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From April 11 to 18, Namibia’s Minister of International Relations and Trade Selma Ashipala-Musavyi paid an official visit to China.

She met with government officials and business leaders in Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Beijing, looking to deepen Namibia’s partnership with China, especially in trade, investment and industrial development.

As China prepares to roll out zero-tariff treatment for African countries with diplomatic ties starting May 1, new opportunities are emerging for African exports and industrial growth. What does this mean for Namibia?

And with 2026 designated as the China-Africa Year of People-to-People Exchanges, how are the two countries working to bring their peoples closer together?

China Africa Talk sat down with Minister Ashipala-Musavyi on April 17.

China Africa Talk: How’s your trip so far? What are some of the achievements and priorities of your trip?

Selma Ashipala-Musavyi: Yes indeed, I’m leading a delegation to China. I started in the Guangdong Province, I was in Shenzhen and then after that I went to Guangzhou. I’m here to enhance and strengthen our bilateral relations, which come a long way. My focus here has been two-fold: one is to strengthen bilateral relations between the two governments, but also to enhance our bilateral trade, to invite Chinese business people to increasingly take an interest in Namibia, come and invest in Namibia, so that we can bring about a positive trade balance between our two countries. In terms of what I’ve achieved so far, I’ve seen that there’s been growing interest, everywhere we went, there was really genuine interest in Namibia, in what Namibia has to offer in terms of bilateral trade, in terms of tourism, also people-to-people ties.

China Africa Talk: Starting from May 1 this year, China will implement zero-tariff treatment to 53 African countries with diplomatic ties. What opportunities does this policy present for Namibia, particularly in terms of exports and industrial development?

Selma Ashipala-Musavyi: First I need to express Namibia’s thanks and appreciation to the government of the People’s Republic of China, because I think the gesture from China to extend the zero-tariff measure to African countries is a direct product of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation, FOCAC. So we are very happy about that. And we welcome that. How Namibia is going to benefit is manifold. First, it will build confidence between our two countries and also our two private sectors because non-tariff measures are a confidence building measure. Second, I think it will generate industrialization and optimize it and enhance it in order for us to gain more access to the Chinese market. I think it will accelerate the industrialization process in our country and also Africa in general. For Namibia, we’re a coastal state. All of our neighbors who do not have access to the sea depend on our port, so it means more businesses for the Walvis Bay Port because the cargo has to go through our port. And I think it will be really a way of what Africa has been talking. When we say the Africa we want, yes, we are endowed with resources, but we do not want to remain a source of raw materials. We want to add value to our products, be it minerals or agricultural products, so that we can become more relevant to the Chinese economy, but also to the global economy. So we are looking at it from that perspective and I think it’s a very welcome measure.

China Africa Talk: China and Namibia have enjoyed long-standing diplomatic relations. How would you characterize the bilateral ties? What milestones have stood out to you?

Selma Ashipala-Musavyi: Our bilateral diplomatic relationship is now clocking 36 years, but that is after Namibia’s independence. Our relationship started long before Namibia’s independence. As you know, both our countries have diplomatic missions. The bilateral visits between our two countries are outstanding. Every time during the inauguration of a new president in Namibia, China has always sent a very high level delegation to Namibia. So the relationship is strong. In terms of bilateral cooperation in all the areas that I’ve mentioned, agriculture, education, health, transport, fisheries, every sector we have bilateral cooperation. In fact, even the port that I was talking about, the deepening of the port happened with Chinese technology. What we are now embarking on currently is really to focus on the new and emerging sectors. Mining, as I said, value addition, green energy, value addition, AI that is now what we are focusing on because that is where you have an advantage. We come together. We create a win-win situation.

China Africa Talk: In today’s world of uncertainty, how can Namibia and China collaborate in addressing common challenges such as global trade and climate change, and safeguard the shared interests of developing countries? 

Selma Ashipala-Musavyi: Namibia and China work very close at the multilateral level. In most of the issues we have similar positions. Both of our countries believe in resolving disputes peacefully and I think we are going to continue to do that. When I served in New York in the Security Council, we serve with the Chinese delegation and we shall occasionally compare our notes. I think both of us strongly believe in multilateralism, especially now that we live in a world characterized by global tension. And we also compare notes occasionally. We believe that we need to have a world order that is beneficial to all the countries. We recently just came from a meeting of the World Trade Organization in Cameroon where we are also imposing similar position in terms of a global trade. So it’s an all-round relationship that is mutually beneficial to our two countries and we are committed to continuing that relationship.

 

The trading sessions of Monday, 30 March and Tuesday, 31 March 2026 may prove to be a turning point for the Ghana Stock Exchange.

At first glance, Monday appeared encouraging. The GSE Composite Index posted gains, suggesting that the sharp correction of previous days might be stabilising. However, beneath the surface, the GSE Financial Stocks Index continued its decline — a warning sign that the market’s core was already weakening.

By Tuesday, that warning became reality.

The Composite Index slipped back into negative territory, while the Financial Index extended its losing streak. What we are witnessing is not volatility — it is a clear structural transition.

From divergence to alignment — on the downside.

This two-day pattern is critical:

• Monday: A technical rebound masking internal weakness
• Tuesday: A failed follow-through confirming broader market fragility

In market terms, this is a classic “dead-cat bounce followed by rollover” — often the early stage of a more sustained correction.

The Real Story: Financials Are Driving the Shift

The financial sector has been the engine of the GSE rally in 2026. Its strong performance carried the broader market to exceptional highs earlier this year.

Now, that same sector is leading the decline.

This matters.

