# GHANA AND BRICS: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR TRANSFORMATION, BUT ALSO A TEST OF POLITICAL MATURITY

*Why Ghana must look beyond diplomatic symbolism and prepare for the economic, political and institutional responsibilities of closer cooperation with emerging economies.*

Ghana has announced its intention to apply to join BRICS as a partner country. I welcome the initiative because I believe Ghana should broaden its international economic relationships, strengthen its cooperation with emerging economies and explore new opportunities for investment, industrialisation and technological development.

However, supporting this initiative should not prevent us from asking some difficult but necessary questions.

**What does Ghana expect to gain from BRICS, what responsibilities will accompany participation, and are our political and economic institutions prepared to make the most of this opportunity?**

These questions deserve serious consideration, particularly in a country where political transitions, changes in economic priorities and difficulties with policy implementation have sometimes complicated long-term development efforts.

My position is straightforward: Ghana should pursue international partnerships that advance its national interests. But the success of such partnerships will depend less on diplomatic announcements than on our ability to translate them into consistent policies, productive investments and measurable improvements in the lives of our citizens.

## 1. WHY BRICS MATTERS TO GHANA

BRICS brings together major emerging and developing economies, including Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates.

The grouping provides a platform for cooperation on economic development, trade, investment and international governance. It also reflects the growing demand among developing countries for a greater voice in shaping global economic and political institutions.

For Ghana, closer engagement with BRICS could create opportunities in several areas.

**First, investment and industrialisation.**

Ghana needs productive investment that creates employment, expands domestic manufacturing, strengthens agriculture and supports the development of local enterprises.

Relationships with BRICS countries could help mobilise capital, technology and expertise for these purposes. However, investment must be assessed on its economic merits. The objective should not simply be to attract foreign capital, but to build productive capacity within Ghana.

**Second, technology transfer.**

Cooperation with countries possessing substantial technological and industrial capabilities could support the development of Ghanaian expertise in digital services, pharmaceuticals, agricultural processing, renewable energy, transport infrastructure and other strategic sectors.

The emphasis must be on developing our own capabilities rather than remaining permanently dependent on imported technology and external expertise.

**Third, diversification of economic partnerships.**

Ghana should not unnecessarily restrict its development options to a narrow group of international partners.

Expanding cooperation with India, China, Brazil, South Africa and other BRICS countries could complement existing relationships with Europe, North America and international development institutions.

Diversification is not an act of hostility towards existing partners. It is a means of expanding the range of opportunities available to Ghana.

**Fourth, a stronger voice in international affairs.**

Ghana has a longstanding tradition of participating in international diplomacy and advocating African interests. Greater engagement with BRICS could provide additional opportunities to discuss reforms to global governance and the representation of developing countries in international institutions.

Nevertheless, influence cannot be measured simply by the number of international organisations or groupings to which a country belongs. It must also be demonstrated through constructive participation, credible positions and the ability to advance practical proposals.

## 2. PARTNER-COUNTRY STATUS: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

It is important to distinguish between full BRICS membership and partner-country status.

Following the clarification by Ghana’s Foreign Affairs Minister on 10 October 2026, Ghana’s intention is to apply for partner-country status rather than full membership.

Under the BRICS framework, partner countries can be invited to participate in selected summits, ministerial meetings and other activities. They may also endorse certain declarations and joint documents.

However, partner-country status does not confer all the same rights or participation opportunities as full membership.

The application must also be accepted by the existing BRICS members.

This distinction should inform the national discussion. Ghana should assess the practical opportunities available under partner-country status, rather than assume that applying to join BRICS automatically provides the full benefits associated with membership.

Equally, we should not exaggerate the obligations involved.

BRICS is not a conventional international organisation established by a constitutive treaty, with its own permanent secretariat and central budget. Its cooperation is organised through consultations, rotating presidencies, declarations and agreed initiatives.

Consequently, the responsibilities associated with participation are not equivalent to those arising from membership of a treaty-based organisation.

Nevertheless, the absence of a conventional treaty does not mean the absence of expectations.

Participation requires diplomatic engagement, constructive cooperation, respect for agreed principles and a willingness to maintain working relationships with countries whose interests and political systems may differ considerably from our own.

For Ghana, understanding these expectations before entering the partnership will be essential.

## 3. THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL CONTINUITY

One of the most important questions concerns Ghana’s domestic political environment.

Ghana has maintained a competitive multiparty democratic system and experienced peaceful transfers of political power. These are significant institutional achievements.

However, successive administrations have also pursued different economic priorities, adjusted development programmes and faced difficulties in sustaining certain initiatives over time.

This raises a fundamental question: **Can Ghana maintain a consistent international economic strategy when political leadership changes?**

A relationship with BRICS should not be treated as the personal diplomatic project of one administration.

Nor should it become a political instrument used by one party to criticise another or to claim exclusive ownership of Ghana’s international relationships.

If engagement with BRICS is to contribute meaningfully to national development, its objectives must be sufficiently clear, transparent and broadly understood to survive changes of government.

For example, Ghana could establish a national framework identifying the economic and diplomatic objectives it seeks to achieve through BRICS cooperation.

Such a framework could specify priorities for investment, industrial development, technology transfer, agricultural modernisation and export expansion.

It could also establish measurable indicators against which progress would be assessed.

Political parties may legitimately disagree about particular policies. However, they should recognise the long-term national interest in maintaining productive international relationships and evaluating them on the basis of evidence rather than partisan considerations.

The objective should be continuity in national development priorities, even when the administration responsible for implementing them changes.

## 4. NON-ALIGNMENT MUST MEAN MORE THAN A SLOGAN

Ghana’s government has presented the proposed BRICS engagement as part of a broader strategy to diversify international partnerships without abandoning existing relationships.

This is an important distinction.

Ghana’s national interests are not necessarily served by choosing one geopolitical camp at the expense of all others.

Our country needs access to international markets, development finance, technology, investment and diplomatic cooperation across a broad range of partners.

India, China, Russia, Brazil and South Africa have different economic interests and foreign policy priorities. They do not always agree with one another, and BRICS should not be understood as a completely unified political or economic bloc.

The same principle applies to Ghana’s relationships with the United States, the European Union and other traditional partners.

A policy of non-alignment should therefore be understood as the capacity to make decisions independently, on the basis of Ghana’s interests and applicable international commitments.

It should not mean automatic support for every position advanced by a BRICS member.

Nor should it mean automatic opposition to the positions of countries outside the grouping.

This distinction will become particularly important when international disagreements arise over security, trade, sanctions, human rights or the reform of global institutions.

BRICS partner-country criteria include maintaining good diplomatic relations with full members, supporting multilateralism and refraining from imposing sanctions without authorisation from the United Nations Security Council.

Ghana will therefore need to understand the framework’s expectations and consider how its participation will interact with its existing international commitments.

The objective should be a foreign policy that is independent without being unpredictable, and cooperative without surrendering the freedom to make decisions in the national interest.

## 5. THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS WILL NOT ARRIVE AUTOMATICALLY

There is a danger in treating membership of an international grouping as if it were itself a development strategy.

Ghana already has numerous bilateral agreements, development partnerships and international economic relationships.

Yet the existence of such relationships does not automatically produce industrial transformation, sufficient employment or higher living standards.

The same principle applies to BRICS.

Closer cooperation could create opportunities, but Ghana must have the domestic capacity to identify, negotiate, implement and monitor productive projects.

Consider five priorities.

**A. Strengthening domestic production**

Ghana should seek investment that increases the domestic production of goods and services, reduces avoidable import dependence and creates opportunities for Ghanaian enterprises.

Projects should be evaluated according to their contribution to productivity, employment, technology transfer and domestic value addition.

**B. Expanding opportunities for micro and small businesses**

International economic cooperation must not benefit only large companies and major infrastructure projects.

Ghana’s micro and small businesses need better access to productive capital, modern management practices, digital services, markets and technical knowledge.

Cooperation with BRICS countries should explore practical mechanisms through which smaller Ghanaian enterprises can participate in supply chains and benefit from new investment.

**C. Developing skills and technology**

Training agreements should be linked to identifiable economic needs.

Ghana should seek opportunities for technical education, industrial apprenticeships, research cooperation and the development of digital capabilities.

The objective should be to ensure that Ghanaian workers and businesses acquire skills that enable them to participate in higher-value economic activities.

**D. Protecting economic sustainability**

Infrastructure and industrial projects should be assessed carefully in terms of their financing, expected returns, maintenance requirements and wider economic effects.

Ghana must avoid entering arrangements that generate substantial immediate expenditure without establishing a credible path to long-term economic benefits.

Foreign investment is not automatically beneficial simply because it comes from a new partner.

**E. Measuring results**

Every major cooperation initiative should have clearly defined objectives and measurable outcomes.

How many jobs will be created? How much additional production will result? What proportion of project expenditure will remain within Ghana? What technology or skills will be transferred? What will the project contribute to exports and productivity?

These questions should form part of the assessment of individual projects.

Ultimately, the value of Ghana’s engagement with BRICS should be measured by what it contributes to the transformation of the Ghanaian economy.

## 6. GHANA NEEDS INSTITUTIONS THAT CAN DELIVER

A further challenge concerns the relationship between diplomatic agreements and domestic implementation.

International partnerships frequently involve negotiations between governments, public institutions and private investors.

However, even well-intentioned agreements can produce disappointing results when responsibilities are unclear, implementation is delayed or institutional coordination is weak.

Ghana should therefore consider establishing a clear mechanism for coordinating its engagement with BRICS.

This mechanism could bring together the relevant ministries, investment promotion institutions, industry representatives, research organisations and other stakeholders.

Its responsibilities could include identifying priority projects, coordinating negotiations, monitoring implementation and publishing periodic assessments of results.

Transparency would be particularly important where public funds, sovereign guarantees, natural resources or long-term infrastructure commitments are involved.

Parliament should exercise its appropriate oversight responsibilities, while businesses, researchers and civil society should have opportunities to contribute to the national discussion.

Such arrangements would help ensure that international cooperation remains accountable to the Ghanaian public.

They would also reduce the risk that promising initiatives become associated primarily with the administration that originally negotiated them.

## 7. A LESSON FROM GHANA’S OWN DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE

Ghana’s challenge is not simply to establish new international relationships. It is to develop the capacity to use them effectively.

For decades, the country has pursued various development programmes, industrial initiatives and economic reforms. Some have delivered useful results, while others have faced implementation difficulties or failed to achieve their original ambitions.

The reasons differ from programme to programme. Nevertheless, an important lesson emerges: development requires more than a declaration of intent.

It requires continuity, credible financing, capable institutions, effective coordination and sustained attention to implementation.

This lesson should guide Ghana’s approach to BRICS.

A partnership with an emerging economy cannot compensate for weaknesses in domestic policy execution. Nor can diplomatic diversification substitute for the difficult work of improving productivity, strengthening public institutions and creating an environment in which businesses can invest and expand.

International cooperation and domestic reform must reinforce each other.

If Ghana improves its investment environment, strengthens its institutions and develops a clear industrial strategy, it will be better positioned to benefit from cooperation with BRICS countries and other international partners alike.

If these domestic foundations remain weak, the benefits of new diplomatic relationships may be considerably smaller than anticipated.

## 8. FROM GEOPOLITICAL OPPORTUNITY TO A GHANAIAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

I believe Ghana should approach its proposed BRICS partnership as part of a broader effort to build a more productive, diversified and resilient economy.

That requires a development strategy which connects international cooperation with the everyday economic realities of Ghanaian households and businesses.

Investment should support productive activities.

Digitalisation should improve efficiency, expand access to markets and strengthen transparency.

Infrastructure should connect producers to markets and reduce the cost of doing business.

Education and technical training should respond to the needs of a transforming economy.

And development programmes should create opportunities across Ghana’s regions rather than concentrating their benefits in a limited number of locations.

These objectives should not be pursued through BRICS alone. They should guide Ghana’s relationships with all international partners.

The proposed partnership could become one component of a wider national effort to strengthen domestic production, expand employment and accelerate structural transformation.

However, this will require Ghana to approach the opportunity with clearly defined priorities and a realistic assessment of its own capabilities.

## 9. THE QUESTIONS WE SHOULD BE ASKING NOW

Before Ghana proceeds further with its application, I believe several questions deserve public discussion.

