR BRICS AND NDB OUT, BECAUSE MY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THAT IS NEAR TO ZERO. HOWEVER, I AM CONFIDENT THERE ARE ENOUGH ICT EXPERTS WITHN THE TWO INSTITUTIONS TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS), IS IT ADVISABLE FOR THESE COUNTRIES TO JOIN THEM NOW?

I CONCENTRATE MY ARGUMENTATION ON GHANA, AND ONLY REFER TO THE AFRICAN CONTINENT WHEN ITS SUITABLE FOR THE CONTENTS. I PERSONALLY DO NOT SEE AN PROBLEMS FOR GHANA TO APPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN NDB, BECAUSE THERE ARE ALMOST ONLY ADVANTAGES FOR GHANA. WE HAVE SEEN THE EXAMPLE OF URUGUAY WHICH IS A MEMBER OF NDB, BUT NOT OF BRICS. A LITTLE BIT MORE COMPLICATED IS THE QUESTION OF A FULL MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS+. I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE TOO MANY INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN GHANA WHICH MUST BE SOLVED FIRST BEFORE THE CONCENTRATION ON A FULL MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS CAN BE FRUITFUL. THE LAST ELECTIONS HAVE IN MY  OPINION SHOWN THAT TWO MANY PEOPLE PUT THEIR OWN INTERESTS BEFORE THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY (POSING AS AN INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE AFTER LOSING THE PRIMARIES, E.G.). ANY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES IS MORE OR LESS NON-EXISTENT, AND ONLY SUCH A COOPERATION CAN BE OF BENEFIT FOR THE COUNTRY. YOU CANNOT CLEAN YOUR NEIGHBOURHOOD BEFORE CLEANING YOUR OWN HOUSE;

AN ALTERNATIVE FOR GHANA WOULD BE – AND I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT STRONGLY, NO MATTER WHICH GOVERNMENT IS IN POWER – TO BECOME AN “INTEREST NATION” IN BRICS.

BRICS HAS A FOUR STEP MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION PROCESS:

— AN INTERESTED COUNTRY,

— A PROSPECTIVE BRICS MEMBER STATE,

— AN INVITED BRICS MEMBER STATE, AND

— A BRICS MEMBER STATE.

DETAILS ABOUT THE PROCESS CAN BE DERIVED FROM “BRICS MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION GUIDING PRINCIPLES, STANDARDS, CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES”. HERE I WILL ONLY MENTION THE PROCEDURE TO BECOME AN INTERESTED COUNTRY.

 

“A country is considered interested when its Leader or Foreign Minister formally communicates its interest in becoming a new BRICS member state to the BRICS Chair,”

 

THIS APPROACH IS RATHER EASY TO PERFORM, AND CAN ONLY BE BENEFICIARY FOR THE COUNTRY. FROM BRICS, THE LEADERS OF THIS COUNTRY MIGHT EVEN LEARN HOW TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BETWEEN ORGANISATIONS WITH DIFFERENT KINDS OF LEADERSHIP. IT IS INTERESTING TONOTE THAT ACCORDING TO MY INFORMATION,

 

IN ALL WE CAN SAY THAT THERE IS WIDESPREAD INTEREST IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO BECOME MEMBERS IN BRICS, BUT WE MUST ALSO REALISE WHAT IS ELABORATED MAINLY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LITERATURE ON BRICS: EVEN WITHIN THIS ORGANISATION – AS POSITIVE AND FUTURE-ORIENTED IT MAY BE – AFRICA MUST LEARN TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE TO REPRESENT AFRICA’S INTERESTS ON THE WORLD STAGE – AND OF COURSE ALSO ON THE BRICS’S STAGE – BETTER.

PERHAPS THE AFRICAN UNION SHOULD APPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS…

 

REFERNCES:

AGREEMENT ON THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK, FORTALEZA, JULY 15, 2015;

NDB’S GENERAL STRATEGY: 2017-2021;

NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK GENERAL STRATEGY FOR 2022 TO 2026;

THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL PAYMENTS: BRICS PAY AND THE EVOLVING FINANCIAL ORDER;

IQBAL; BRICS AS A DRIVER OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT;

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND; BRICS’ PHILOSOPHIES FOR DEVELOPMENT FINANCING AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR LICS;

NO AUTHOR; THE BRICS;

MARTYNOV; THE BRICS: PARADIGM SHIFT IN DEALING WITH NEW CHALLENGES;

KATZENSTEIN P.; CIVILIZATION IN WORLD POLITICS, BOOK 1-3;

THE BRICS ALLIANCE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOUTH AFRICA AND AFRICA