When market leaders begin to fall consistently, it typically signals:

• Profit-taking after overstretched valuations
• Repricing of risk
• Weakening investor confidence

And most importantly:

The broader market rarely holds up for long once its leading sector turns.

What Changed?

The events of these two days suggest a shift in investor behaviour:

• From “buy the dip” → to “reduce exposure”
• From momentum-driven optimism → to risk awareness
• From sector leadership → to sector liquidation

The rebound on Monday was not the start of recovery — it was a temporary pause in a developing downtrend.

Implications for the 24H+ Economy Narrative

This market development goes beyond technical trading patterns.

The rally on the Ghana Stock Exchange had, in part, reflected expectations of structural transformation, policy momentum, and improved economic prospects.

The current correction raises a critical question:

Is the market reassessing the credibility, timing, or execution risks of these expectations?

If financial stocks — typically the most sensitive to macroeconomic confidence — continue to weaken, it may indicate:

• Concerns about liquidity conditions
• Uncertainty around policy transmission
• Doubts about the pace of real economic impact

What to Watch Next

The coming days will be decisive:

• Will the Financial Index find a bottom?
• Can the Composite Index hold key support levels?
• Or will selling pressure broaden further?

If current trends persist, the market may be entering a more prolonged correction phase.

Final Thought

The events of 30–31 March are not just another fluctuation.

They represent a shift in market structure and sentiment.

And in markets, such shifts often matter more than the magnitude of any single day’s movement.

The signal is clear: the rally is losing its foundation. The question now is how deep the adjustment will go.

(THIS ARTICLE WAS PRODUCED WITH THE ASSISTANE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENE – AI.)

Over the past months, Ghana has experienced a remarkable macroeconomic shift:
• Inflation has dropped sharply — reportedly to below 4%
• The cedi has appreciated significantly
• Macroeconomic stability appears to be returning
At first glance, this looks like a decisive turnaround.
But a closer look reveals a more complex — and more important — reality.
________________________________________
Why inflation fell so quickly
The decline in inflation is real, but it is not primarily the result of cheaper credit or improved productivity.
Instead, it has been driven by a combination of:
• Strong appreciation of the cedi (making imports cheaper)
• Fiscal tightening under the IMF-supported programme
• External inflows increasing the supply of foreign currency
• Reduced demand for imports and foreign exchange
In simple terms:
More dollars entered the system, fewer dollars were needed — and prices fell.
________________________________________
Why high interest rates didn’t help SMEs
At the same time, the Bank of Ghana raised its policy rate to as high as 28% to tighten liquidity.
In theory, this should reduce borrowing and slow inflation.
In practice, however:
• Micro businesses still face loan rates of 25–35%
• SMEs still face borrowing costs near or above 20%
This reveals a fundamental issue:
Ghana’s monetary policy does not effectively reach the real economy.
Banks price risk, not just interest rates — and for SMEs and micro businesses, perceived risk remains high due to informality, lack of collateral, and weak financial records.
________________________________________
The hidden reality: a “temporary dollar abundance”
The strong cedi is not primarily the result of a structural export boom.
It is the result of:
• IMF inflows and external financial support
• Reduced external debt payments
• Fiscal restraint lowering import demand
• High interest rates making the cedi attractive
This created a situation where:
Dollars became temporarily abundant — and the cedi strengthened sharply.
________________________________________
What happens when the IMF programme ends?
This is the critical question.
When external inflows decline:
• Dollar supply will fall
• Import demand may recover
• External debt servicing will resume
And importantly:
These inflows will not automatically be replaced by foreign direct investment (FDI).
FDI requires time, confidence, infrastructure, and clear return prospects — it does not arrive overnight.
________________________________________
What this means for SMEs and micro businesses
Today’s impact (short term)
There are some positive effects:
• Lower inflation reduces cost pressures
• A stronger cedi makes imported inputs cheaper
• Greater macro stability improves business confidence
But the core constraint remains unchanged:
Access to affordable finance is still extremely limited
High interest rates continue to:
• restrict expansion
• limit investment
• keep businesses operating at subsistence levels
________________________________________
Future risks (medium term)
If the current situation reverses:
• The cedi may weaken again
• Inflation could rise
• Interest rates may remain high or increase further
For SMEs and micro businesses, this would mean:
• renewed cost pressures
• continued difficulty accessing credit
• persistent vulnerability to shocks
________________________________________
The structural issue: a broken transmission system
Ghana does not primarily face a monetary policy problem.
It faces a financial transmission problem:
• Policy changes do not reach SMEs
• Credit allocation is skewed toward low-risk borrowers
• Informal businesses remain excluded
________________________________________
What needs to change
Sustainable stability will not come from interest rates or external inflows alone.
It requires:
• Expansion of domestic production
• Development of agro-processing and industry
• Reduction of import dependence
• New financing mechanisms that reach SMEs directly
• Formalisation and integration of micro businesses into value chains
________________________________________
Final thought
Ghana’s recent progress is real — but it is not yet structural.
The IMF programme can stabilise the economy.
But only structural transformation can keep it stable.
And for micro businesses and SMEs, that transformation is not optional —
it is the difference between survival and sustainable growth.
________________________________________
#Ghana #Economy #SMEs #Inflation #ExchangeRate #EconomicTransformation #AfricaEconomy

 

In the 2026 State of the Nation Address, President John Dramani Mahama stated that more than one million Ghanaians gained employment between the first and third quarters of 2025, citing data from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS). The announcement was presented as evidence of strong economic recovery and improving labour market conditions.

The statement deserves careful examination.

What Exactly Was Claimed?