1. What specific economic and diplomatic objectives does Ghana want to achieve through BRICS partner-country status?

2. Which sectors should receive priority, and how will projects be selected according to their contribution to productivity, employment and industrial development?

3. How will Ghana ensure that the benefits of cooperation reach micro and small businesses, farmers, workers and communities across the country?

4. What arrangements will ensure continuity in Ghana’s BRICS engagement across changes of government?

5. How will the country balance its cooperation with BRICS against its existing relationships with international financial institutions, development partners and trading partners?

6. What mechanisms will ensure transparency in investment agreements, project financing and the use of public resources?

7. How will Ghana measure the results of its participation and communicate those results to the public?

These are not arguments against engagement with BRICS. They are questions intended to help Ghana prepare for it.

A country that understands its objectives, responsibilities and limitations is better positioned to benefit from international cooperation than one that relies primarily on the symbolic significance of joining a new grouping.

## CONCLUSION: THE REAL TEST IS WHAT GHANA DOES WITH THE OPPORTUNITY

I welcome Ghana’s decision to pursue BRICS partner-country status.

It reflects a legitimate interest in broadening our international relationships, exploring additional economic opportunities and strengthening cooperation with emerging and developing economies.

However, the initiative should be approached with clear objectives, institutional preparedness and a realistic understanding of what participation can and cannot deliver.

Ghana’s political history offers both reasons for confidence and lessons that should not be ignored. Our democratic institutions have demonstrated the capacity to manage changes of government peacefully. At the same time, the country must continue strengthening the consistency, transparency and implementation capacity required for long-term economic development.

The challenge is to ensure that a change in political leadership does not automatically translate into a change in national development priorities.

BRICS should not be presented as a substitute for Ghana’s existing international partnerships, nor should it be expected to solve domestic economic problems on its own.

Its value will depend on the quality of the opportunities Ghana negotiates, the projects it implements and the benefits that ultimately reach its people.

**The central question is not simply whether Ghana can join BRICS. It is whether Ghana can use the opportunity to strengthen its productive economy, create sustainable employment and build a development strategy that remains credible beyond individual political administrations.**

That is the standard against which this initiative should ultimately be judged.

For Ghana, the objective must be more than diplomatic diversification. It must be economic transformation.

*Hans Peter Reckling*
*Reckling Enterprise*

(THIS ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIIGENCE – AI.)

THE VISIT OF CHINA’S FOREIGN MINISTER TO INDIA AND THE CONNECTION TO BRICS

 

LAST WEEK, THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC), WANG YI, VISITED INDIA AND MET THERE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF THIS COUNTRY, NARENDRA MODI.

SINCE DECADES, THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE IN BORDER DISPUTES WHICH EVEN LEAD TO DESTHS, EVEN AS BOTH COUNTRIES ARE MEMBERS OF THE BRICS ORGANISATION. THESE TIMES SEEM TO BE OVER, AS BOTH MODI AND WANG YI FORMULATED SEVERAL AGREEMENTS, AND PRIME MINISTER MODI TNTENDS TO ATTEND THE SUMMIT OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION, A EURASIAN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANISATION, WHICH TAKES PLACE FROM THE 31ST OF AUGUST TO THE 1ST OF SEPTEMBER 2025. THERE, HE WILL PROBABLY MEET PRESIDENT XI JINPING OF THE PRC WHO WILL CHAIR THE 25TH MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF HEADS OF STATE OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION.

MANY COMMENTATORS DOUBT THAT THE BRICS ORGANISATION WILL BE SUCCESSFUL. ONE REASON FOR THIS DOUBT WAS THE ONGOING CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA. WELL, THE TWO COUNTRIES SEEM TO BE ON THE BEST WAY TO LEAVE THESE CONFLICTS BEHIND. THERE ARE TWO MAIN REASONS FOR THIS DEVELOPMENT:

  1. THE TARIFFS IMPOSED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A. ON THE WORLD;
  2. THE RECOGNITION THAT THE BRICS ORGANISATION IS THE BASE FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

AD 1: THE BEST SOLUTION TO MINIMISETHE EFFECTS OF THE TRUMP-IMPOSED TARIFFS IS TO SEEK THE COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. AND AS CHINA IS AN ECONOMICALLY STRONG AND RELIABLE PARTNER, IT IS NOT A MIRACLE THAT MANY COUNTRIES SEEK THE COOPERATION WITH CHINA. FORTUNATELY, THE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA HAS REALISED THAT AND SOUGHT FOR THE GHANA-CHINA BUSINESS SUMMIT, AFTER ITS PREDECESSOR JOINED THE BELT-AND-ROAD INITIATIVE OF CHINA IN 2018. THIS AGREEMENT BASED ON A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MoU) WAS PART OF EIGHT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN GHANA AND CHINA UNDER THE FORMER GHANAIAN GOVERNMENT.

AD: THE BRICS ORGANISATION FORMS THE FOUNDATION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WHICH HAS THE DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRIES OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH IN FOCUS. IT IS NOT A KIND OF “COOPERATION” THAT IS ACTING UNDER THE MOTTO; IF YOU DON’T WANT TO WORK WITH US THE WAY WE WANT IT, YOU WILL BE PUNISHED, WHICH IS THE WAY THE U.S.A. GOVERNMENT OPERATES, ESPECIALLY UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION. THE BRICS ORGANISATION OFFERS MANY ADVANTAGES ECONOMICALLY, FINANCIALLY, AND POLITICALLY. THEREFORE, IT IS ONLY UNDERSTANDABLE THAT INDIA AND CHINA MANIFEST THEIR WISH TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITIONS ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE BRICS ORGANISATION.

SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES – SOUTH AFRICA, EGYPT, AND ETHIOPIA – ARE ALREADY MEMBERS OF BRICS, AND NIGERIA JOINED THE LAST BRICS SUMMIT IN RIO DE JANEIRO THIS YEAR AS A PARTNER COUNTRY. SENEGAL IS CURRENTLY IN NEGOTIATIONS TO JOIN BRICS.

IT IS TIME FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA TO ALSO TAKE THE NEXT STEP TO START NEGOTIATIONS TO JOIN BRICS – FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE COUNTRY.

Ghana and BRICS: Why an Observer Role Now Could Pave the Way for Future Membership

 

As global power balances shift, new alliances are redefining how countries pursue growth and influence. One of the most prominent platforms reshaping international cooperation today is BRICS—the bloc originally formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, and now expanding to include new members from Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.

In this changing landscape, Ghana should not remain a bystander. While immediate membership might be premature, taking steps toward observer status would allow Ghana to participate in the conversations shaping the next phase of global economic realignment—and to prepare for eventual full membership when the timing is right.

The Case for Engagement

  1. Diversifying Ghana’s Global Partnerships

For decades, Ghana’s economic orientation has leaned heavily toward Western institutions—such as the IMF, World Bank, and EU trade systems. While these partnerships have brought investment and stability, they have also created structural dependence.
Engaging with BRICS offers Ghana access to alternative sources of finance, technology, and markets—particularly from China and India, which are already major investors in infrastructure, manufacturing, and digital services across Africa. It would broaden Ghana’s economic diplomacy and reduce overreliance on traditional Western creditors.

  1. Access to Development Finance

The New Development Bank (NDB), established by BRICS, is emerging as a credible complement to the Bretton Woods system. Membership could eventually allow Ghana to access long-term, low-interest financing for industrial, energy, and agricultural transformation—key pillars of the country’s 24H+ Economy programme.
Even as an observer, Ghana could begin building the relationships and technical understanding necessary to benefit from NDB operations in the region.

  1. South–South Cooperation and Technology Transfer

BRICS promotes practical cooperation among developing economies. For Ghana, this could mean technology sharing in agriculture, renewable energy, and digital governance—fields where emerging economies like India and Brazil have made remarkable progress. It aligns with Ghana’s ambitions to industrialise, modernise governance, and expand job-creating sectors.

The Risks and Realities

  1. Balancing Global Relationships

Joining BRICS too quickly could unsettle Ghana’s longstanding relationships with Western partners and financial institutions. The country still relies on IMF-supported programmes and Western market access for exports such as cocoa, gold, and manufactured goods.
A hasty shift might therefore be interpreted as a geopolitical realignment rather than an economic diversification—potentially risking investment flows and diplomatic goodwill.

  1. Limited Influence in a Large Bloc

Even within BRICS, influence is uneven. China and India dominate decision-making, while smaller economies often find their voices diluted. Ghana must realistically assess how much leverage it could exercise within such a structure—and ensure that its engagement aligns strictly with national interests.

  1. Governance and Institutional Readiness

Effective participation in BRICS initiatives demands strong policy coordination, data systems, and project governance. Ghana must strengthen its institutional capacity—particularly in trade, finance, and industrial policy—to ensure that any partnership translates into tangible domestic gains rather than symbolic diplomacy.

A Phased Approach Makes Sense

Given these considerations, the most strategic path forward is a gradual, two-phase approach:

  • Phase 1 – Observer Engagement:
    Ghana should formally seek observer status at BRICS summits and the NDB. This would provide a learning platform, open diplomatic channels, and allow Ghana to assess the financial and political mechanisms of the bloc from within—without committing to full alignment.
  • Phase 2 – Medium- to Long-Term Membership:
    Once macroeconomic stability improves and institutional readiness deepens, Ghana could pursue full membership. By that stage, BRICS will likely have matured into an even more diverse and balanced grouping, offering Ghana significant influence as one of Africa’s leading democracies and innovation hubs.

Conclusion: The Time to Prepare Is Now

In a multipolar world, Ghana cannot afford to remain dependent on a single geopolitical or financial axis. The country’s future prosperity will depend on strategic diversification—politically, economically, and diplomatically.

Seeking observer status in BRICS now would be a low-risk, high-return move: it would expand Ghana’s options, strengthen its voice in global development debates, and position it for deeper cooperation in the future.

Full membership may not be immediate, but the journey should begin now—on Ghana’s own terms, guided by its long-term economic vision and regional leadership ambitions.

(This article was prepared with the assistance of AI.)

U.S.A. TARIFFS ON GHANA

SINCE YESTERDAY, 7TH OF AUGUST 2025, THE U.S.A. HAVE IMPOSED A 15% TARIFF ON ALL GOODS IMPORTED FROM GHANA. WITH THAQT, GHANA IS PART OF A GROUP OF 15 AFRICAN NATIONS ON WHICH A TARIFF OF 15%z IS IMPLEMENTED,

GHANA HAS A TRADE SURPLUS WITH THE U.S.A., AND THAT MIGHT BE THE REASON WHY THE TARIFF WAS PUT ON GHANA. THE TRADE SURPLUS AMOUNTS TO 19 MILLION US-DOLLARS IN FAVOUR OF GHANA. IN MAY 2025, GHANA EXPORTED GOODS WORTH 108 MILLION US-DOLLARS TO THE U.S.A, WGILE THE COUNTRY IMPORTED GOODS WORTH 88.6 MILLION US-DOLLARS FROM THE U.S.A.

GHANA MAINLY EXPORTS COCOA BEANS, COCOA PASTE AND COCOA POWDER TO THE U.S.A. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE EXPORT OF COCOA BEANS IS 8 TIMES AS HIGH AS THE EXPORT OF COCOA PASTE AND COCOA POWDER TOGETHER, BUT THIS IS THE SUBJEDT FOR A DIFFERENT ARTICLE (MARCH 2025; SOURCE: BING CO-PILOT).

AS THE U.S.A. TARIFFS ON COTE D’IVOIRE – ANOTHER BIG COCOA PRODUCER ARE ALSO 15%, THE TARIFFS WOULDN’T MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE IN THE PRICE FOR COCOA AND COCOA PRODUCTS FROM BOTH COUNTRIES. AND AS THE U.S.A WILL HARDLY BE ABLE TO GROW COCOA IN THEIR COUNTRY, THE OTHER ARGUMENT OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION THAT PRDUCTION OF GOODS SHOULD BE BROUGHT BACK TO THE COUNTRY DOES ALSO NOT APPLY TO COCOA.

THEREFORE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TARIFFS ON COUNTRIES – AND ESPECIALLY AFRICAN COUNTRIES – IS A GENERAL PROBLEM. TRUMP’S ADMINISTRATION TRIES TO “CONQUER” COUNTRIES THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TARIFFS. WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES TRY TO ACHIEVE BY MILI TARY FORCE, TRUMP’S ADMINISTRATION TRIES THE ECONOMY WAY.  GOOD EXAMPLES FOR THAT ARE BRAZIL, WHERE TRUMP TRIES TO PUNISH THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION FOR TAKING THE FORMER PRESIDENT TO COURT, AND INDIA FOR BUYING OIL FROM RUSSIA. FURTHERMORE, BOTH COUNTRIES ARE PUNISHED FOR BEING MEMBERS OF THE BRICS ORGANISATION.

AS TRUMP’S POLICIES ARE UNPREDICTABLE. THE ONLY THING WE CAN SAY IS THAT HE ALWAYS CHANGES HIS POLICIES WHEN HE THINKS THAT IT SERVES HIS OWN INTERESTS BETTER. THEREFORE, THE U.S.A. APPEAR UNRELIABLE AS A TRADING PARTNER, ESPECIALLY FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

ON THE OTHER HAND, CHINA APPEARS TO BE AN ALTERNATIVE AS A TRADING PARTNER. GHANA HAS ALREADY JOINED THE BELT-AND-ROAD INIATIVE IN 2018, AND UNTIL NOW, THE COOPERATION OF GHANA WITH CHINA IS ONLY OF ADVANTAGE FOR GHANATHE COPERATIN WITH CHINA IS FOR OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES. 

ALSO, A MEMBERSHIP OR AT LEAST AN OBSERVER STATUS IN THE BRICS ORGANISATION SHOULD NOT BE LEFT OUT OF SIGHT. THIS ORGANISATION OFFERS FINANCIAL AND TRADE ADVANTAGES WHICH ARE ESPECIALLY NECESSARY FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES. ALREADY SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES LIKE ETHIOPIA HAVE JOINED THE BRICS ORGANISATIN. EVEN THE AFRICA UNION AS AN ORGANISATION SHOULD TAKE A COOPERATION WITH THE BRICS COUNTRIES INTO CONSIDERATION.

LAST BUT NOT LEAST, AFRICA INCLUDED GHANA SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR OWN “INVENTION”, THE AFRICA CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTER-AFRICAN TRAFE WOULD GIVE THE 54 COUNTRIES A GOOD CHANCE TO BECOME AT LEAST MORE INDEPENDENT FROM EXTERNAL UNPREDICTABILITIES WHICH THE U.S.A. HAVE TO OFFER.

17TH BRICS SUMMIT TAKES PLACE IN RIO DE JANEIRO (BRAZIL)

THE 17TH BRICS SUMMIT TAKES PLACE IN RIO DE JANEIRO (BRAZIL). THE BRICS ORGANISATION ORIGINALLY CONSISTED OF FIVE MEMBERS – BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA, CHINA, AND SOUTH AFRICA. -, BUT RECENTLY MORE COUNTRIES, EXPECIALLY FROM AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, HAVE JOINED THE ORGANISATION.

BRICS SUMMITS TAKE PLACE EVERY YEAR IN A DIFFERENT MEMBER COUNTRY. IN THE CENTER OF THIS YEAR’S SUMMIT ARE TOPICS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND TRADE. BOTH TOPICS BECAME MORE IMPORTANT RECENTLY IN VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ATTEMPT UNDER PRESIDENT TRUMP TO INFLUENCE THE GLOBAL ORDER BY IMPOSING TARRIFS ON EVERY COUNTRY THAT DOES NOT PLAY HIS RULES. ACCOTDING TO OUR FINFORMATION, HE NOW IMPOSED AN ADDITIONAL 10% TARRIF ON EVERY BRICS MEMBER. FURTHER IMPORTANT TOPICS ON THE AGENDA ARE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (A.I.) AND CLIMATE CHANGE.

PRESIDENT LULA DA SILVA OF BRAZIL URGED THE BRICS MEMBERS IN HIS INAUGURAL SPEECH TO STAND UNITED AGAINST ANY ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE THE WORLD ORDER BY FORCE, BE IT MILITARILY OR ECONOMICALLY. HE EXPECIALLY MENTIONED GAZA, UKRAINE, AND THE TARRIFS POLICY. INSTEAD, HE EMPHASIZED THAT ONLY DIALOGUE WILL BE ABLE TO SOLVE GLOBAL PROBLEMS. THESE ISSUES WERE ECHOED BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUNLICH OF CHINA.

ON THE SIDELINES, THERE ARE MANY BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH FOLLOW-UP AGREEMENTS WHICH SHOW THE INCREASING COOPERATION AMONG THE BRICS COUNTRIES.

THE BRICS SUMMIT WILL END TODAY, ON THE 7TH OF JULY. RECKLING ENTERPRISE WILL TOMORROW PUBLISH AN OVERVIEW ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT. ADDITIONALLY, RECKLING ENTERPRISE IS CURRENTLY WORKING ON A WIDER ARTICLE ON THE BRICS ORGANISATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR AFRICA. YOU CAN FIND A SPECIAL BRICS REPORT ON THE SUMMIT HERE;

special brics report – rio summit 2025

RECKLING ENTERPRISE WILL SURELY FOLLOW THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRICS ORGANISATION AND WILL ALWAYS ADVOCATE A MEMBERSHIP OF GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE CONTINENT.

WE WISH THE SUMMIT GOOD LUCK IN ITS EFFORTS.

AFRICA’S FUTURE LIES IN COOPERATION AND SELF-CONFIDENCE

A REPLY –OR BETTER ADDITION TO MS RACHEL GYABAAH’S ARTICLE IN THE BUSINESS&FINANCIAL TIMES DATED NOVEMBER 20,2024 “BRICS: THE NEED FOR AFRICA TO CAREFULLY BALANCE THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE AMID GLOBAL POWER STRUGGLES”

 

AUTHOR: HANS PETER RECKLING

ORGANISATION: GHANA RESEARCH

WEBSITE: https://www.recklingenterprise.com

SUBMITTED: 20/01/25

 

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

BEGINNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF NDB

2ND NDB STRATEGY 2022-2026

MISSION OF NDB

PROFILE OF NDB

NDB WITHIN THE FINANCJAL SYSTEM – PRESENT AND FUTURE

LINKAGE BETWEEN NDB AND BRICS

CONDITIONS FOR  A MEMBERSHIP OF GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS IN BRICS AND NDB

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS OF AN NDB AND BRICS MEMBERSHIP

CONCLUSION

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

FIRST OF ALL, I WANT TO THANK MS. GYABAAH FOR HER INTERESTING ARTICLE. IF ANYTHING, IT BRINGS TO MIND OF THE GHANAIAN READER THE EXISTENCE OF THE BRICS ORGANISATION AND ITS SUCCESS SINCE ITS INAUGURATION.

HER CONCLUSION, HOWEVER, WAS A LITTLE BIT TOO CAUTIOUS FOR MY TASTE. AFRICA IN GENERAL, AND GHANA IN PARTICULAR, MUST SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY. A MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS – OR FOR THE MEANTIME AT LEAST AN OBSERVER STATUS, AND THEREFORE AN APPROACH TOWARDS THE ORGANISATION – WOULD BRING TO THE COUNTRY AND THE CONTINENT AT LARGE.

AS MS. GYABAAH FOCUSSED MORE ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION A POSSIBLE MEMBERSHIP FOR GHANA WILL BE CONFRONTED WITH – AND UNDERSTANDABLY POINTED OUT THE GEOPOLITICAL RISKS – I WILL STRESS MORE THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMICAL FACTORS, AND LOOK AT THE “NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK” (FOLLOWING CALLED NDB) WHICH WAS FOUNDED BY THE FOUNDING MEMBERS BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA, AND CHINA PLUS THE LATER JOINING SOUTH AFRICA. FIRST OF ALL, I WILL INTRODUCE A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NDB WHICH I TOOK FROM ITS STRATEGY PLAN 2017 TO 2021:

 

BEGINNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NDB

FIRST OF ALL, I WILL INTRODUCE A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NDB WHICH I TOOK FROM ITS STRATEGY PLAN 2017 TO 2021:

Trajectory of NDB’s Creation

NDB was established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in the context of the BRICS mechanism, along with the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement. At the March 2012 New Delhi Summit, the leaders of BRICS countries directed their finance ministers to examine the feasibility and viability of setting up a new development bank that would support economic growth in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries. One year later, in the Durban Summit in March 2013, BRICS leaders announced the start of formal negotiations to establish NDB. The Agreement on the New Development Bank was signed during the BRICS Summit held in Fortaleza on July 15, 2014. Following ratification by all five founding members, the Agreement entered into force on July 3, 2015. The inaugural meeting of the Board of Governors of NDB was held in Moscow on July 7, 2015.

CURRENTLY, THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK (FOLLOWING, I ‘LL USE THE ABBREVIATION “ NDB”) IS IN THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR TERM OF STRATEGY PLANNING.

IN THE AGREEMENT ABOUT THE FOUNDING OF NDB THAT WAS SIGNED BY THE FIVE BRICS MEMBERS, IT IS STATED THAT THE SIGNING MEMBERS ACKNOWLEDGE THE CONSTRAINTS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND EMERGING ECONOMIES FACE IN TODAY’S GLOBAL ECONOMY.THE PURPOSE OF THE BANK SHALL BE TO MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN BRICS COUNTRIES AND OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THE MEMBERSHIP IN NDB IS OPEN TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS BORROWING AND NON-BORROWING MEMBERS. THE NON-BORROWING MEMBERS ARE CLASSIFIED AS DEVELOPED NATIONS, WHOSE MEMBERSHIP IS LIMITED TO 20% OF ALL MEMBERS, TO AVOID A CONTROL OF DEVELOPED NATIONS IN THE BANK. THE BANK WAS THEN LAUNCHED ONE YEAR AFTER THE AGREEMENT IN 2016.

THE FIRST AND FOREMOST INTENTION OF THE NDB – ACCORDING TO THE AGREEMENT – IS TO MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.

THE FIRST STRATEGY PERIOD OF THE BANK DATED FROM 2017 TO 2021. IN THIS PERIOD, THE MISSION AND THE TARGETS WERE MANIFESTED. THESE TARGETS WERE IN PARTICULAR:

— BUILDING NEW RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE MEMBERS OF THE BANK AND EXTERNALLY;

— DEVELOPING NEW PROJECTS AND THE INSTRUMENTS TO FINANCE THEM;

— DEVELOPING NEW APPROACHES FOR FINANCING IN THE EMERGING ECONOMIES.

(NDB’S GENERAL STRATEGY 2017-2021, P.3F.)

BUILDING NEW RELATIONSHIPS MEANS DEVELOPING TRUST BETWEEN THE BANK AND THE MEMBER STATES.

DEVELOPING NEW PROJECTS AND NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS MEANS THE BANK LAYING EMPHASIS ON SUSTAINABLE PROJECTS. FURTHERMORE, BUILDING SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE IS AT THE CORE OF THE BANK, AS MOST OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND EMERGING ECONOMIES LACK MODERN INFRASTRUCTURAL BASICS. REALISING THAT THERE IS A GAP IN THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE, THE BANK IS READY TO FILL IN THIS GAP FOR THE BETTER OF THE EMERGING ECONOMIES.THAT INCLUDES LOW INTEREST RATES AND OFFERING LOANS IN LOCAL CURRENCIES.

ADDITIONALLY, THE BANK ENVISAGED NEW APPROACHES, ESPECIALLY CONCERNING THE HANDLING OF LOAN DISBURSEMENT. THE BANK USES A TWO-WAY APPROACH TO RISK MANAGEMENT: LOW RISK PROJECTS ENJOY A FAST TRACK APPROVAL AND OVERSIGHT, WHILE HIGH RISK PROJECTS ARE PUT UNDER MORE SCRUTINY IN APPROVAL AND OVERSIGHT.