The President’s assertion refers specifically to employment gains between Q1 and Q3 of 2025. It does not formally refer to cumulative job creation since the government assumed office, but to developments within that three-quarter period.

However, the key analytical question is: what does the “one million jobs” figure actually measure?

Is it:

• A net increase in total employment?
• A cumulative count of individuals who entered employment at some point during the period?
• Or a broader labour market transition measure?

The distinction is crucial.

What Do the Official Statistics Show?

According to publicly released labour force data from the Ghana Statistical Service:

• Total employment rose from approximately 13.09 million in Q1 2025 to about 13.42 million in Q3 2025.
• This represents a net employment increase of roughly 330,000 persons.
• The national unemployment rate remained broadly stable at around 12–13%.
• Youth unemployment remained significantly higher (around or above 30%).
• A large share of employment remains informal or classified as vulnerable work.

These official figures clearly confirm that employment increased during the period. However, the net increase of approximately 330,000 differs substantially from the headline figure of one million.

This suggests that the one million figure likely reflects cumulative employment transitions or gross additions rather than the net change in total employment stock.

Stock vs Flow: The Statistical Core of the Debate

Labour market statistics can be presented in two fundamentally different ways:

1. Stock measures – the total number of people employed at a given point in time.
2. Flow measures – the number of people moving into employment during a period.

If one million individuals gained employment at some point between Q1 and Q3, this does not automatically imply that total employment increased by one million. Many jobs may have been temporary, seasonal, or offset by job losses elsewhere.

The publicly available GSS stock data shows a net increase of about 330,000. That is a meaningful gain — but it is not one million.

Without explicit clarification of methodology, headline comparisons risk conflating gross flows with net structural gains.

The Demographic Constraint

Even the net gain of 330,000 must be viewed in context.

Ghana’s labour force grows rapidly each year. Hundreds of thousands of young people enter working age annually. If employment rises by 330,000 while the labour force grows by a similar magnitude, unemployment rates may remain broadly unchanged — which is exactly what the data shows.

In other words:

Job creation must exceed labour force growth substantially to produce a significant decline in unemployment.

This makes sustained reductions in unemployment structurally challenging.

Structural Context: A Longer-Term Pattern

Assessments by the World Bank have repeatedly noted that Ghana’s economic growth over the past decade has not generated sufficient high-quality jobs relative to demographic expansion.

Key structural features include:

• Labour force growth outpacing formal job creation.
• Expansion concentrated in services and capital-intensive sectors.
• Agricultural job losses offsetting gains elsewhere.
• Persistent informality dominating the labour market.
• Stagnant or slow real wage growth in several sectors.

Against this structural background, achieving one million net sustainable jobs within three quarters would require extraordinary, broad-based, labour-intensive expansion — something not yet clearly reflected in the published employment stock data.

Employment Quantity vs Employment Quality

Even beyond the numerical debate, the composition of employment matters.

Critical questions include:

• How many new jobs are formal versus informal?
• Are they full-time and productive?
• Do they provide income security and social protection?
• Are real wages rising?

Ghana’s labour market remains heavily informal. Many new positions fall under self-employment or vulnerable categories. While such jobs contribute to employment statistics, they do not necessarily represent structural transformation.

Political Narrative and Statistical Precision

It is natural for governments to highlight positive economic developments. The increase in employment between Q1 and Q3 2025 is real and should be acknowledged.

However, economic credibility depends on statistical precision.

The publicly released data shows:

• A net employment increase of approximately 330,000.
• Stable unemployment rates.
• Continued structural challenges.

Therefore, while the claim of one million employment gains may refer to cumulative transitions, the net expansion in total employment stock during the period is substantially smaller.

Careful qualification is essential.

Why This Debate Matters

Ghana faces a demographic imperative. A rapidly expanding working-age population requires sustained, large-scale, productive job creation.

Headline figures — whether 330,000 or one million — are less important than structural transformation:

• Industrial expansion
• Productivity growth
• Formalisation of employment
• Youth labour absorption
• Real wage growth

Without these, statistical gains risk remaining cyclical rather than transformative.

Conclusion

The available data confirms that employment increased between Q1 and Q3 2025. That is a positive development.

However, publicly released figures from the Ghana Statistical Service indicate a net employment increase of approximately 330,000 — not one million — over the period.

If the one million figure refers to cumulative employment transitions rather than net job creation, this distinction should be clearly stated.

The broader policy challenge remains unchanged:

Ghana does not merely need large employment numbers. It needs sustained, labour-intensive, productivity-enhancing growth capable of outpacing demographic expansion.

 

Only then will employment statistics translate into lasting economic transformation.

The forthcoming Ghana 21C Economy Programme seeks to confront these structural bottlenecks directly, outlining a comprehensive reform framework focused on sustainable job creation, productivity transformation, and long-term economic resilience.

(This article was produced with the assistance of Artificial Intelligence –AI.)

Abstract

Over the past four decades, African economic reform programmes have largely been shaped by externally driven policy frameworks, short political cycles, and a narrow conception of growth that prioritises macroeconomic stability over structural transformation. While these approaches have delivered episodic gains, they have failed to produce resilient, inclusive, and self-sustaining economies. Ghana, often considered a model reform country, exemplifies these contradictions: repeated stabilisation efforts coexist with persistent fiscal fragility, industrial underdevelopment, regional inequality, and vulnerability to external shocks.

The Ghana 21C Economy Programme is proposed as a comprehensive, domestically anchored alternative. It is not a traditional adjustment programme, nor a political manifesto, but a system-level economic architecture designed for the realities of the 21st century. This article outlines the conceptual foundations of the Ghana 21C Economy Programme, compares it with prevailing African economic strategies, and explains why it offers a superior pathway for Ghana and, with appropriate national adaptations, for other African economies.