THESE ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT BASICS THE BANK INTENDED TO INTRODUCE IN ITS BUSINESS ACCORDING TO THE GENERAL STRATEGY 2017-2021. NOW WE WILL SEE HOW THE BANK PUTS THESE UNDERLININGS INTO REALITY DURING THE SECOND GENERAL STRATEGY 2022-2026.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2ND NDB STRATEGY 2022-2026

THE SECOND STRATEGIC PLAN OF THE NDB IS CHARACTERISED BY THREE MAJOR ISSUES: THE MISSION OF NDB, THE PROFILE OF NDB, AND THE POSITION OF NDB WITHIN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM – HOW DOES IT LOOK LIKE NOW, AND WHAT WILL NDB’S POSITION IN THE SYSTEM IN FUTURE.

MISSION OF NDB

THE TITLE OF THIS SECOND STRATEGY PAPER FORMS ALREADY THE BASE FOR THE MISSION OF NDB: “SCALING UP DEVELOPMENT FINANCE FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE”. IT CONTAINS TWO ELEMENTS: DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTURE. THE BANK SETS ITS TARGET TO BECOME A LEADING MEMBER OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM TO SUPPLY EMERGING MARKETS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE PROJECTS. THUS, AFTER IN ITS FEW YEARS OF EXISTENCE, NDB HAS ALREADY FOUND ITS PLACE WITHIN MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS (MDB’S).

THE BANK REALISES THAT THERE IS A GAP BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES, AND THAT THE EXISTING MDBS CANNOT FILL THIS GAP. CONSEQUENTLY, NDB SETS AS ITS MISSION THE SUPPORT OF THESE EMERGING ECONOMIES, IMPROVE THE INFRASTRUCTURE IN ITS MEMBERSHIP COUNTRIES AND SUSTAIN THEIR FINANCIAL STRUCTURE.

PROFILE OF NDB

SINCE ITS START AS AN IDEA IN FORTALEZA, NDB HAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS A MAJOR PLAYER IN SUPPORT OF ITS TARGET GROUP. IT HAS A SOUND  FINANCIAL FOUNDATION WHICH IS RECOGNISED BY MAJOR RATING AGENCIES. FITCH RATES NDB WITH “AA+” = OUTLOOK STABLE – FROM NEGATIVE IN 2023. S&P GLOBAL AFFIRMED ITS RATINGS OF NDB ON 10TH OF MAY, 2024 AS “AA+/A-+”. UNLIKE SEVERAL WESTERN ECONOMISTS THAT DECLARE NDB “TOO SMALL” TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, THE “INTERNATIONAL BANKER” ACKNOWLEDGES ON ITS WEBSITE https://internationalbanker.com THAT NDB IS A REFLECTION OF DEVELOPING NATIONS BEING UNHAPPY WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM. THIS DESIRE TO HAVE A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION THAT PUTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMERGING MARKETS INTO THE CENTER OF ITS OPERATIONS IS REFLECTED IN THE SERVICES OF NDB AND ITS TARGET MARKET: FINANCING SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE AND OTHER SUSTAINABLE PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

AND JUST LIKE MODERN TECHNOLOGY IS INTEGRATED IN THE DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS OF THE BANK, THIS MODERN TECHNOLOGY ALSO FORMS PART OF THE SERVICES OF THE BANK. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY IS AT THE CORE OF PROJECTS FINANCED BY NDB.

BY THAT, WE GET TO THE POSITION OF NDB IN THE PRESENT AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE. GEOPOLITICALLY, THE WORLD IS MORE AND MORE DIVIDED INTO THE “DEVELOPED” NORTH AND THE “DEVELOPING” SOUTH. THIS POLITICAL DIVIDE IS MIRRORED IN THE ECONOMICAL SITUATION. THIS IS BECAUSE ECONOMY AND POLITICS  HAVE A DIALECTICAL RELATION, WHICH MEANS THAT ECONOMY DEPENDS ON POLITICS, AND VICE VERSA. NDB GETS MORE AND MORE REGOGNITION IN THE FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL WORLD, AS ELABORATED BEFORE IN VIEW OF THE RATING AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM. MEANWHILE, FOUR NEW COUNTRIES HAVE BECOME MEMBERS OF THE NDB IN 2021, NAMELY BANGLA DESH, EGYPT, AND URUGUAY AS BORROWING MEMBERS, AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AS NON-BORROWING MEMBER. THIS SHOWS THE GROWING ATTRACTION NDB AND ITS FINANCIAL STRATEGIES ENJOY IN THE EMERGING MARKETS. THIS GROWING ATTRACTION WILL SURELY LEAD TO A FURTHER EXPANSION, AS IT IS ALREADY INCORPORATED IN THE SECOND STRATEGY OF THE NDB 2022-2026.

OF COURSE, THERE ARE CHALLENGES AND DOUBTS FOR  POTENTIAL FUTURE MEMBERS OF NDB. THESE ARE BASICALLY THE SAME AS THEY ARE CONCERNING THE BRICS ORGANISATION. THE MOST IMPORTANT CONCERNS ARE THE ECONOMICAL AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF CHINA IN THE BANK, AND POSSIBLE INTERNAL CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN NDB MEMBERS, LIKE CHINA AND INDIA. WE WILL LOOK AT THESE CONCERNS IN THE NEXT CHAPTER. APART FROM THAT, THERE ARE MORE TECHNICAL ISSUES WHICH I ADMIT, I CANNOT LOOK AT FURTHER, SIMPLY I LACK THE KNOWLEDGE TO COMMENT ON THOSE. BUT I AM SURE THAT THERE ARE PEOPLE WITHIN BRICS AND THE NDB WHO CAN SOLVE THESE ISSUES AS THEY APPEAR.

LINKAGE BETWEEN NDB AND BRICS

AS WE ALL MEANWHILE KNOW, THE BRIC ORGANISATION WAS FOUNDED BY BRAZIL, RUSSIS, INDIA, AND CHINA,  LATER JOINED BY SOUTH AFRICA TO BECOME BRICS. THE BRICS ORGANISATION THEN LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR NDB IN 2015, WHICH WAS THEN LAUNCHED IN 2016. AS THE FOUNDING MEMBERS OS BRICS AND NDB ARE THE SAME, THERE ARE SURELY LINKAGES BETWEEN BOTH.

BUT OF COURSE, THE LINKAGE BETWEEN BRICS AND NDB IS NOT REDUCED TO WHO FOUNDED WHOM. LINKAGES BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMY ARE RECOGNISED BY MAINSTREAM WESTERN ECONOMISTS (POLITICAL ECONOMY!) AS WELL AS BY MARXIST ECONOMISTS.

POLITICAL ECONOMY IS DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:

 

Political economy is an interdisciplinary branch of the social sciences. It focuses on the interrelationships of individuals, governments, and public policy.

Political economists study how economic theories such as capitalism, socialism, and communism work in the real world. Any economic theory is a means of directing the distribution of a finite amount of resources in a way that benefits the greatest number of individuals.

o Political economy is an interdisciplinary branch of the social sciences. It focuses on the interrelationships of individuals, governments, and public policy.

Political economists study how economic theories such as capitalism, socialism, and communism work in the real world. Any economic theory is a means of directing the distribution of a finite amount of resources in a way that benefits the greatest number of individuals.

(INVESTOPEDIA: WHAT IS POLITICAL ECONOMY?)

HERE WE SEE ALREADY HOW ECONOMY IS RELATED TO POLITICAL SYSTEMS. OF COURSE, THE DEFINITION IS INCORRECT, AS FAR AS CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND COMMUNISM ARE NO THEORIES (PERHAPS COMMUNISM, AS THERE IS NO COMMUNIST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD), BUT CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM ARE POLITICAL SYSTEMS.

PERHAPS THE BEST KNOWN PHRASE CHARACTERISING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN A PRACTICAL WAY IS THE ONE ATTRIBUTED TO JAMES CARVILLE, ADVISOR TO BILL CLINTON IN THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN IN THE U.S.A. IN 1992: “IT’S THE ECONOMY STUPID.” (OFTEN, THIS SENTENCE IS WRITTEN AS “IT’S THE ECONOMY, STUPID.”) IT SHOWS HOW IMPORTANT ECONOMY IS CONSIDERED IN THE POLITICAL LIFE.

MARXISM-LENINISM SEES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMY EVEN CLEARER, ALBEIT PERHAPS MORE DRASTCALLY IN THE DEFINITION OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM:

As a materialist philosophy, Marxist dialectics emphasizes the importance of real-world conditions and the presence of functional contradictions within and among social relations, which derive from, but are not limited to, the contradictions that occur in social class, labour economics, and socioeconomic interactions.[3] Within Marxism, a contradiction is a relationship in which two forces oppose each other, leading to mutual development.[4]:  (WIKIPEDIA;; DIALECTICAL MATERIALIM)

HERE WE SEE CLEARLY THAT BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMY THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON CONTRADICTIVE FORCES (MARX AND ENGELS MORE OR LESS LIMIT THESE CONTRADICTIVE FORCES TO POLITICAL CLASSES!) WHICH OPPOSE EACH OTHER OVER ECONOMICAL CONDITIONS.

AND EXACTLY THESE CONTRADICTIVE FORCES WE NOW HAVE GLOBALLY, NOT WITHIN ONE COUNTRY. AND THESE CONTRADICTIONS ARE NOT (YET) THOSE OF CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM, BUT THOSE OF THE “DEVELOPED NORTH” AND THOSE OF THE “DEVELOPING SOUTH”.

THE BRICS NATIONS HAVE RECOGNISED THAT WITHOUT A SOUND FINANCIAL FOUNDATION, THE BEST POLITICAL CONCEPTS ARE LEADING TO NOTHING. FOR THE “DEVELOPED WEST”, THE U.S.A. PRACTISES THIS FOR A RATHER LONG TIME, PRACTICALLY SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. ONLY IN THE LAST YEARS, IT IS BECOMING MORE OBVIOUS. IN HIS FIRST TERM, TRUMP HAS INTRODUCED TARIFFS WHICH WERE CONTINUED UNDER THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION. AND FOR HIS SECOND TERM, TRUMP PROMISED MORE AND HIGHER TARIFFS, NOT ONLY ON COUNYTIES WHICH ARE OPPOSED TO U.S.A. POLITICS, BUT ALSO ON ALLIES LIKE CANADA, THE EU AND MEXICO. MARTYNOV HAS REALISED THAT VERY WELL IN HIS ARTICLE “THE BRICS: PARADIGM SHIFT IN DEALING WITH NEW CHALLENGES”. HE POINTS OUT THAT THE AIM OF THE U.S.A. IS TO BE THE “POLICE OF THE WORLD”. HE CITES MOVEMENTS IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ACADEMIC LITERATURE WHICH PROPOSES A “CIVILIZATION OF MODERNITY” WITH SEVERAL NEW CIVILISATIONS WHICH ARE “SUPERVISED” BY ONE WHICH IS MORE EQUAL THAN THE OTHERS – THE ANGLO-AMERICAN. THIS ASIDE: THE UNITED KINGDOM DOES NOT SEEM TO REALISE THAT THE ROLES HAVE BEEN REVERSED. THE  U.S.A. IS NO LONGER A COLONY OF THE UK, BUT IT IS THE OTHER WAY ROUND.

BUT BACK TO BRICS AND THE NDB: UNLIKE DOOMSAYERS HAVE SUGGESTED WHAT WILL HAPPEN AT THE LONG RUN, BOTH ORGANISATIONS HAVE SURVIVED, AND EVEN BECAME STRONGER IN THE LAST YEARS. FOR THE NDB, THIS IS SHOWN – AMONG OTHER SIGNS – BY THE JUDGMENT OF THE RATING AGENCIES, AND FOR BRICS BY THE ATTENTION THE LAST BRICS SUMMIT ENJOYED IN THE WESTERN MEDIA AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES THAT SHOWED INTEREST IN JOINING BRICS. PERHAPS THE MOST VALUABLE RECOGNITION OF BRICS AND THE NDB COMES FROM TRUMP HIMSELF WHO WARNED COUNTRIES THAT EXCHANGE THE DOLLAR WITH A BRICS CURRENCY WITH SERIOUS MEASURES. WELL, A BRICS CURRENCY IS NOT (YET) ON THE AGENDA, BUT WHAY IS ON THE AGENDA IS TRADE AMONG BRICS MEMBERS IN NATIONAL CURRENCIES. WHICH IS IN LINE WITH THE POLICY OF NDB TO INCREASINGLY DISBURSE LOANS IN NATIONAL CURRENCIES,

ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE REACTIONS OF THE WESTERN MEDIA TO IT SHOW THAT DESPITE MANY CHALLENGES (FOR EXAMPLE DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT, MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN FOR EXAMPLE INDIA AND CHINA), BRICS AND THE NDB ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK TO BECOME NAJOR PLAYERS IN THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR. ALWAYS KEEP IN MIND THAT BOTH ORGANISATIONS ARE RELATIVELY YOUNG, AND WHAT THEY HAVE ALREADY ACHIEVED IN THAT SHORT PERIOD OF TIME IS REMARKABLE.

CONDITIONS FOR  A MEMBERSHIP OF GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS IN BRICS AND NDB

AS THERE ARE CONDITIONS FOR ANY OTHER ORGANISATION, THERE ARE ALSO CONDITIONS FOR A MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS. MOST OF THESE CONDITIONS ARE BASED  ON THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF BRICS. TOGETHER THEY ARE CALLED THE “BRICS SPIRIT”, AND THEY ARE IN PARTICULAR:

MUTUAL RESPECT, UNDERSTANDING, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY, SOLIDARITY, DEMOCRACY, OPENNESS, INCLUSIVENESS, COLLABORATION, AND CONSENSUS.

MOST PEOPLE WON’T HAVE PROBLEMS WITH MOST OF THESE GUIDING PRINCIPLES, EXCEPT FOR ONE: THAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRACY. ESPECIALLY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, COUNTRIES LIKE CHINA AND RUSSIA ARE CONSIDERED AN AUTOCRACY.

LET’S HAVE A LOOK AT CHINA FIRST. CHINA IS A SOCIALIST COUNTRY, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MARX AND LENIN. ACCORDING TO THESE PRINCIPLES, DEMOCRACY HAS A DIFFERENT DEFINITION FROM THE WESTERN INTERPRETATION.  REAL DEMOCRACY FOR MARXISM-LENINISM IS THE DEMOCRACY OF THE WORKING CLASS, LED BY THE PARTY OF THE WORKING CLASS, THE COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS KIND OF DEMOCRACY IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM THE DEMOCRACY IN THE WESTERN FORM, WHICH IS A DEMOCRACY OF THE CAPITALIST CLASS. IF WE ACCEPT THIS DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF DEMOCRACY – WHICH IS IN LINE WITH THE OTHER GUIDING PRINCIPLES -, THEN THERE IS REALLY NO PROBLEM WITH CHINA’S DEMOCRACY.

THE SITUATION IS A LITTLE BIT DIFFERENT  WITH RUSSIA, WHICH IS THEORETICALLY A DEMOCRACY IN THE WESTERN SENSE (THE “DUMA” IS THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT WITH VARIOUS PARTIES OCCUPYING SEATS IN IT), BUT FOR WESTERN IDEOLOGISTS IT IS ONLY PUTIN WHO HAS THE COMMAND IN RUSSIA, NOT THE PARLIAMENT AS “REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE”. NEVERTHELESS, AS RUSSIA IS AT LEAST A DEMOCRACY IN THE FORMAL SENSE OF THE WORD, AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, BRICS AND THE NDB DON’T HAVE ANY PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUS OF RUSSIA, WE SHOULD ACCEPT THAT. FURTHERMORE, BOTH ORGANISATIONS ARE OPEN TO ANY KIND OF FORM OF GOVERNANCE; THEREFORE, WE CAN ARGUE THAT THE COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IS MEANT AS DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE ORGANISATION. AND WITH THIS ONE, RUSSIA OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT HAVE ANY PROBLEMS.

THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT CONDITIONS FOR A MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS. OTHERS – WHICH ARE SURELY CONNECTED WITH THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES – ARE AS FOLLOWS:

— COMMITMENT TO STRENGTHENING BRICS,

— BE AN EMERGING OR DEVELOPING COUNTRY WITH REGIONAL INFLUENCE,

— ALIGN WITH FOUNDING VALUES OF BRICS,

— HAVE DIPLOMATIC AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL MEMBERS OF BRICS,

— BEING COMMITTED TO SUPPORT REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURUTY,

— SUPPORTING REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS AN ORGANISATION, AMONG OTHERS.

(FOR A COMPLETE OVERVIEW OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES, THE CONDITIONS FOR EXPANSION, AND THE PROCEDURE OF ACCEPTING NEW MEMBERS, GO TO http://www.brics.utoronto. ca)

GHANA – AS MANY OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS – WOULD SURELY FULFILL THE CONDITIONS FOR A MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS. GHANA IS COMMITTED TO SUPPORT REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, WHICH IS SHOWN BY THE LONG=LASTING CONTRIBUTION OF GHANA TO THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING FORCE. GHANA SUPPORTS – ON ITS OWN AND THROUGH THE AFRICAN UNION – A REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS.AND GHANA IS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY WITH REGIONAL INFLUENCE – AS SHOWN BY RUNNING THE SECRETARIAT OF THE AFRICA CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA. AS GHANA ALSO HAS DIPLOMATIC AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS TO ALL BRICS MEMBERS – OLD AND NEW – THERE SHOULD ALSO NOT FROM THIS SIDE ANY PROBLEMS FOR GHANA BECOMING A MEMBER OF BRICS.

WHAT ARE NOW THE ADVANTAGES AND THE DISADVANTAGES OF GHANA BECOMING A MEMBER OF BRICS AND THE NDB?

 

 

 

 

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS OF AN NDB AND BRICS MEMBERSHIP

THE ADVANTAGES OF GHANA – AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS – IN  THE NDB ARE OBVIOUS. THEY WOULD GET BETTER FINANCING CONDITIONS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND OTHER SUSTAINABLE PROJECTS. AS I ALREADY MENTIONED, THERE WOULD EVEN BE THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING LOANS IN THE LOCAL CURRENCY, WHICH WOULD MAKE THE COUNTRY LESS DEPENDENT ON DOLLAR-DENOMINATED FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS. ONE DISADVANTAGE WOULD BE THAT GHANA HAS TO CONTRIBUTE TO FINANCING NDB, BUT THAT IS PROBABLY A PROBLEM THAT CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

THE MAJOR PROBLEM FOR MOST PEOPLE – AS MS  GYABAAH MENTIONED IN HER ARTICLE – IS WHETHER A MEMBERSHIP IN NDB AND BRICS WOULDN’T MAKE THE COUNTRY MORE DEPENDENT ON CHINA, AND THAT WOULD ONLY EXCHANGE THE DEPENDENCY ON ONE COUNTRY – THE U.S.A. – WITH THE DEPENDENCY ON ANOTHER – CHINA.

IN MY OPINION, THIS ARGUMENTATION MISSES THE REALITY ON THE GROUND. THERE ARE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES. AS ONE CONTRIBUTOR FROM A DEVELOPING COUNTRY – NOT CHINA! – PUT IT:  THE U.S.A IS WORRIED ABOUT ENEMIES, CHINA IS WORRIED ABOUT FRIENDS. WHEREVER THE U.S.A. GOES, TGERE IS DESTRUCTION. LIBYA, SYRIA, AND AFGHANISTAN ARE THE BEST EXAMPLES FOR THAT. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE IS IN THE FOREMOST INTEREST OF THE U.S.A., BECAUSE THE MILITARY INDUSTRY GAINS A LOT OF PROFIT FROM IT. THIS HAS BEEN THE CASE UNDER THE FIRST TRUMP ADMINISTRATION, WAS CONTINUED UNDER THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION – PERHAPS WITH OTHER WORDS, BUT IN REALITY THE SAME OUTCOME – AND WILL CONTINUE EVEN STRONGER UNDER THE SECOND TRUMP ADMINISTRATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, CHINA IS MORE INTERESTED IN COOPERATION BETWEEN COUNTRIES. CHINA IS NOT INTERESTED IN MILITARY CONFLICTS, AND ONLY TRIES TO DEFEND THE ONE-CHINA POLICY, WHICH IS HISTORICALLY BASED, AGAINST THE U.S.A. AND SOME OF THEIR ALLIES IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA. AND EVEN IF CHINA WOULD USE ITS ECONOMIC STRENGTH FOR ITS OWN INTERESTS: AS LONG AS IT ALSO BENEFITS OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND EMERGING MARKETS, I DON’T SEE ANYTHING WRONG WITH THAT.

OTHER CHALLENGES FOR BRICS, WHICH COULD CAUSE DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS, IS THE ARGUMENTATION THAT BRICS IS STILL STRUCTURALLY WEAK, AND WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SURVIVE AT THE LONG RUN. THIS ARGUMENTATION WAS FROM THE BEGINNING ON THE SAME FOR THE NDB.

I BELIEVE THAT REALITY HAS OUTPACED THIS ARGUMENTATION.THIS IS ESPECIALLY OBVIOUS FOR THE NDB WHICH HAS BECOME FINANCIALLY MUCH STRONGER FROM THE 1ST STRATEGY DOCUMENT 2017-2021 TO THE SECOND 2022-2026. THIS IS – AS I ALREADY MENTIONED – IN THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN THE RATINGS BY FITCH AND S&P GLOBAL. AND THIS ACCOUNTS ALSO FOR THE WHOLE BRICS ORGAINSATION. AS A YOUNG INSTITUTION WITH A LOT OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES WITHIN THE ORGANISATION, BRICS HAS ACHIEVED A LOT UNTIL TODAY. MANY COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY JOINED BRICS AND THE NDB, OR SHOWN INTEREST IN  A MEMBERSHIP. INTERESTINLY ENOUGH, AMONG THOSE SHOWING INTEREST IS NIGERIA, A MEMBER OF THE MINT COUNTRIES, WHICH MS GYABAAH SHORTLY CONSIDERED AS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO BRICS, BUT ALSO DISMISSED IT BECAUSE OF WEAK ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE.

AS WE NOW FOUND OUT THAT THERE ARE MORE ADVANTAGES THAN DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA IN JOINING BRICS, SHOULD GHANA COMPLETE THE STEP AND BECOME A MEMBER? LET’S FIND OUT IN THE CONCLUSION.

 

CONCLUSION

NOW THAT WE HAVE SEEN THE MAIN ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS TO JOIN BRICS AND NDB (I INTENTIONALLY LEFT ANY TECHNICAL CHALLENGES FOR BRICS AND NDB OUT, BECAUSE MY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THAT IS NEAR TO ZERO. HOWEVER, I AM CONFIDENT THERE ARE ENOUGH ICT EXPERTS WITHN THE TWO INSTITUTIONS TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS), IS IT ADVISABLE FOR THESE COUNTRIES TO JOIN THEM NOW?

I CONCENTRATE MY ARGUMENTATION ON GHANA, AND ONLY REFER TO THE AFRICAN CONTINENT WHEN ITS SUITABLE FOR THE CONTENTS. I PERSONALLY DO NOT SEE AN PROBLEMS FOR GHANA TO APPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN NDB, BECAUSE THERE ARE ALMOST ONLY ADVANTAGES FOR GHANA. WE HAVE SEEN THE EXAMPLE OF URUGUAY WHICH IS A MEMBER OF NDB, BUT NOT OF BRICS. A LITTLE BIT MORE COMPLICATED IS THE QUESTION OF A FULL MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS+. I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE TOO MANY INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN GHANA WHICH MUST BE SOLVED FIRST BEFORE THE CONCENTRATION ON A FULL MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS CAN BE FRUITFUL. THE LAST ELECTIONS HAVE IN MY  OPINION SHOWN THAT TWO MANY PEOPLE PUT THEIR OWN INTERESTS BEFORE THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY (POSING AS AN INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE AFTER LOSING THE PRIMARIES, E.G.). ANY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES IS MORE OR LESS NON-EXISTENT, AND ONLY SUCH A COOPERATION CAN BE OF BENEFIT FOR THE COUNTRY. YOU CANNOT CLEAN YOUR NEIGHBOURHOOD BEFORE CLEANING YOUR OWN HOUSE;

AN ALTERNATIVE FOR GHANA WOULD BE – AND I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT STRONGLY, NO MATTER WHICH GOVERNMENT IS IN POWER – TO BECOME AN “INTEREST NATION” IN BRICS.