1. Overview of the Ghana 21C Economy Programme

1.1 Rationale and Conceptual Foundation

The Ghana 21C Economy Programme begins from a simple but often ignored premise: African economies are not underperforming because they lack plans, but because existing plans are structurally misaligned with political economy realities, demographic pressures, and global power asymmetries.

Conventional programmes tend to assume:

• A linear path from stability to growth to development;

Efficient transmission of macroeconomic reforms into productive investment;

• Strong institutional capacity that, in practice, does not exist;
• Political neutrality in economic policy implementation.

The Ghana 21C Programme rejects these assumptions. Instead, it treats the economy as a living system—one that must be engineered for resilience, redundancy, productivity, and social legitimacy. Growth is treated as a result, not a starting point.

1.2 Core Pillars of the Programme

The programme is structured around six mutually reinforcing pillars:

1. Productive Sovereignty
   The programme prioritises domestic value creation in agriculture, manufacturing, logistics, energy, and digital services. Rather than export dependence, it focuses on import substitution where economically rational, combined with selective export competitiveness.
2. Time-Based Economic Expansion
   Unlike traditional growth models, the Ghana 21C Programme incorporates time as an economic variable—extending productive hours through reliable energy and digitalisation, logistics, and decentralised industrial zones. This allows higher output without proportional capital intensity.
3. Decentralised Economic Architecture
   Economic activity is deliberately spatially distributed. District- and region-level production hubs are embedded into national value chains, reducing congestion, inequality, and political tension.
4. Financial System Re-engineering
   Instead of treating finance as a neutral intermediary, the programme redesigns financial flows to support long-term production. Development finance, blended capital, and profit-sharing mechanisms replace short-term rent extraction.
5. Institutional Load Management
   The programme assumes weak institutions and designs around them. It limits discretionary power, standardises implementation frameworks, and embeds legal, financial, and operational safeguards.
6. Social Contract Rebalancing
   Economic reform is anchored in visible, early gains for citizens: employment, income stability, local infrastructure, and predictability. Political legitimacy is treated as an economic input, not an afterthought.

1.3 What the Programme Is Not

The Ghana 21C Economy Programme is not:

• A structural adjustment programme;
• A donor-driven reform package;
• A short-term crisis response;
• A politically branded manifesto.

It is a long-horizon economic operating system, designed to survive electoral cycles and external shocks.

2. Comparison with Other Economic Programmes and Strategies in Africa

2.1 IMF- and World Bank-Supported Reform Frameworks

Across Africa, IMF and World Bank programmes remain the dominant economic reform vehicles. These frameworks typically prioritise:

• Fiscal consolidation;
• Debt sustainability;
• Monetary tightening;
• Market liberalisation.

While these measures can restore short-term stability, they consistently fail to transform productive structures. In Ghana, repeated IMF programmes have stabilised macro indicators while leaving the economy more debt-dependent and externally exposed.

The Ghana 21C Programme diverges fundamentally by:

• Treating fiscal discipline as a constraint, not a goal;
• Embedding growth in production systems rather than financial indicators;
• Designing reforms that function even under imperfect governance.

2.2 National Long-Term Visions and Development Plans

Many African countries have adopted long-term visions (e.g., Ghana’s Vision 2020, Kenya Vision 2030, Rwanda Vision 2050). These documents are often aspirational, listing sectoral targets without enforceable implementation architecture.

The Ghana 21C Programme differs by:

• Linking every strategic goal to an operational mechanism;
• Defining financing, governance, and accountability upfront;
• Avoiding overreliance on projected GDP growth or foreign investment inflows.

2.3 Industrialisation and “Big Push” Strategies

Several African governments have embraced industrialisation drives, industrial parks, and special economic zones. While conceptually sound, these efforts often fail due to:

• Energy unreliability;
• Weak domestic supply chains;
• Limited local ownership;
• Fiscal unsustainability.

The Ghana 21C Programme integrates industrialisation into a national production grid, ensuring energy, logistics, finance, and skills are synchronised. Industrial zones are not enclaves but nodes in a distributed system.

2.4 Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)

AfCFTA represents a major opportunity, but most African economies risk becoming net importers within the continent, rather than competitive producers.

The Ghana 21C Programme treats AfCFTA as a second-order opportunity, to be leveraged only after domestic productive capacity is secured. Trade liberalisation follows production, not the reverse.

2.5 Resource-Led and Commodity-Based Models

Resource-rich African countries continue to rely on commodity exports as growth engines. This model exposes economies to price volatility and weakens fiscal planning.

In contrast, the Ghana 21C Programme:

• Uses resources as inputs into domestic value chains;
• Prioritises processing, refining, and manufacturing;
• Limits revenue leakage through contractual and institutional safeguards.

3. Conclusion: Why the Ghana 21C Economy Programme Is the Best Option

3.1 Structural Realism

The greatest strength of the Ghana 21C Economy Programme is its structural realism. It does not assume ideal institutions, perfect markets, or benevolent political actors. Instead, it designs economic mechanisms that work under constraint.

3.2 Political and Social Sustainability

Unlike technocratic reform packages, the programme explicitly incorporates:

• Employment creation;
• Regional balance;
• Predictable income flows;
• Visible public benefits.

This makes it politically sustainable, reducing reform reversals and public resistance.

3.3 Scalability and Adaptability Across Africa

While rooted in Ghana’s context, the programme is modular. Core principles—productive sovereignty, decentralisation, time-based expansion, and financial re-engineering—can be adapted to:

• Resource-rich economies;
• Landlocked countries;
• Small island states;
• Post-conflict societies.

National adjustments are expected and encouraged.

3.4 A 21st Century Economic Architecture

The Ghana 21C Economy Programme is not a reaction to past failures; it is a response to future constraints: climate stress, demographic pressure, geopolitical fragmentation, and technological disruption.

By aligning production, finance, governance, and social legitimacy into a single architecture, it offers a credible alternative to the cycle of crisis management that has characterised African economic policy for decades.

Announcement

The full Ghana 21C Economy Programme, including its analytical framework, institutional design, implementation roadmap, and financial architecture, will be publicly released in the second quarter of 2026.’

 

The Government of Ghana’s 24H+ Economy Programme has brought new momentum to national development. It introduces innovative approaches in logistics, agro-processing, industrial parks, and export acceleration. However, despite emerging successes in selected regions, 24H+ does not address the most entrenched structural challenges—notably regional imbalance, unequal economic opportunity, financing bottlenecks, and the fragmentation of local economic systems. This underscores the continued necessity of the Ghana 21st-Century (21C) Economy Programme as the nation’s comprehensive framework for sustainable and inclusive      economic transformation.

1. Limitations of the 24H+ Programme

1.1 Uneven Spatial Impact

24H+ implementation has so far been concentrated in strategic corridors and districts with existing infrastructure or commercial activity. Many districts, such as Sekyere South, show minimal on-the-ground development. This highlights a pattern where growth accelerators benefit areas with existing momentum, leaving less-developed regions behind.

1.2 Absence of Regional Equalisation Mechanisms

While 24H+ promotes productivity, it lacks instruments to systematically reduce regional disparities. Without explicit mechanisms for equitable distribution, its gains risk reinforcing existing inequalities. In effect, 24H+ may cement the pattern where the rich districts and regions get richer while poorer districts get left behind.

1.3 Centralised Financing Dependence

The programme relies on donor funding, central government allocations, and bank financing. Districts with limited access to capital or political leverage may therefore remain disadvantaged, and local economies continue to face chronic financial constraints.

1.4 Limited District-Level Institutional Reform

24H+ enhances sectoral outputs but does not reform district governance or capacity to manage sustained economic transformation. Without institutional structures like Regional Transformation Teams or District Development Boards, local implementation and continuity are weak.

2. The 21C Economy Programme: A Structural Solution

2.1 Addressing Regional Imbalances

The 21C Programme provides a nationwide, structured framework to ensure equitable development across all regions and districts. Core instruments include:

• Regional Equalisation Mechanisms allocating resources based on development gaps.
• District Development Frameworks (DDFs) setting enforceable transformation standards.
• Regional Transformation Teams coordinating land, skills, infrastructure, and investment.

2.2 Resolving Financial Constraints

Through mechanisms such as the Ghana Development Fund, the 21C Infrastructure Bond Programme, and local public-private financing partnerships, the programme ensures predictable, decentralized, and sustainable financing for all districts.

2.3 Strengthening District Capacity

21C reforms institutional capacity at the district level through:

• Modern land management systems
• Integrated investment pipelines
• Technical support for agriculture, skills, and business development

These structures enable districts to absorb investment effectively and sustain economic progress.

2.4 Ensuring Inclusive Development

Where 24H+ accelerates growth in select regions, the 21C framework ensures benefits reach all districts, particularly those historically under-served or structurally disadvantaged.

3. Strategic Visual Representation

Figure 1: Comparative Impact of 24H+ vs. 21C Programmes

Region/District       24H+ Impact       21C Impact

—————–    ————     ————–

High-Income Districts   Rapid Growth     Sustained Growth + Equalisation

Middle-Income Districts Moderate Growth  Targeted Support + Capacity Building

Low-Income Districts    Minimal Growth   Accelerated Development + Financial Access

This diagram illustrates how 24H+ primarily accelerates existing advantages, while the 21C Programme actively corrects disparities and provides structural support to all districts.

4. Complementarity and Strategic Integration

• 24H+ acts as a productivity accelerator, boosting outputs in industrial, agricultural, and logistics sectors.
• 21C Economy Programme provides the structural foundation, ensuring spatial fairness, financing equity, and institutional stability.

Together, the two programmes can drive Ghana’s transformation; however, only the 21C Economy Programme guarantees inclusive, balanced, and sustainable development across all regions and districts, addressing the gaps that 24H+ alone cannot resolve.

This introduction establishes the rationale for the 21C Economy Programme as the cornerstone of Ghana’s long-term economic architecture, setting the stage for the detailed policy, operational, and financing frameworks that follow.

 

• The 24H+ Economy programme is ambitious and has momentum: the government has done the proper launch, legal amendments, initial financing scaffolding and private-sector signalling.
• However, momentum does not guarantee outcomes. The key bottlenecks will be the alignment of funding (including private capital), institutional coordination, realistic phasing, regional equity, and measurable implementation.
• Given Ghana’s current fiscal pressures (high debt service, limited public investment space), the programme needs to prioritise feasible, high-impact interventions rather than broad, “everything everywhere” ambition.

 

LAST WEEK, THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC), WANG YI, VISITED INDIA AND MET THERE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF THIS COUNTRY, NARENDRA MODI.