BRICS HAS A FOUR STEP MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION PROCESS:

— AN INTERESTED COUNTRY,

— A PROSPECTIVE BRICS MEMBER STATE,

— AN INVITED BRICS MEMBER STATE, AND

— A BRICS MEMBER STATE.

DETAILS ABOUT THE PROCESS CAN BE DERIVED FROM “BRICS MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION GUIDING PRINCIPLES, STANDARDS, CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES”. HERE I WILL ONLY MENTION THE PROCEDURE TO BECOME AN INTERESTED COUNTRY.

 

“A country is considered interested when its Leader or Foreign Minister formally communicates its interest in becoming a new BRICS member state to the BRICS Chair,”

 

THIS APPROACH IS RATHER EASY TO PERFORM, AND CAN ONLY BE BENEFICIARY FOR THE COUNTRY. FROM BRICS, THE LEADERS OF THIS COUNTRY MIGHT EVEN LEARN HOW TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BETWEEN ORGANISATIONS WITH DIFFERENT KINDS OF LEADERSHIP. IT IS INTERESTING TONOTE THAT ACCORDING TO MY INFORMATION,

 

IN ALL WE CAN SAY THAT THERE IS WIDESPREAD INTEREST IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO BECOME MEMBERS IN BRICS, BUT WE MUST ALSO REALISE WHAT IS ELABORATED MAINLY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LITERATURE ON BRICS: EVEN WITHIN THIS ORGANISATION – AS POSITIVE AND FUTURE-ORIENTED IT MAY BE – AFRICA MUST LEARN TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE TO REPRESENT AFRICA’S INTERESTS ON THE WORLD STAGE – AND OF COURSE ALSO ON THE BRICS’S STAGE – BETTER.

PERHAPS THE AFRICAN UNION SHOULD APPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS…

 

REFERNCES:

AGREEMENT ON THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK, FORTALEZA, JULY 15, 2015;

NDB’S GENERAL STRATEGY: 2017-2021;

NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK GENERAL STRATEGY FOR 2022 TO 2026;

THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL PAYMENTS: BRICS PAY AND THE EVOLVING FINANCIAL ORDER;

IQBAL; BRICS AS A DRIVER OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT;

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND; BRICS’ PHILOSOPHIES FOR DEVELOPMENT FINANCING AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR LICS;

NO AUTHOR; THE BRICS;

MARTYNOV; THE BRICS: PARADIGM SHIFT IN DEALING WITH NEW CHALLENGES;

KATZENSTEIN P.; CIVILIZATION IN WORLD POLITICS, BOOK 1-3;

THE BRICS ALLIANCE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOUTH AFRICA AND AFRICA

AFRICA’S FUTURE LIES IN COOPERATION AND SELF-CONFIDENCE

A REPLY –OR BETTER ADDITION TO MS RACHEL GYABAAH’S ARTICLE IN THE BUSINESS&FINANCIAL TIMES DATED NOVEMBER 20,2024 “BRICS: THE NEED FOR AFRICA TO CAREFULLY BALANCE THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE AMID GLOBAL POWER STRUGGLES”

 

AUTHOR: HANS PETER RECKLING

ORGANISATION: GHANA RESEARCH

WEBSITE: https://www.recklingenterprise.com

SUBMITTED: 20/01/25

 

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

BEGINNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF NDB

2ND NDB STRATEGY 2022-2026

MISSION OF NDB

PROFILE OF NDB

NDB WITHIN THE FINANCJAL SYSTEM – PRESENT AND FUTURE

LINKAGE BETWEEN NDB AND BRICS

CONDITIONS FOR  A MEMBERSHIP OF GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS IN BRICS AND NDB

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS OF AN NDB AND BRICS MEMBERSHIP

CONCLUSION

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

FIRST OF ALL, I WANT TO THANK MS. GYABAAH FOR HER INTERESTING ARTICLE. IF ANYTHING, IT BRINGS TO MIND OF THE GHANAIAN READER THE EXISTENCE OF THE BRICS ORGANISATION AND ITS SUCCESS SINCE ITS INAUGURATION.

HER CONCLUSION, HOWEVER, WAS A LITTLE BIT TOO CAUTIOUS FOR MY TASTE. AFRICA IN GENERAL, AND GHANA IN PARTICULAR, MUST SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY. A MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS – OR FOR THE MEANTIME AT LEAST AN OBSERVER STATUS, AND THEREFORE AN APPROACH TOWARDS THE ORGANISATION – WOULD BRING TO THE COUNTRY AND THE CONTINENT AT LARGE.

AS MS. GYABAAH FOCUSSED MORE ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION A POSSIBLE MEMBERSHIP FOR GHANA WILL BE CONFRONTED WITH – AND UNDERSTANDABLY POINTED OUT THE GEOPOLITICAL RISKS – I WILL STRESS MORE THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMICAL FACTORS, AND LOOK AT THE “NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK” (FOLLOWING CALLED NDB) WHICH WAS FOUNDED BY THE FOUNDING MEMBERS BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA, AND CHINA PLUS THE LATER JOINING SOUTH AFRICA. FIRST OF ALL, I WILL INTRODUCE A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NDB WHICH I TOOK FROM ITS STRATEGY PLAN 2017 TO 2021:

 

BEGINNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NDB

FIRST OF ALL, I WILL INTRODUCE A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NDB WHICH I TOOK FROM ITS STRATEGY PLAN 2017 TO 2021:

Trajectory of NDB’s Creation

NDB was established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in the context of the BRICS mechanism, along with the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement. At the March 2012 New Delhi Summit, the leaders of BRICS countries directed their finance ministers to examine the feasibility and viability of setting up a new development bank that would support economic growth in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries. One year later, in the Durban Summit in March 2013, BRICS leaders announced the start of formal negotiations to establish NDB. The Agreement on the New Development Bank was signed during the BRICS Summit held in Fortaleza on July 15, 2014. Following ratification by all five founding members, the Agreement entered into force on July 3, 2015. The inaugural meeting of the Board of Governors of NDB was held in Moscow on July 7, 2015.

CURRENTLY, THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK (FOLLOWING, I ‘LL USE THE ABBREVIATION “ NDB”) IS IN THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR TERM OF STRATEGY PLANNING.

IN THE AGREEMENT ABOUT THE FOUNDING OF NDB THAT WAS SIGNED BY THE FIVE BRICS MEMBERS, IT IS STATED THAT THE SIGNING MEMBERS ACKNOWLEDGE THE CONSTRAINTS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND EMERGING ECONOMIES FACE IN TODAY’S GLOBAL ECONOMY.THE PURPOSE OF THE BANK SHALL BE TO MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN BRICS COUNTRIES AND OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THE MEMBERSHIP IN NDB IS OPEN TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS BORROWING AND NON-BORROWING MEMBERS. THE NON-BORROWING MEMBERS ARE CLASSIFIED AS DEVELOPED NATIONS, WHOSE MEMBERSHIP IS LIMITED TO 20% OF ALL MEMBERS, TO AVOID A CONTROL OF DEVELOPED NATIONS IN THE BANK. THE BANK WAS THEN LAUNCHED ONE YEAR AFTER THE AGREEMENT IN 2016.

THE FIRST AND FOREMOST INTENTION OF THE NDB – ACCORDING TO THE AGREEMENT – IS TO MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.

THE FIRST STRATEGY PERIOD OF THE BANK DATED FROM 2017 TO 2021. IN THIS PERIOD, THE MISSION AND THE TARGETS WERE MANIFESTED. THESE TARGETS WERE IN PARTICULAR:

— BUILDING NEW RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE MEMBERS OF THE BANK AND EXTERNALLY;

— DEVELOPING NEW PROJECTS AND THE INSTRUMENTS TO FINANCE THEM;

— DEVELOPING NEW APPROACHES FOR FINANCING IN THE EMERGING ECONOMIES.

(NDB’S GENERAL STRATEGY 2017-2021, P.3F.)

BUILDING NEW RELATIONSHIPS MEANS DEVELOPING TRUST BETWEEN THE BANK AND THE MEMBER STATES.

DEVELOPING NEW PROJECTS AND NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS MEANS THE BANK LAYING EMPHASIS ON SUSTAINABLE PROJECTS. FURTHERMORE, BUILDING SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE IS AT THE CORE OF THE BANK, AS MOST OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND EMERGING ECONOMIES LACK MODERN INFRASTRUCTURAL BASICS. REALISING THAT THERE IS A GAP IN THE FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE, THE BANK IS READY TO FILL IN THIS GAP FOR THE BETTER OF THE EMERGING ECONOMIES.THAT INCLUDES LOW INTEREST RATES AND OFFERING LOANS IN LOCAL CURRENCIES.

ADDITIONALLY, THE BANK ENVISAGED NEW APPROACHES, ESPECIALLY CONCERNING THE HANDLING OF LOAN DISBURSEMENT. THE BANK USES A TWO-WAY APPROACH TO RISK MANAGEMENT: LOW RISK PROJECTS ENJOY A FAST TRACK APPROVAL AND OVERSIGHT, WHILE HIGH RISK PROJECTS ARE PUT UNDER MORE SCRUTINY IN APPROVAL AND OVERSIGHT.

THESE ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT BASICS THE BANK INTENDED TO INTRODUCE IN ITS BUSINESS ACCORDING TO THE GENERAL STRATEGY 2017-2021. NOW WE WILL SEE HOW THE BANK PUTS THESE UNDERLININGS INTO REALITY DURING THE SECOND GENERAL STRATEGY 2022-2026.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2ND NDB STRATEGY 2022-2026

THE SECOND STRATEGIC PLAN OF THE NDB IS CHARACTERISED BY THREE MAJOR ISSUES: THE MISSION OF NDB, THE PROFILE OF NDB, AND THE POSITION OF NDB WITHIN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM – HOW DOES IT LOOK LIKE NOW, AND WHAT WILL NDB’S POSITION IN THE SYSTEM IN FUTURE.

MISSION OF NDB

THE TITLE OF THIS SECOND STRATEGY PAPER FORMS ALREADY THE BASE FOR THE MISSION OF NDB: “SCALING UP DEVELOPMENT FINANCE FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE”. IT CONTAINS TWO ELEMENTS: DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTURE. THE BANK SETS ITS TARGET TO BECOME A LEADING MEMBER OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM TO SUPPLY EMERGING MARKETS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE PROJECTS. THUS, AFTER IN ITS FEW YEARS OF EXISTENCE, NDB HAS ALREADY FOUND ITS PLACE WITHIN MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS (MDB’S).

THE BANK REALISES THAT THERE IS A GAP BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES, AND THAT THE EXISTING MDBS CANNOT FILL THIS GAP. CONSEQUENTLY, NDB SETS AS ITS MISSION THE SUPPORT OF THESE EMERGING ECONOMIES, IMPROVE THE INFRASTRUCTURE IN ITS MEMBERSHIP COUNTRIES AND SUSTAIN THEIR FINANCIAL STRUCTURE.

PROFILE OF NDB

SINCE ITS START AS AN IDEA IN FORTALEZA, NDB HAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS A MAJOR PLAYER IN SUPPORT OF ITS TARGET GROUP. IT HAS A SOUND  FINANCIAL FOUNDATION WHICH IS RECOGNISED BY MAJOR RATING AGENCIES. FITCH RATES NDB WITH “AA+” = OUTLOOK STABLE – FROM NEGATIVE IN 2023. S&P GLOBAL AFFIRMED ITS RATINGS OF NDB ON 10TH OF MAY, 2024 AS “AA+/A-+”. UNLIKE SEVERAL WESTERN ECONOMISTS THAT DECLARE NDB “TOO SMALL” TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, THE “INTERNATIONAL BANKER” ACKNOWLEDGES ON ITS WEBSITE https://internationalbanker.com THAT NDB IS A REFLECTION OF DEVELOPING NATIONS BEING UNHAPPY WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM. THIS DESIRE TO HAVE A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION THAT PUTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMERGING MARKETS INTO THE CENTER OF ITS OPERATIONS IS REFLECTED IN THE SERVICES OF NDB AND ITS TARGET MARKET: FINANCING SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE AND OTHER SUSTAINABLE PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

AND JUST LIKE MODERN TECHNOLOGY IS INTEGRATED IN THE DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS OF THE BANK, THIS MODERN TECHNOLOGY ALSO FORMS PART OF THE SERVICES OF THE BANK. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY IS AT THE CORE OF PROJECTS FINANCED BY NDB.