SINCE DECADES, THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE IN BORDER DISPUTES WHICH EVEN LEAD TO DESTHS, EVEN AS BOTH COUNTRIES ARE MEMBERS OF THE BRICS ORGANISATION. THESE TIMES SEEM TO BE OVER, AS BOTH MODI AND WANG YI FORMULATED SEVERAL AGREEMENTS, AND PRIME MINISTER MODI TNTENDS TO ATTEND THE SUMMIT OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION, A EURASIAN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANISATION, WHICH TAKES PLACE FROM THE 31ST OF AUGUST TO THE 1ST OF SEPTEMBER 2025. THERE, HE WILL PROBABLY MEET PRESIDENT XI JINPING OF THE PRC WHO WILL CHAIR THE 25TH MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF HEADS OF STATE OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION.

MANY COMMENTATORS DOUBT THAT THE BRICS ORGANISATION WILL BE SUCCESSFUL. ONE REASON FOR THIS DOUBT WAS THE ONGOING CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA. WELL, THE TWO COUNTRIES SEEM TO BE ON THE BEST WAY TO LEAVE THESE CONFLICTS BEHIND. THERE ARE TWO MAIN REASONS FOR THIS DEVELOPMENT:

1. THE TARIFFS IMPOSED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A. ON THE WORLD;
2. THE RECOGNITION THAT THE BRICS ORGANISATION IS THE BASE FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

AD 1: THE BEST SOLUTION TO MINIMISETHE EFFECTS OF THE TRUMP-IMPOSED TARIFFS IS TO SEEK THE COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. AND AS CHINA IS AN ECONOMICALLY STRONG AND RELIABLE PARTNER, IT IS NOT A MIRACLE THAT MANY COUNTRIES SEEK THE COOPERATION WITH CHINA. FORTUNATELY, THE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA HAS REALISED THAT AND SOUGHT FOR THE GHANA-CHINA BUSINESS SUMMIT, AFTER ITS PREDECESSOR JOINED THE BELT-AND-ROAD INITIATIVE OF CHINA IN 2018. THIS AGREEMENT BASED ON A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MoU) WAS PART OF EIGHT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN GHANA AND CHINA UNDER THE FORMER GHANAIAN GOVERNMENT.

AD: THE BRICS ORGANISATION FORMS THE FOUNDATION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WHICH HAS THE DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRIES OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH IN FOCUS. IT IS NOT A KIND OF “COOPERATION” THAT IS ACTING UNDER THE MOTTO; IF YOU DON’T WANT TO WORK WITH US THE WAY WE WANT IT, YOU WILL BE PUNISHED, WHICH IS THE WAY THE U.S.A. GOVERNMENT OPERATES, ESPECIALLY UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION. THE BRICS ORGANISATION OFFERS MANY ADVANTAGES ECONOMICALLY, FINANCIALLY, AND POLITICALLY. THEREFORE, IT IS ONLY UNDERSTANDABLE THAT INDIA AND CHINA MANIFEST THEIR WISH TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITIONS ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE BRICS ORGANISATION.

SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES – SOUTH AFRICA, EGYPT, AND ETHIOPIA – ARE ALREADY MEMBERS OF BRICS, AND NIGERIA JOINED THE LAST BRICS SUMMIT IN RIO DE JANEIRO THIS YEAR AS A PARTNER COUNTRY. SENEGAL IS CURRENTLY IN NEGOTIATIONS TO JOIN BRICS.

IT IS TIME FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA TO ALSO TAKE THE NEXT STEP TO START NEGOTIATIONS TO JOIN BRICS – FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE COUNTRY.

 

JUST  2 DAYS AGO I SAW A VIDEO ONLINE IN WHICH THE NEW CEO OF DALEX FINANCE SAYS THAT GHANA CAN EMBRACE CRYPTOCURRENCY FULLY. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT HE WILL SAY THAT AS DALEX WILL BENEFIT IMMENSELY IF CRYPTOCURRENCY IS “FULLY EMBRACED” BY GHANA HERE IS A BRIEF COMPARISON OF THE SCENARIOS IF CRYPTOCURRENCY IS FULLY EMBRACED (REGULATED, WIDELY USED, INTEGRATED IN FINANCE) IN 2028, AND IF IT IS NOT:

 Dalex Finance in 2028 — Scenario Comparison

Dimension	Scenario A: Full Crypto Adoption	Scenario B: Limited / Informal Adoption
Customer Base	Expanded: Dalex attracts not only traditional clients (salary workers, SMEs) but also young crypto users, remittance clients, and diaspora investors. Could double client base.	Mostly unchanged. Sticks with salary loans, fixed deposits, and traditional investment products. Growth limited to existing segments.
Products & Services	• Crypto savings / investment products (custodial wallets, stablecoin deposits). • Cross-border payments & remittances via blockchain. • Tokenized loan portfolios for investors. • Crypto-collateralized loans.	• Traditional loans (salary, business). • Fixed deposits. • Limited innovation — maybe some fintech upgrades but no new asset class.
Revenue Streams	• Transaction fees on crypto payments. • Custody fees for crypto assets. • Spread income from crypto-fiat conversions. • Higher margins from remittance services.	• Interest income on loans. • Small margins from deposits. • Fee inco bme stays limited (no new sources).
Market Position	Seen as an innovator and first-mover among non-bank financial institutions in Ghana. Could become the go-to regulated crypto-finance hub.	Remains a mid-tier financial institution, competing mainly on loans against other SDIs and microfinance companies.
Partnerships	Likely to attract partnerships with global crypto exchanges, fintechs, diaspora groups, and payment providers.	Limited to local partnerships with payroll systems, SMEs, and perhaps mobile money providers.
Profitability	Potential to multiply profits by 2–3x compared to a traditional path, if execution is right and regulation is supportive.	Modest profit growth (incremental, maybe 10–20% over 2025 levels), but vulnerable to erosion if customers migrate to crypto alternatives outside Dalex.
Risks	• Volatility exposure. • Cybersecurity threats. • Regulatory compliance costs. • Need for heavy investment in infrastructure and customer education.	• Risk of stagnation. • Losing younger, digitally savvy clients to crypto-native platforms. • Dependence on government salary-loan base makes it vulnerable to public sector wage reforms or defaults.

COMPARISON PRODUCED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI).

THE TAKEAWAY FROM BOTH SCENARIOS IS THE FOLLOWING:

SCENARIO A (CRYPTO INTEGRATION) – IF DALEX MOVES BOLDLY AND EARLY, IT COULD BENEFIT ENORMOUSLY, BECOMING A LEADER IN DIGITAL FINANCE, EXPANDING PRODUCTS, DOUBLING ITS CUSTOMER BASE AND POTENTIALLY TRIPLING ITS PROFITABILITY BY 2028.

SCENARIO B (NO INTEGRATION) – DALEX WOULD STILL EXIST, BUT GROWTH WOULD BE MODEST. IT RISKS BECOMING LESS RELEVANT, ESPECIALLY AMONG YOUNGER GHANAIANS AND DIASPORA USERS WHO INCREASINGLY DEMAND CRYPTO-ENABLED SERVICES.

BUT IS GHANA REALLY FULLY CRYPTO-READY, AS THE DALEX CEO CLAIMS?

I LEAN TO THE POSITION THAT “GHANA IS PARTIALLY READY”. IN MANY RESPECTS, THE FOUNDATIONS ARE BEING BUILT, AND WITH POLITICAL WILL AND CAREFUL IMPLEMENTATION, IT CAN MOVE TOWARD FULL READINESS PERHAPS WITHIN A FEW YEARS. BUT GHANA IS NOT YET AT A POINT WHERE CRYPTO CAN BE FULLY EMBRACED WITHOUT RISK. IF  “FULLY EMBRACED” MEANS MAKING CRYPTO AS NORMAL AS BANKS, ETC. – WITH ALL PLAYERS REGULATED, LEGAL CLARITY, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND STABLE INTEGRATION INTO THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM – THEN GHANA STILL HAS STEPS TO TAKE.

THE SAME CEO IS QUOTED TO HAVE SAID THAT ” THE STARS ARE ALIGNED FOR GHANA”, THE QUESTIONS ARISING ARE NOW WHETHER THE STARS ARE REALLY ARISING FOR GHANA, AND WHY THE CEO MADE THE TWO REMARKS ABOUT CRYPTOCURRENCY AND THE STARS.’WITH THE REMARK ABOUT THE STARS, THE CEO COULD MEAN TWO DIFFERENT THINGS:

— HE COULD MEAN THE APPRECIATION OF THE CEDI AGAINST THE US-DOLLAR. HERE, SOME POSITIVE ASPECTS CAN BE SEEN. THE APPRECIATION OF THE CEDI IS STRONG (ALTHOUGH PARTLY CAUSED BY A GENERALLY WEAK DOLLAR); FORECASTS FROM REPUTABLE INSTITUTIONS LIKE FITCH EXPECT FURTHER STRENGTHENING; A STRONGER CEDI IMPROVES THE CONFIDENCE IN THE MACROECONOMY, WHICH IS ONE OF THE STARS TO BE ALIGNED.

BUT THERE ARE ALSO CAVEATS: THE TREND MAY NOT BE STABLE OR DURABLE; THE VOLATILITY RISK REMAINS HIGH; SOME REPORTS SUGGEST THAT “GAINS CRUMBLE” OR ARE UNDER STRESS; FORECASTS DEPEND ON FISCAL STABILITY, EXTERNAL BALANCES AND FAVOURABLE GLOBAL CONDITIONS.

AS A CONCLUSION WE CAN SAY THAT FOR THE CEDI SEVERAL STARS ARE ALIGNING, BUT IT IS NOT A PERFECT ALIGNMENT YET. THE RISK OF REVERSAL IS REAL, AND THE GAINS MAY STILL BE FRAGILE. THEREFORE, IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT TO A MEANINGFUL EXTENT THE STARS ARE ALIGNING, BUT IT IS A DELICATE BALANCE, NOT A GUARANTEED DESTINY.

IF THE CEO MEANT THE CRYPTOCURRENCY WITH THE STARS, IT IS MORE OR LESS THE SAME SCENARIO: THE STARS FOR THE CRYPTOCURRENCY ARE ALIGNED IN AS FAR AS

— THE DEMAND EXISTS;

— THERE IS A POLICY SHIFT OF THE BANK OF GHANA;

— THERE IS AN INFRASTRUCTURE BASE – FINTECH AND MOBILE MONEY ARE STRONG;

— THERE IS A GLOBAL MOMENTUM – OTHER A FRICAN COUNTRIES GO INTO THE SAME DIRECTION, AND GHANA RISKS TO LAG BEHIND.

BUT NOT ALL STARS ARE ALIGNED YET:

— THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IS INCOMPLETE;

— CONSUMER RISKS – SCAMS, VOLATILITY, WEAK FINANCIAL LITERACY OF POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS;

— INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS – INTERNET RELIABILITY, CYBERSECURIITY CAPACITY, ELECTRICITY STABILITY.

AS A TAKEAWAY WE CAN SAY THAT THE PHRASE OF THE CEO – IF IT IS ALSO MEANT FOR THE CRYPTOCURRENCY – IS MORE AN OPTIMISTIC FRAMING THAN REALITY. MANY OF THE STARS IN GHANA POINT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, BUT THE CONSTELLATION IS NOT COMPLETE.