BY THAT, WE GET TO THE POSITION OF NDB IN THE PRESENT AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE. GEOPOLITICALLY, THE WORLD IS MORE AND MORE DIVIDED INTO THE “DEVELOPED” NORTH AND THE “DEVELOPING” SOUTH. THIS POLITICAL DIVIDE IS MIRRORED IN THE ECONOMICAL SITUATION. THIS IS BECAUSE ECONOMY AND POLITICS  HAVE A DIALECTICAL RELATION, WHICH MEANS THAT ECONOMY DEPENDS ON POLITICS, AND VICE VERSA. NDB GETS MORE AND MORE REGOGNITION IN THE FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL WORLD, AS ELABORATED BEFORE IN VIEW OF THE RATING AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM. MEANWHILE, FOUR NEW COUNTRIES HAVE BECOME MEMBERS OF THE NDB IN 2021, NAMELY BANGLA DESH, EGYPT, AND URUGUAY AS BORROWING MEMBERS, AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AS NON-BORROWING MEMBER. THIS SHOWS THE GROWING ATTRACTION NDB AND ITS FINANCIAL STRATEGIES ENJOY IN THE EMERGING MARKETS. THIS GROWING ATTRACTION WILL SURELY LEAD TO A FURTHER EXPANSION, AS IT IS ALREADY INCORPORATED IN THE SECOND STRATEGY OF THE NDB 2022-2026.

OF COURSE, THERE ARE CHALLENGES AND DOUBTS FOR  POTENTIAL FUTURE MEMBERS OF NDB. THESE ARE BASICALLY THE SAME AS THEY ARE CONCERNING THE BRICS ORGANISATION. THE MOST IMPORTANT CONCERNS ARE THE ECONOMICAL AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF CHINA IN THE BANK, AND POSSIBLE INTERNAL CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN NDB MEMBERS, LIKE CHINA AND INDIA. WE WILL LOOK AT THESE CONCERNS IN THE NEXT CHAPTER. APART FROM THAT, THERE ARE MORE TECHNICAL ISSUES WHICH I ADMIT, I CANNOT LOOK AT FURTHER, SIMPLY I LACK THE KNOWLEDGE TO COMMENT ON THOSE. BUT I AM SURE THAT THERE ARE PEOPLE WITHIN BRICS AND THE NDB WHO CAN SOLVE THESE ISSUES AS THEY APPEAR.

LINKAGE BETWEEN NDB AND BRICS

AS WE ALL MEANWHILE KNOW, THE BRIC ORGANISATION WAS FOUNDED BY BRAZIL, RUSSIS, INDIA, AND CHINA,  LATER JOINED BY SOUTH AFRICA TO BECOME BRICS. THE BRICS ORGANISATION THEN LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR NDB IN 2015, WHICH WAS THEN LAUNCHED IN 2016. AS THE FOUNDING MEMBERS OS BRICS AND NDB ARE THE SAME, THERE ARE SURELY LINKAGES BETWEEN BOTH.

BUT OF COURSE, THE LINKAGE BETWEEN BRICS AND NDB IS NOT REDUCED TO WHO FOUNDED WHOM. LINKAGES BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMY ARE RECOGNISED BY MAINSTREAM WESTERN ECONOMISTS (POLITICAL ECONOMY!) AS WELL AS BY MARXIST ECONOMISTS.

POLITICAL ECONOMY IS DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:

 

Political economy is an interdisciplinary branch of the social sciences. It focuses on the interrelationships of individuals, governments, and public policy.

Political economists study how economic theories such as capitalism, socialism, and communism work in the real world. Any economic theory is a means of directing the distribution of a finite amount of resources in a way that benefits the greatest number of individuals.

o Political economy is an interdisciplinary branch of the social sciences. It focuses on the interrelationships of individuals, governments, and public policy.

Political economists study how economic theories such as capitalism, socialism, and communism work in the real world. Any economic theory is a means of directing the distribution of a finite amount of resources in a way that benefits the greatest number of individuals.

(INVESTOPEDIA: WHAT IS POLITICAL ECONOMY?)

HERE WE SEE ALREADY HOW ECONOMY IS RELATED TO POLITICAL SYSTEMS. OF COURSE, THE DEFINITION IS INCORRECT, AS FAR AS CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND COMMUNISM ARE NO THEORIES (PERHAPS COMMUNISM, AS THERE IS NO COMMUNIST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD), BUT CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM ARE POLITICAL SYSTEMS.

PERHAPS THE BEST KNOWN PHRASE CHARACTERISING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN A PRACTICAL WAY IS THE ONE ATTRIBUTED TO JAMES CARVILLE, ADVISOR TO BILL CLINTON IN THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN IN THE U.S.A. IN 1992: “IT’S THE ECONOMY STUPID.” (OFTEN, THIS SENTENCE IS WRITTEN AS “IT’S THE ECONOMY, STUPID.”) IT SHOWS HOW IMPORTANT ECONOMY IS CONSIDERED IN THE POLITICAL LIFE.

MARXISM-LENINISM SEES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMY EVEN CLEARER, ALBEIT PERHAPS MORE DRASTCALLY IN THE DEFINITION OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM:

As a materialist philosophy, Marxist dialectics emphasizes the importance of real-world conditions and the presence of functional contradictions within and among social relations, which derive from, but are not limited to, the contradictions that occur in social class, labour economics, and socioeconomic interactions.[3] Within Marxism, a contradiction is a relationship in which two forces oppose each other, leading to mutual development.[4]:  (WIKIPEDIA;; DIALECTICAL MATERIALIM)

HERE WE SEE CLEARLY THAT BETWEEN POLITICS AND ECONOMY THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON CONTRADICTIVE FORCES (MARX AND ENGELS MORE OR LESS LIMIT THESE CONTRADICTIVE FORCES TO POLITICAL CLASSES!) WHICH OPPOSE EACH OTHER OVER ECONOMICAL CONDITIONS.

AND EXACTLY THESE CONTRADICTIVE FORCES WE NOW HAVE GLOBALLY, NOT WITHIN ONE COUNTRY. AND THESE CONTRADICTIONS ARE NOT (YET) THOSE OF CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM, BUT THOSE OF THE “DEVELOPED NORTH” AND THOSE OF THE “DEVELOPING SOUTH”.

THE BRICS NATIONS HAVE RECOGNISED THAT WITHOUT A SOUND FINANCIAL FOUNDATION, THE BEST POLITICAL CONCEPTS ARE LEADING TO NOTHING. FOR THE “DEVELOPED WEST”, THE U.S.A. PRACTISES THIS FOR A RATHER LONG TIME, PRACTICALLY SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. ONLY IN THE LAST YEARS, IT IS BECOMING MORE OBVIOUS. IN HIS FIRST TERM, TRUMP HAS INTRODUCED TARIFFS WHICH WERE CONTINUED UNDER THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION. AND FOR HIS SECOND TERM, TRUMP PROMISED MORE AND HIGHER TARIFFS, NOT ONLY ON COUNYTIES WHICH ARE OPPOSED TO U.S.A. POLITICS, BUT ALSO ON ALLIES LIKE CANADA, THE EU AND MEXICO. MARTYNOV HAS REALISED THAT VERY WELL IN HIS ARTICLE “THE BRICS: PARADIGM SHIFT IN DEALING WITH NEW CHALLENGES”. HE POINTS OUT THAT THE AIM OF THE U.S.A. IS TO BE THE “POLICE OF THE WORLD”. HE CITES MOVEMENTS IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ACADEMIC LITERATURE WHICH PROPOSES A “CIVILIZATION OF MODERNITY” WITH SEVERAL NEW CIVILISATIONS WHICH ARE “SUPERVISED” BY ONE WHICH IS MORE EQUAL THAN THE OTHERS – THE ANGLO-AMERICAN. THIS ASIDE: THE UNITED KINGDOM DOES NOT SEEM TO REALISE THAT THE ROLES HAVE BEEN REVERSED. THE  U.S.A. IS NO LONGER A COLONY OF THE UK, BUT IT IS THE OTHER WAY ROUND.

BUT BACK TO BRICS AND THE NDB: UNLIKE DOOMSAYERS HAVE SUGGESTED WHAT WILL HAPPEN AT THE LONG RUN, BOTH ORGANISATIONS HAVE SURVIVED, AND EVEN BECAME STRONGER IN THE LAST YEARS. FOR THE NDB, THIS IS SHOWN – AMONG OTHER SIGNS – BY THE JUDGMENT OF THE RATING AGENCIES, AND FOR BRICS BY THE ATTENTION THE LAST BRICS SUMMIT ENJOYED IN THE WESTERN MEDIA AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES THAT SHOWED INTEREST IN JOINING BRICS. PERHAPS THE MOST VALUABLE RECOGNITION OF BRICS AND THE NDB COMES FROM TRUMP HIMSELF WHO WARNED COUNTRIES THAT EXCHANGE THE DOLLAR WITH A BRICS CURRENCY WITH SERIOUS MEASURES. WELL, A BRICS CURRENCY IS NOT (YET) ON THE AGENDA, BUT WHAY IS ON THE AGENDA IS TRADE AMONG BRICS MEMBERS IN NATIONAL CURRENCIES. WHICH IS IN LINE WITH THE POLICY OF NDB TO INCREASINGLY DISBURSE LOANS IN NATIONAL CURRENCIES,

ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE REACTIONS OF THE WESTERN MEDIA TO IT SHOW THAT DESPITE MANY CHALLENGES (FOR EXAMPLE DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT, MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN FOR EXAMPLE INDIA AND CHINA), BRICS AND THE NDB ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK TO BECOME NAJOR PLAYERS IN THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR. ALWAYS KEEP IN MIND THAT BOTH ORGANISATIONS ARE RELATIVELY YOUNG, AND WHAT THEY HAVE ALREADY ACHIEVED IN THAT SHORT PERIOD OF TIME IS REMARKABLE.

CONDITIONS FOR  A MEMBERSHIP OF GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS IN BRICS AND NDB

AS THERE ARE CONDITIONS FOR ANY OTHER ORGANISATION, THERE ARE ALSO CONDITIONS FOR A MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS. MOST OF THESE CONDITIONS ARE BASED  ON THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF BRICS. TOGETHER THEY ARE CALLED THE “BRICS SPIRIT”, AND THEY ARE IN PARTICULAR:

MUTUAL RESPECT, UNDERSTANDING, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY, SOLIDARITY, DEMOCRACY, OPENNESS, INCLUSIVENESS, COLLABORATION, AND CONSENSUS.

MOST PEOPLE WON’T HAVE PROBLEMS WITH MOST OF THESE GUIDING PRINCIPLES, EXCEPT FOR ONE: THAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRACY. ESPECIALLY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, COUNTRIES LIKE CHINA AND RUSSIA ARE CONSIDERED AN AUTOCRACY.

LET’S HAVE A LOOK AT CHINA FIRST. CHINA IS A SOCIALIST COUNTRY, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MARX AND LENIN. ACCORDING TO THESE PRINCIPLES, DEMOCRACY HAS A DIFFERENT DEFINITION FROM THE WESTERN INTERPRETATION.  REAL DEMOCRACY FOR MARXISM-LENINISM IS THE DEMOCRACY OF THE WORKING CLASS, LED BY THE PARTY OF THE WORKING CLASS, THE COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS KIND OF DEMOCRACY IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM THE DEMOCRACY IN THE WESTERN FORM, WHICH IS A DEMOCRACY OF THE CAPITALIST CLASS. IF WE ACCEPT THIS DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF DEMOCRACY – WHICH IS IN LINE WITH THE OTHER GUIDING PRINCIPLES -, THEN THERE IS REALLY NO PROBLEM WITH CHINA’S DEMOCRACY.

THE SITUATION IS A LITTLE BIT DIFFERENT  WITH RUSSIA, WHICH IS THEORETICALLY A DEMOCRACY IN THE WESTERN SENSE (THE “DUMA” IS THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT WITH VARIOUS PARTIES OCCUPYING SEATS IN IT), BUT FOR WESTERN IDEOLOGISTS IT IS ONLY PUTIN WHO HAS THE COMMAND IN RUSSIA, NOT THE PARLIAMENT AS “REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE”. NEVERTHELESS, AS RUSSIA IS AT LEAST A DEMOCRACY IN THE FORMAL SENSE OF THE WORD, AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, BRICS AND THE NDB DON’T HAVE ANY PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUS OF RUSSIA, WE SHOULD ACCEPT THAT. FURTHERMORE, BOTH ORGANISATIONS ARE OPEN TO ANY KIND OF FORM OF GOVERNANCE; THEREFORE, WE CAN ARGUE THAT THE COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IS MEANT AS DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE ORGANISATION. AND WITH THIS ONE, RUSSIA OBVIOUSLY DOES NOT HAVE ANY PROBLEMS.

THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT CONDITIONS FOR A MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS. OTHERS – WHICH ARE SURELY CONNECTED WITH THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES – ARE AS FOLLOWS:

— COMMITMENT TO STRENGTHENING BRICS,

— BE AN EMERGING OR DEVELOPING COUNTRY WITH REGIONAL INFLUENCE,

— ALIGN WITH FOUNDING VALUES OF BRICS,

— HAVE DIPLOMATIC AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL MEMBERS OF BRICS,

— BEING COMMITTED TO SUPPORT REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURUTY,

— SUPPORTING REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS AN ORGANISATION, AMONG OTHERS.

(FOR A COMPLETE OVERVIEW OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES, THE CONDITIONS FOR EXPANSION, AND THE PROCEDURE OF ACCEPTING NEW MEMBERS, GO TO http://www.brics.utoronto. ca)

GHANA – AS MANY OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS – WOULD SURELY FULFILL THE CONDITIONS FOR A MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS. GHANA IS COMMITTED TO SUPPORT REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, WHICH IS SHOWN BY THE LONG=LASTING CONTRIBUTION OF GHANA TO THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING FORCE. GHANA SUPPORTS – ON ITS OWN AND THROUGH THE AFRICAN UNION – A REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS.AND GHANA IS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY WITH REGIONAL INFLUENCE – AS SHOWN BY RUNNING THE SECRETARIAT OF THE AFRICA CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA. AS GHANA ALSO HAS DIPLOMATIC AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS TO ALL BRICS MEMBERS – OLD AND NEW – THERE SHOULD ALSO NOT FROM THIS SIDE ANY PROBLEMS FOR GHANA BECOMING A MEMBER OF BRICS.

WHAT ARE NOW THE ADVANTAGES AND THE DISADVANTAGES OF GHANA BECOMING A MEMBER OF BRICS AND THE NDB?

 

 

 

 

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS OF AN NDB AND BRICS MEMBERSHIP

THE ADVANTAGES OF GHANA – AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS – IN  THE NDB ARE OBVIOUS. THEY WOULD GET BETTER FINANCING CONDITIONS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE AND OTHER SUSTAINABLE PROJECTS. AS I ALREADY MENTIONED, THERE WOULD EVEN BE THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING LOANS IN THE LOCAL CURRENCY, WHICH WOULD MAKE THE COUNTRY LESS DEPENDENT ON DOLLAR-DENOMINATED FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS. ONE DISADVANTAGE WOULD BE THAT GHANA HAS TO CONTRIBUTE TO FINANCING NDB, BUT THAT IS PROBABLY A PROBLEM THAT CAN BE SOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

THE MAJOR PROBLEM FOR MOST PEOPLE – AS MS  GYABAAH MENTIONED IN HER ARTICLE – IS WHETHER A MEMBERSHIP IN NDB AND BRICS WOULDN’T MAKE THE COUNTRY MORE DEPENDENT ON CHINA, AND THAT WOULD ONLY EXCHANGE THE DEPENDENCY ON ONE COUNTRY – THE U.S.A. – WITH THE DEPENDENCY ON ANOTHER – CHINA.

IN MY OPINION, THIS ARGUMENTATION MISSES THE REALITY ON THE GROUND. THERE ARE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES. AS ONE CONTRIBUTOR FROM A DEVELOPING COUNTRY – NOT CHINA! – PUT IT:  THE U.S.A IS WORRIED ABOUT ENEMIES, CHINA IS WORRIED ABOUT FRIENDS. WHEREVER THE U.S.A. GOES, TGERE IS DESTRUCTION. LIBYA, SYRIA, AND AFGHANISTAN ARE THE BEST EXAMPLES FOR THAT. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE IS IN THE FOREMOST INTEREST OF THE U.S.A., BECAUSE THE MILITARY INDUSTRY GAINS A LOT OF PROFIT FROM IT. THIS HAS BEEN THE CASE UNDER THE FIRST TRUMP ADMINISTRATION, WAS CONTINUED UNDER THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION – PERHAPS WITH OTHER WORDS, BUT IN REALITY THE SAME OUTCOME – AND WILL CONTINUE EVEN STRONGER UNDER THE SECOND TRUMP ADMINISTRATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, CHINA IS MORE INTERESTED IN COOPERATION BETWEEN COUNTRIES. CHINA IS NOT INTERESTED IN MILITARY CONFLICTS, AND ONLY TRIES TO DEFEND THE ONE-CHINA POLICY, WHICH IS HISTORICALLY BASED, AGAINST THE U.S.A. AND SOME OF THEIR ALLIES IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA. AND EVEN IF CHINA WOULD USE ITS ECONOMIC STRENGTH FOR ITS OWN INTERESTS: AS LONG AS IT ALSO BENEFITS OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND EMERGING MARKETS, I DON’T SEE ANYTHING WRONG WITH THAT.

OTHER CHALLENGES FOR BRICS, WHICH COULD CAUSE DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS, IS THE ARGUMENTATION THAT BRICS IS STILL STRUCTURALLY WEAK, AND WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SURVIVE AT THE LONG RUN. THIS ARGUMENTATION WAS FROM THE BEGINNING ON THE SAME FOR THE NDB.

I BELIEVE THAT REALITY HAS OUTPACED THIS ARGUMENTATION.THIS IS ESPECIALLY OBVIOUS FOR THE NDB WHICH HAS BECOME FINANCIALLY MUCH STRONGER FROM THE 1ST STRATEGY DOCUMENT 2017-2021 TO THE SECOND 2022-2026. THIS IS – AS I ALREADY MENTIONED – IN THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN THE RATINGS BY FITCH AND S&P GLOBAL. AND THIS ACCOUNTS ALSO FOR THE WHOLE BRICS ORGAINSATION. AS A YOUNG INSTITUTION WITH A LOT OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES WITHIN THE ORGANISATION, BRICS HAS ACHIEVED A LOT UNTIL TODAY. MANY COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY JOINED BRICS AND THE NDB, OR SHOWN INTEREST IN  A MEMBERSHIP. INTERESTINLY ENOUGH, AMONG THOSE SHOWING INTEREST IS NIGERIA, A MEMBER OF THE MINT COUNTRIES, WHICH MS GYABAAH SHORTLY CONSIDERED AS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO BRICS, BUT ALSO DISMISSED IT BECAUSE OF WEAK ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE.

AS WE NOW FOUND OUT THAT THERE ARE MORE ADVANTAGES THAN DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA IN JOINING BRICS, SHOULD GHANA COMPLETE THE STEP AND BECOME A MEMBER? LET’S FIND OUT IN THE CONCLUSION.

 

CONCLUSION

NOW THAT WE HAVE SEEN THE MAIN ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR GHANA AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS TO JOIN BRICS AND NDB (I INTENTIONALLY LEFT ANY TECHNICAL CHALLENGES FOR BRICS AND NDB OUT, BECAUSE MY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THAT IS NEAR TO ZERO. HOWEVER, I AM CONFIDENT THERE ARE ENOUGH ICT EXPERTS WITHN THE TWO INSTITUTIONS TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS), IS IT ADVISABLE FOR THESE COUNTRIES TO JOIN THEM NOW?

I CONCENTRATE MY ARGUMENTATION ON GHANA, AND ONLY REFER TO THE AFRICAN CONTINENT WHEN ITS SUITABLE FOR THE CONTENTS. I PERSONALLY DO NOT SEE AN PROBLEMS FOR GHANA TO APPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN NDB, BECAUSE THERE ARE ALMOST ONLY ADVANTAGES FOR GHANA. WE HAVE SEEN THE EXAMPLE OF URUGUAY WHICH IS A MEMBER OF NDB, BUT NOT OF BRICS. A LITTLE BIT MORE COMPLICATED IS THE QUESTION OF A FULL MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS+. I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE TOO MANY INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN GHANA WHICH MUST BE SOLVED FIRST BEFORE THE CONCENTRATION ON A FULL MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS CAN BE FRUITFUL. THE LAST ELECTIONS HAVE IN MY  OPINION SHOWN THAT TWO MANY PEOPLE PUT THEIR OWN INTERESTS BEFORE THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY (POSING AS AN INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE AFTER LOSING THE PRIMARIES, E.G.). ANY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES IS MORE OR LESS NON-EXISTENT, AND ONLY SUCH A COOPERATION CAN BE OF BENEFIT FOR THE COUNTRY. YOU CANNOT CLEAN YOUR NEIGHBOURHOOD BEFORE CLEANING YOUR OWN HOUSE;

AN ALTERNATIVE FOR GHANA WOULD BE – AND I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT STRONGLY, NO MATTER WHICH GOVERNMENT IS IN POWER – TO BECOME AN “INTEREST NATION” IN BRICS.

BRICS HAS A FOUR STEP MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION PROCESS:

— AN INTERESTED COUNTRY,

— A PROSPECTIVE BRICS MEMBER STATE,

— AN INVITED BRICS MEMBER STATE, AND

— A BRICS MEMBER STATE.

DETAILS ABOUT THE PROCESS CAN BE DERIVED FROM “BRICS MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION GUIDING PRINCIPLES, STANDARDS, CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES”. HERE I WILL ONLY MENTION THE PROCEDURE TO BECOME AN INTERESTED COUNTRY.

 

“A country is considered interested when its Leader or Foreign Minister formally communicates its interest in becoming a new BRICS member state to the BRICS Chair,”

 

THIS APPROACH IS RATHER EASY TO PERFORM, AND CAN ONLY BE BENEFICIARY FOR THE COUNTRY. FROM BRICS, THE LEADERS OF THIS COUNTRY MIGHT EVEN LEARN HOW TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BETWEEN ORGANISATIONS WITH DIFFERENT KINDS OF LEADERSHIP. IT IS INTERESTING TONOTE THAT ACCORDING TO MY INFORMATION,

 

IN ALL WE CAN SAY THAT THERE IS WIDESPREAD INTEREST IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO BECOME MEMBERS IN BRICS, BUT WE MUST ALSO REALISE WHAT IS ELABORATED MAINLY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LITERATURE ON BRICS: EVEN WITHIN THIS ORGANISATION – AS POSITIVE AND FUTURE-ORIENTED IT MAY BE – AFRICA MUST LEARN TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE TO REPRESENT AFRICA’S INTERESTS ON THE WORLD STAGE – AND OF COURSE ALSO ON THE BRICS’S STAGE – BETTER.

PERHAPS THE AFRICAN UNION SHOULD APPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN BRICS…

 

REFERNCES:

AGREEMENT ON THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK, FORTALEZA, JULY 15, 2015;

NDB’S GENERAL STRATEGY: 2017-2021;

NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK GENERAL STRATEGY FOR 2022 TO 2026;

THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL PAYMENTS: BRICS PAY AND THE EVOLVING FINANCIAL ORDER;

IQBAL; BRICS AS A DRIVER OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT;

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND; BRICS’ PHILOSOPHIES FOR DEVELOPMENT FINANCING AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR LICS;

NO AUTHOR; THE BRICS;

MARTYNOV; THE BRICS: PARADIGM SHIFT IN DEALING WITH NEW CHALLENGES;

KATZENSTEIN P.; CIVILIZATION IN WORLD POLITICS, BOOK 1-3;

THE BRICS ALLIANCE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOUTH AFRICA AND AFRICA

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