SO, AS A CONCLUSION OF THIS ARTICLE, WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE REMARKS OF THE DALEX FINANCE CEO?

1. HE WANTS TO SHAPE THE NARRATIVE (HE IS FRAMING GHANA AS BEING AT A TURNING POINT WHICH CREATES OPTIMISM AND POSITIONS GHANA NOT AS A STRUGGLING ECONOMY, BUT AS A LEADER IN DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT;
2. HE WANTS TO INFLUENCE REGULATORS AND POLICYMAKERS. HE ASKS POLICYMAKERS NOT TO DELAY, BECAUSE THE TIME “IS RIGHT”.
3. HE WANTS TO POSITION DALEX AS FORWARD-LOOKING BY LINKING MACRO STABILITY WITH DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION, WHICH HELPS THE COMPANY TO ATTRACT PARTNERS, INVESTORS AND CUSTOMERS;
4. HE WANTS TO EMPHASISE THE COMMERCIAL INTEREST.
5. IN SHORT, HE CREATES OPTIMISM FOR GHANA’S ECONOMY AND DIGITALISATION, AND FOR HIS COMPANY DALEX BY LINKING IT TO THIS GHANA ECONOMICAL TRANSFORMATION. I WOULD NOT BE SO POSITIVE CONCERNING THE ECONOMICAL TRANSFORMATION IN GHANA, BECAUSE FOR MY UNDERSTANDING THERE ARE TOO MANY SERIOUS CHALLENGES TO OVERCOME, BUT I WISH JOE JACKSON – THE CEO OF DALEX FINANCE – HIS COMPANY- (AND GHANA FOR THAT MATTE) GOOD LUCK.

 

As global power balances shift, new alliances are redefining how countries pursue growth and influence. One of the most prominent platforms reshaping international cooperation today is BRICS—the bloc originally formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, and now expanding to include new members from Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.

In this changing landscape, Ghana should not remain a bystander. While immediate membership might be premature, taking steps toward observer status would allow Ghana to participate in the conversations shaping the next phase of global economic realignment—and to prepare for eventual full membership when the timing is right.

The Case for Engagement

1. Diversifying Ghana’s Global Partnerships

For decades, Ghana’s economic orientation has leaned heavily toward Western institutions—such as the IMF, World Bank, and EU trade systems. While these partnerships have brought investment and stability, they have also created structural dependence.
Engaging with BRICS offers Ghana access to alternative sources of finance, technology, and markets—particularly from China and India, which are already major investors in infrastructure, manufacturing, and digital services across Africa. It would broaden Ghana’s economic diplomacy and reduce overreliance on traditional Western creditors.

2. Access to Development Finance

The New Development Bank (NDB), established by BRICS, is emerging as a credible complement to the Bretton Woods system. Membership could eventually allow Ghana to access long-term, low-interest financing for industrial, energy, and agricultural transformation—key pillars of the country’s 24H+ Economy programme.
Even as an observer, Ghana could begin building the relationships and technical understanding necessary to benefit from NDB operations in the region.

3. South–South Cooperation and Technology Transfer

BRICS promotes practical cooperation among developing economies. For Ghana, this could mean technology sharing in agriculture, renewable energy, and digital governance—fields where emerging economies like India and Brazil have made remarkable progress. It aligns with Ghana’s ambitions to industrialise, modernise governance, and expand job-creating sectors.

The Risks and Realities

1. Balancing Global Relationships

Joining BRICS too quickly could unsettle Ghana’s longstanding relationships with Western partners and financial institutions. The country still relies on IMF-supported programmes and Western market access for exports such as cocoa, gold, and manufactured goods.
A hasty shift might therefore be interpreted as a geopolitical realignment rather than an economic diversification—potentially risking investment flows and diplomatic goodwill.

2. Limited Influence in a Large Bloc

Even within BRICS, influence is uneven. China and India dominate decision-making, while smaller economies often find their voices diluted. Ghana must realistically assess how much leverage it could exercise within such a structure—and ensure that its engagement aligns strictly with national interests.

3. Governance and Institutional Readiness

Effective participation in BRICS initiatives demands strong policy coordination, data systems, and project governance. Ghana must strengthen its institutional capacity—particularly in trade, finance, and industrial policy—to ensure that any partnership translates into tangible domestic gains rather than symbolic diplomacy.

A Phased Approach Makes Sense

Given these considerations, the most strategic path forward is a gradual, two-phase approach:

• Phase 1 – Observer Engagement:
  Ghana should formally seek observer status at BRICS summits and the NDB. This would provide a learning platform, open diplomatic channels, and allow Ghana to assess the financial and political mechanisms of the bloc from within—without committing to full alignment.
• Phase 2 – Medium- to Long-Term Membership:
  Once macroeconomic stability improves and institutional readiness deepens, Ghana could pursue full membership. By that stage, BRICS will likely have matured into an even more diverse and balanced grouping, offering Ghana significant influence as one of Africa’s leading democracies and innovation hubs.

Conclusion: The Time to Prepare Is Now

In a multipolar world, Ghana cannot afford to remain dependent on a single geopolitical or financial axis. The country’s future prosperity will depend on strategic diversification—politically, economically, and diplomatically.

Seeking observer status in BRICS now would be a low-risk, high-return move: it would expand Ghana’s options, strengthen its voice in global development debates, and position it for deeper cooperation in the future.

Full membership may not be immediate, but the journey should begin now—on Ghana’s own terms, guided by its long-term economic vision and regional leadership ambitions.

(This article was prepared with the assistance of AI.)